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Abstract 
 
Managing volcanic hazards: An Actor-Network of technology and 
communication 
The scientific and socio-political dimensions of volcanic hazards have been 
realigned since the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in 2010, and have highlighted the 
need for volcanic activity to be studied from interdisciplinary perspectives. By 
focussing on communication, adaptability and resilience, this research explains 
the links between hazard management and social constructivism. The research 
question asks how Iceland’s networked approach to managing volcanoes can be 
understood by analysing the development of communication channels between 
human stakeholders and non-human technical devices and systems. Fieldwork 
was conducted in both Iceland and the UK, and a mixed methods approach was 
used to engage with the network. Research methods consisted of semi-structured 
interviews, participant observations and archival research.  
Findings explain the evolution of knowledge exchange, the value of 
technical innovation, and the need for interactions between local, national and 
international stakeholders. The study concludes that actors are increasingly 
empowered by the use of participatory technologies within hazard management, 
and the development of collaborative engagements between stakeholder 
communities from scientific and socio-political backgrounds. This research is 
relevant as it illustrates how the adaptive capacity of hazard networks can be 
expanded, potentially influencing the approaches that are taken to manage 
volcanic hazards in less economically developed contexts. In addition, this study 
can encourage continued interaction between scientists, at-risk communities and 
the aviation industry in multi-hazard environments such as Iceland.  
 
Keywords: Actor-Network, Communication, Co-production, Information, 
Resilience, Translation 
 
 
 
 
   4 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank the many individuals and agencies who have contributed to 
this research over the past four years, their support and advice has allowed for a 
successful research experience and the completion of this PhD.  
Firstly, many thanks to my supervisors, Professor Michael Woods of Aberystwyth 
University and Dr. Carina Fearnley of UCL, whose consistent and tireless support 
and influence has provided both the guidance and the confidence required to 
carry out this research. I would like to thank Carina for being there for me 
throughout and for the faith and trust that has been placed in me, particularly at 
the challenging times in the first year of the PhD when the structure of the 
research had to be changed. I appreciate the time that has been invested in this 
research and the provision of both encouragement and morale. My thanks also to 
Professor Deborah Dixon of the University of Glasgow, whose inspiration 
before the beginning of the PhD encouraged me to take the opportunity and 
helped to construct the interdisciplinary research that has been carried out.  
Thanks also to Aberystwyth University, the Department of Geography and Earth 
Sciences, and the Royal Geographical Society, without whose financial support, in 
the form of the respective Doctoral Career Development Scholarship, 
Postgraduate Discretionary Research Fund, and Geographical Club Award, the 
fieldwork conducted in this research could not have taken place. I am most 
grateful and hope that the research I have done will contribute to the integrity 
and profile of those institutions. 
I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the many staff members and 
postgraduate students at Aberystwyth University, and particularly the Department 
of Geography and Earth Sciences, who I have enjoyed working alongside and 
who are a credit to their institute. I thank them for both their direct input into the 
PhD, and also for their contribution to the skills and teaching opportunities that I 
have undertaken over the course of the four years. I would particularly like to 
thank Dr. Gareth Hoskins and Dr. Rhys Dafydd Jones who have offered their 
guidance and advice. My postgraduate colleagues have been incredibly supportive, 
particularly Robert Mackinnon, Marton Lendvay, Justa Hopma and Sam Saville, 
   5 
 
whose support and sharing of PhD experiences has provided further 
encouragement.  
My utmost thanks and appreciation also go to the participants who engaged with 
the fieldwork that has been conducted in both Iceland and the UK, and also to 
those who I have spoken to via Skype. These include the staff, both technical and 
administrative, at the Icelandic Met Office, Isavia, the University of Iceland 
(Institute of Earth Sciences), and the Department of Civil Protection, each of 
whom have played a leading role in facilitating the research findings. The 
fieldwork experience was thoroughly enjoyable and I was shown immense levels 
of unwavering kindness and support. I would also like many of the other 
contributors, direct and indirect, based in Iceland, such as the Icelandic Search 
and Rescue, the Icelandic Red Cross and Icelandair. I am most grateful for being 
able to explore not only the hazard network in Iceland, but also the country and 
its culture. My thanks also go to the Met Office in the UK (particularly the 
London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre), the Civil Aviation Authority, the Cabinet 
Office, the British Geological Survey, EasyJet, and the Department for 
Transport. I would also like to thank, amongst others, the Norwegian Institute 
for Air Research, Nicarnica Aviation, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization, and academics from many universities in both the UK and New 
Zealand (Cabot Institute, Bristol, Institute of Hazard, Risk and Resilience, 
Durham, Department of Earth Sciences, Cambridge, the School of 
Environmental Sciences, UEA and many others). 
My thanks also to the many conferences, committee meetings and working 
groups that have been attended over the course of this PhD, and for the 
attendees who have offered me their advice. These include the Royal 
Geographical Society annual conference in London, the GEORISK conference 
in Madrid, the Dealing with Disasters Conference in Newcastle, the Volcanic and 
Magmatic Studies Group conference in Norwich and many more. 
Many thanks to my PhD examiners, Professor Peter Merriman of Aberystwyth 
University and Professor David Chester of the University of Liverpool, for their 
invaluable advice and recommendations. 
Finally, my thanks and gratitude to my family and friends, who have given me 
belief, motivation and overwhelming support throughout. 
   6 
 
 
 
List of Contents 
 
Abstract…………………………………………………………………...….. 3 
Acknowledgements………………………………………………...……....... 4 
List of Contents…………………………………………………………...…. 6 
List of Figures……………………………………………………………...... 
11 
List of Tables………………………………………………………...……… 
13 
List of Acronyms and Translations…………………………………...……. 
14 
Quotation……………………………………………………………………. 16 
 
Chapter One: Introducing the research…………………...……………….. 
17 
 1.1: Research background…………………………………………………… 
18 
 1.2: Research question ………………………...…………………………….. 
19 
 1.3: Research objectives and location……………………………………….... 
20 
 1.4: Rationale for conducting the research……………………………...……. 
21 
 1.5: Thesis structure ……………………………………………………….... 
22 
 
Chapter Two: A review of volcanic hazards, Actor-Network Theory and co-
production…………………………………………………………………... 24 
 2.1: Transforming hazard and risk management: A sociological perspective…. 
24 
  2.1.1: Performing hazard discourse through the construct of a network………… 
25 
  2.1.2: The interdisciplinary expansion of hazard management……………........ 
29 
   7 
 
  2.1.3: Recognising the role and influence of a technical infrastructure…………... 
34 
  2.2: Constructing and communicating knowledge…………………………...... 
36 
  2.2.1: Defining Social Constructionism: Links to science and technology………. 
37 
  2.2.2: Applying constructivism to hazard management……………....………. 
39 
  2.3: Actor-Network Theory: Applying sociology to hazard management……... 
41 
  2.3.1: Geographical engagements with Actor-Network Theory………………... 
42 
              2.3.2: Understanding the emergence of Actor-Network Theory………………... 
43 
  2.3.3: Establishing links between Actor-Network Theory and natural hazards… 
50 
  2.4: Understandings of co-production…………………………...………...…. 
56 
  2.4.1: Co-production and the management of hazards………………………. 
59 
  2.5: Hazard management, Actor-Network Theory and co-production................. 
61  
  2.6: Outlining the subsidiary research questions……………………………… 
63 
 
Chapter Three: A methodology for studying Iceland’s volcanic hazard 
network from an interdisciplinary perspective…...………………………... 
64 
 3.1: Methodological context…………………………………………………. 
64 
3.1.1: Philosophical perspectives…………………………………………. 65 
3.1.2: Methods adopted by similar studies of volcanic hazards……………….... 
69 
 3.2: Research timeframe and location………………………………………... 
70 
  3.2.1: Fieldwork conducted in Iceland (4th March 2014 - 8th April 2014)…….. 
70 
              3.2.2: Fieldwork conducted in the UK (August and October 2014)…………... 
73 
   8 
 
 3.3: Research methods and materials……………………….……………….... 
74  
  3.3.1: Semi-structured interviewing………………………………………. 74 
  3.3.2: Participant observations…………………………………………... 81 
  3.3.3: Archival research……………………………………………….... 
85 
 3.4: Research ethics………………………………………………………...... 
88 
  3.5: Qualitative data analysis…………………………………………………. 
89 
 
Chapter Four: A contextual overview of Iceland’s hazard network…......... 
91 
4.1: Icelandic volcanism: Unearthing the need for a complex hazard network... 
91 
  4.1.1: The geology of Icelandic volcanism…………………………………... 
92 
  4.1.2: Anthropogenic vulnerabilities associated with Iceland’s volcanoes……….... 
94 
4.2: From Eyjafjallajökull to Bárðarbunga: Developing Iceland’s hazard 
network…………………………………………………………………….... 
95 
4.2.1: Instigating change: The eruption of Eyjafjallajökull (20th March - 23rd June 
2010)………………………………………………………………... 96 
4.2.2: Post-Eyjafjallajökull: The eruption at Grímsvötn (22nd May - 25th May 
2011)………………………………………………………………... 99 
4.2.3: Between Grímsvötn and Bárðarbunga (29th August - 27th February 2015): 
Explaining FutureVolc and the Emergency Response Coordination Centre…… 
102 
           4.3: The dynamics of Iceland - UK relations……………………………….... 
112 
  4.3.1: Explaining the UK’s intervention………………………………… 
112 
  4.3.2: The VolcIce exercise……………………………………………. 114 
  4.3.3: Beyond VolcIce: A complex affiliation……………………………... 
118 
           4.4: Concluding remarks…………………………………………………...... 
119 
 
   9 
 
Chapter Five: Exploring power dynamics and technical actors: Illustrating 
collaboration and trust in Iceland’s hazard network………………...…… 
120 
5.1: Renegotiating power relations:  The evolution of actor communication… 
121 
5.1.1: Leveraging power: The transient presence of coordinators……………… 
122 
5.1.2: Collaboration and power: The formation and evolution of the VolcIce ash 
monitoring exercise……………………………………………………. 
125 
5.1.3: Repositioning and renegotiating power: Engagement, participation and social 
media……………………………………………………………….. 129 
5.1.4: The source of power and responsibility: Decision-making and evolution…. 
136 
 5.2: Valuing technical actors: From innovation to evolution………………… 
140 
5.2.1: Reforming space and time: The innovation of the screen-world…………. 
140 
5.2.2: Context and standardisation: The use and symbiosis of technical actors…. 
142 
5.2.3: Exploring technological innovation: The emergence of the Airborne Volcanic 
Object Imaging Detector……………………………………………….. 
143 
5.2.4: Valuing information: The Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling 
Environment………………………………………………………… 147 
5.2.5: Negotiating technical actors: The importance of translation……………. 
152 
  5.2.6: The reliance of stakeholders on technical actors………………………. 
154 
 5.3: Conclusions…………………………………………………………… 157 
 
Chapter Six: Transcending scale: The emergence of a borderless hazard 
network in Iceland…………………………………………………………. 
158 
6.1: Transcending scale: The fragmentation of boundaries…………………. 
160 
6.1.1: Positioning hazard response and monitoring beyond Iceland: The European 
Response Coordination Centre and the FutureVolc project…………………. 
160 
   10 
 
6.1.2: Contesting boundary spaces: The role of information hubs and 
partnerships………………………………………………………….. 
163 
6.1.3: Communicating at the boundary: Distributing knowledge and reducing 
complexity………………………………………………………….... 166 
6.1.4: Technical actors and scale: Improving adaptability by deconstructing 
borders……………………………………………………………… 170 
 6.2: Managing and calibrating data: The evolution of hazard information…… 
172 
6.2.1: Communicating open data: An assessment of the impact on scale………. 
173 
6.2.2: Representing hazard information: Scale and the mapping of risk………. 
174 
  6.2.3: The value of calibrating data: From adaptation to interpretation………. 
176 
 6.3: Concluding remarks………………………………………………….... 180 
 
Chapter Seven: Defining actors and stakeholder communities in Iceland’s 
hazard network…………………………………………………………….. 182 
7.1: Deconstructing institutional entities: The contentious role of individual 
actors……………………………………………………………………… 183 
  7.1.1: Institutional flexibility: The impact on the positioning of actors………… 
183 
  7.1.2: The persistence of heterogeneity……………………………………. 
187 
  7.1.3: Institutions and individual actors: The rejection of ideology……………. 
188 
7.2: Institutions, actors and expertise: Cultivating change within stakeholder 
communities……………………………………………………………….. 
191 
           7.2.1: The relevance of intermediaries in conveying expertise…………………... 
191 
7.2.2: Sharing, transferring and coalescing expertise: The role of institutions…….. 
193 
7.3: Concluding comments………………………………………………..... 
196 
 
Chapter Eight: Research conclusions and recommendations…………… 
197 
   11 
 
 8.1: Responding to the subsidiary research questions………………………. 
197 
 8.2: Responding to the research question and outcomes……………………. 
199 
                    8.2.1: Establishing the research outcomes…………………………………… 
200 
8.3: Research limitations…………………………………………………… 
203 
8.4: Recommendations……………………………………………………... 
205 
 
References…………………………………………………...…………….. 206 
Appendices………………………………………………………………… 255 
 
Appendix One: Research materials for methodology……………………. 
255 
1.1: Interview transcript examples………………………………………….. 
255 
 1.2: Interview questions (preliminary guide)……………………………….... 
259 
 
Appendix Two: Fieldwork supplements………………………………...... 
262 
2.1: Informed consent form (used for Iceland and UK-based fieldwork)……. 
262 
2.2: Information document (used for Iceland and UK-based fieldwork)…….. 
264 
 
Appendix Three: Participant observation and archival research 
examples…………………………………………………………………… 266 
3.1: Participant observation: Field diary example…………………………… 
266 
3.2: Archival research: Internet-based resources……………………….......... 
267 
 
Appendix Four: Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies - Minutes…. 
269 
   12 
 
4.1: 5th May 2010: Examples of selected discussion extracts and actions……. 
269 
4.2: 19th May 2010: Examples of selected discussion extracts and actions…… 
271 
 
Appendix Five: VolcIce exercise materials………………………………. 273 
5.1: VolcIce report for the observed exercise (March 2014)………….…….... 
273 
5.2: VolcIce exercise debrief transcript example (field diary)……………….... 
276 
  
Appendix Six: Bárðarbunga……………………………………………….. 
277 
6.1: Update report log example - 29th August 2014…………………………. 
277 
 6.2: Daily factsheet - 26th September 2014…………………………………... 
279 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
   13 
 
Figure 2.1: An illustration of the transition from purification to translation 
(Latour, 1993, 
p.11)……………………………………………………………………. 44 
Figure 3.1: The location of the research sites in Southern Iceland (Accessed: June 
2016)…………………………………………………………………………. 71 
Figure 3.2: Location of the key monitoring and response institutions in 
Reykjavík, (Accessed: June 
2016)………………………………………………………… 71 
Figure 4.1: The geographical location of Iceland’s volcanic systems (Accessed: 
May 2016)…………………………………………………………………….. 92 
Figure 4.2: A diagram illustrating Iceland’s geology (Thordarson and Larsen, 
2007, 
p.121)………………………………………………………………………… 93 
Figure 4.3: The systematic structure of the civil protection service in Iceland 
(Elíasson, 2014, p.104)………………………………………………………... 96 
Figure 4.4: A satellite photograph of the ash plume from Eyjafjallajökull 
(Accessed: May 2016)……………………………………………………….... 98 
Figure 4.5: Catalogue of Icelandic Volcanoes (Accessed: May 2016)…………. 
106 
Figure 4.6: The testing process for the airborne volcanic object imaging detector 
(Witze, 2013, p.423)…………………………………………………………. 108 
Figure 4.7: Technology Readiness Levels (Accessed: August 2016)…………. 
109 
Figure 4.8: The area of responsibility assigned to each Volcanic Ash Advisory 
Centre (Accessed: May 2016)………………………………………………… 
113 
Figure 4.9: A template for a standard SIGMET (Accessed: May 2016)………. 
115 
Figure 4.10: The position of the Numerical Atmospheric Dispersion Modelling 
Environment in the monitoring network (Accessed: May 2015)……………… 
116 
Figure 5.1: The use of Facebook during the Bárðarbunga eruption (Accessed: 
January 2016)………………………………………………………………... 135 
Figure 5.2: A time-adjustable graphic showing sulfur pollution during 
Bárðarbunga (Accessed: January 2016)………………………………………. 
136 
Figure 5.3: The use of Twitter by the Department of Civil Protection during the 
eruption of Bárðarbunga (Accessed: December 2015)………………………... 
138 
Figure 5.4: A graph displaying ash dispersal information (Accessed: January 
2015)……………………………………………………………………….... 149 
   14 
 
Figure 5.5: An output showing volcanic ash Nephanalysis (Accessed: August 
2016)……………………………………………………………………….... 150 
Figure 6.1: An illustration of the regions covered by Iceland’s ‘supersite’ 
(Accessed: March 2016)…………………………………………………….... 
162 
Figure 6.2: A real-time graphic illustrating gas dispersion during the Bárðarbunga 
eruption (Accessed: March 2015)…………………………………………….. 
180 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   15 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 3.1: Fieldwork timetable for Iceland (March - April 2014)……………… 
73 
Table 3.2: Interviews conducted in Iceland (March - April 2014)……………... 
75 
Table 3.3: Interviews conducted in the UK (August and October 2014)……… 
76 
Table 3.4: Interviews conducted via Skype (April - December 2014)………….. 
77 
Table 3.5: Participant observations conducted in Iceland (March - April 
2014)…………………………………………………………………………. 82 
Table 3.6: Participant observations conducted in the UK (October 2014)……. 
83 
Table 3.7: Archival research completed as part of the fieldwork……………… 
86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Acronyms and Translations 
 
ANT: Actor-Network Theory 
AT: Assemblage Theory  
ATC: Air Traffic Control 
AVOID: Airborne Volcanic Object Identifier and Detector 
BGS: British Geological Survey  
CAA: Civil Aviation Authority (UK)  
COBR: Cabinet Office Briefing Room 
CP: Civil Protection (Iceland) 
DfT: Department for Transport 
EASA: European Aviation Safety Agency  
ERCC: Emergency Response Coordination Centre  
FMI: Finnish Meteorological Institute 
Höfn: Höfn í Hornafirði 
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization  
ICE-SAR: Icelandic Association for Search and Rescue  
IMO: Icelandic Meteorological Office  
Isavia: Icelandic Aviation Service  
LIDAR: Light Detection and Ranging 
London VAAC: London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre  
MOCCA: Meteorological Office Civil Contingencies Aircraft 
NAME: Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment  
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
   17 
 
NERC: Natural Environment Research Council  
NHP: Natural Hazards Partnership 
NILU: Norwegian Institute for Air Research  
SAGE: Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies   
SCOT: Social Construction of Technology 
SIGMET: Significant Meteorological Information 
SSK: Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
STREVA: Strengthening Resilience in Volcanic Areas 
STS: Science and Technology Studies 
TRL: Technology Readiness Level(s)  
UoI: University of Iceland  
USGS: United States Geological Survey 
VALS: Volcano Alert Level System 
VAORG: Volcanic Ash Observations Review Group 
VAR: Volcanic Ash Reports 
VEI: Volcanic Explosively Index 
Vík: Vík í Mýrdal 
VolcIce: VOLcanic ash exercise in ICEland  
WOVOdat: World Organization of Volcano Observatories 
 
List of Icelandic translations 
Department of Civil Protection: Almannavarnir 
Environment Agency of Iceland: Umhverfisstofnun 
Icelandic Association for Search and Rescue: Slysavarnarfélagið Landsbjörg 
Icelandic Met Office: Veðurstofa Íslands 
Icelandic Police: Lögreglan 
Icelandic Red Cross: Rauði krossinn 
Laki: Lakagígar 
University of Iceland: Háskóli Íslands 
 
 
   18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disaster risk reduction needs theory in order to make sense of apparently chaotic 
events. In effect, theory is the road map of mitigation, response and recovery. 
David E. Alexander 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: Introducing the research 
 
Hazard management can increasingly be defined by networked infrastructures, 
both within and beyond affected regions. Networked infrastructures consist of 
dynamic and interwoven channels of communication and resources (Graham and 
Marvin, 2001); their design and flexibility are integral to explaining stakeholder 
connections, and this has been illustrated in a natural hazards context by leading 
scientific institutions connecting with stakeholder communities from socio-
political backgrounds. This thesis argues that the management of volcanic 
hazards can be studied from the perspective of networked infrastructures; for 
example, in Europe and North America, sophisticated networks of 
communication can exist in areas where volcanic activity both originates and 
impacts. These networks include the services and programs of the United States 
Geological Survey, and Iceland’s approach to managing volcanic hazards.  
Infrastructures were transformed following three major volcanic 
eruptions in Iceland between 2010 and 2014. The first of these eruptions, 
Eyjafjallajökull in April 2010, exposed the fragility of socio-political systems to 
Icelandic volcanism. For instance, the susceptibility of the aviation community 
illustrated the extent to which volcanic activity remained understudied (Miller and 
Casadevall, 2000; Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2012). The notoriety of the 2010 
eruption undoubtedly influenced the deployment of a more flexible approach to 
hazard management (Eiser et al., 2015), evident in the heightened sense of alert to 
the Grímsvötn (2011) and Bárðarbunga (2014-2015) eruptions. Following these 
tumultuous events, the intertwining of knowledge in the physical and social 
sciences has become integral to improving socio-economic resilience.  
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Therefore, a greater volume of research needs to approach hazard 
management from interdisciplinary perspectives. Volcanic events in Iceland have 
led to the construction of a networked infrastructure that can resonate with 
sociology. Iceland is a unique and multi-hazard environment, and it requires a 
network of communication that emerges from the interrelationship between 
science, society and technology (Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2015; Loughlin et 
al., 2015). This PhD research is predicated on this constructivist approach to 
volcanic hazard management, and multiple theoretical frameworks are used to 
interpret socially embedded understandings of Iceland’s networked infrastructure. 
This introductory chapter illustrates the authenticity of the research by outlining 
the relevant subject areas of interest, and highlighting the approaches that 
academics have previously used to study volcanic hazard networks from 
sociological perspectives. The research question and rationale are then outlined 
before a brief overview of the thesis structure is provided. 
 
1.1: Research background 
Hazard networks are ideally configured to reduce the vulnerability of relevant 
publics, whilst maximising the efficiency of measures taken to mitigate risk. This 
thesis uses an interdisciplinary approach to address the subject areas of 
information management, science and society, hazard communication and 
systematic approaches to disaster risk reduction. From a theoretical perspective, 
both Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 1993; 2005; Law, 1992; 1999; Callon, 1999) 
and Co-production (Jasanoff, 2004; Whatmore, 2009; Lane et al., 2011; 
Landström et al., 2011) are mobilised to explain the constructivist elements of 
hazard management. When analysing volcanic hazard networks in the context of 
the social sciences, previous research has tended to focus on either the impact of 
geoengineering and land management (Cutter and Zoback, 2013; Pierson et al., 
2014), or the perceived contestation between science, technology and culture 
(Gaillard, 2008; Lavigne et al., 2008; Mercer et al., 2012; Mei et al., 2013).  
The research outlined in this thesis differs as it analyses a dynamic and 
evolving network, using sociological approaches to explain adaptability and 
resilience. Whilst not discrediting previous interpretations of hazard networks, 
this thesis seeks to cultivate a more interdisciplinary approach. For example, 
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understandings of hazard management have rarely accounted for the dynamic 
evolution of the space or network within which a hazard is managed. In addition, 
there has been an inadequate focus on the importance of communication and the 
need for accessibility to increasingly autonomous and mobile technologies. In the 
context of volcanic hazards, Webersik et al. (2015), Leonard and Potter (2015) 
and Nayembil et al. (2016) renegotiated the relationship between science and 
society, enabling it to be perceived through collaboration and unity rather than 
conflict and contestation. However, this research is unique in that it not only 
penetrates a sophisticated and dynamic network such as Iceland, but does so 
through the lens of multiple sociological concepts. Constructivist narratives such 
as co-production have previously been applied to flood risk management 
(Jasanoff, 2004; Whatmore, 2009; Lane et al., 2011; Landström et al., 2011) and 
volcanic hazards (Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2015), but this thesis also draws 
comparisons with the application of Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 1993; 2005; 
Callon, 1999; Law, 2009a). The incorporation of both approaches into a field of 
research, traditionally dominated by the physical sciences, allows the thesis to 
analyse valuable connections and exchanges of knowledge between science and 
society. Theorising networks enables them to be approached by social scientists, 
and widens their scope of interpretation. 
Unlike many previous explorations of hazard networks, this PhD research 
has a greater level of epistemic centrality; for example, the interdisciplinary 
premise encourages subjective analysis and critical discourse. This holistic 
approach to hazard management has stemmed from the researchers’ past analysis 
of volcanic activity. For example, previous research has examined the 
visualisation and representation of natural hazards, specifically analysing how 
volcanic events and geological environments can be perceived and explained 
through art and the varied use of technology. Whilst the research documented in 
this thesis cannot be directly related, these past explorations built a cultural, 
interdisciplinary and humanistic perception of volcanic activity. Furthermore, the 
extraordinary impact of volcanic events such as the Eyjafjallajökull eruption, 
occurring during the years preceding this research, highlighted the neglect of 
sociology in studies of volcanic hazard management. 
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1.2: Research question  
The dynamism of Iceland’s networked infrastructure can be explored by analysing 
transitions in stakeholder communication, many of which were induced by the 
volcanic events between 2010 and 2014. For example, conscientious efforts were 
made to strengthen links between scientists and socio-political communities since 
the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull. Technical innovation has been essential to this 
process and has brought together aspects of both the physical and social sciences. 
In accordance with these transformations, this study provides responses to the 
following research question:  
How may developing communications between human and 
non-human ‘actors’ be explored to theorise and manage a 
volcanic hazard network in Iceland? 
By not referring to the specific approaches discussed in this thesis (namely actor-
networks and co-production), the research question is kept broad and 
acknowledges the diversity of ‘actors’ within hazard networks. In addition, the 
question refers to actors rather than monitoring and response agencies; this 
reflects the intention to rigorously deconstruct Iceland’s network to the level of 
individual stakeholders, tools and components. Finally, this research question 
views hazard networks as processes that continually develop and evolve. 
 
1.3: Research objectives and location 
As this study adopts an interdisciplinary approach to interpret volcanic hazard 
management, the research question is supplemented by the following objectives: 
1) To analyse the process through which a hazard network is 
furthered in its capability to mitigate risk by adapting the roles and 
positions of the actors within it. 
2) To use Actor-Network Theory and co-production to speculate on 
the extent to which the development and effectiveness of hazard 
management can be attributed to technologies that are virtual and 
participatory. 
3) To identify how the representation, mediation and negotiation of 
hazard knowledge can be explained through sociological narratives. 
By adhering to these objectives, this PhD research can recognise the evolution of 
Iceland’s hazard network and establish transformations in methods of 
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communication. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary element of each objective 
reflects the extension of the study across multiple stakeholder communities. 
However, the scope of this study is not necessarily reflective of the 
knowledge gap between science and society in other hazard networks; for 
example, the fieldwork focuses almost exclusively on Iceland, the UK and 
Europe. Therefore, the outcomes are likely to be largely irrelevant to less 
economically developed regions, where the use of innovative technology and the 
resilience of a network infrastructure is typically more constrained. Whilst the 
contextual focus on Iceland and the UK is potentially problematic, it is a direct 
result of economic and temporal constraints. An extensive overview of the 
fieldwork sites is provided in Chapter Three and the contextual setting is outlined 
at length in Chapter Four.  
 
1.4: Rationale for conducting the research  
This study of Iceland’s network follows an interdisciplinary trend in hazard 
research, influenced by the work of Fearnley (2013), Donovan and Oppenheimer 
(2015) and Webersik et al. (2015). The value of this PhD research can be derived 
from its application of geographical knowledge and sociological theory. For 
example, this thesis theorises how stakeholders and institutions, attached to the 
physical sciences, can actively connect with communities from non-scientific 
backgrounds. This approach is relevant to hazard management as there is a 
universal need for the binaries of scientific and social knowledge to be mutually 
appreciated rather than resented (Tierney, 2012; Cvetkovich and Lofstedt, 2013). 
Furthermore, the interdisciplinary position of the research enables it to relate to a 
vast array of stakeholders in networks that are modelled on a similar trajectory to 
Iceland. This PhD research can consolidate post-structural perceptions of hazard 
networks and renegotiate conceptual understandings of adaptation and resilience.  
Recent seismic activity has highlighted the geological, social and political 
sensitivities of hazard management in European contexts, with examples 
including the recurrent volcanic episodes in Iceland between 2010 and 2014, and 
the powerful earthquakes in Italy in 2009 and 2016 (Donovan and Oppenheimer, 
2014a; Heiðarson et al., 2014; De Marchi, 2015). This study is relevant as the risk 
   24 
 
posed to humanity by natural hazards remains both considerable and 
unsustainable. For example, the impact of the Eyjafjallajökull eruption on the 
aviation industry (Bonadonna, 2014; Parker, 2015) demonstrated the vulnerability 
of socio-economic systems and the need for continued expansion in 
interdisciplinary research. The importance of the study is highlighted by how it 
seeks to address these continuing concerns. Furthermore, the findings can be 
used for both academic and non-academic purposes; for example, they can 
influence how hazard management is taught, as well as explain how mitigation 
strategists and policymakers can negotiate knowledge.  
Despite innovative technologies and the expansive outreach of scientific 
communities, volcanic activity continues to exhibit hazards that are unpredictable 
and unforeseen, even in the most sophisticated of networks. The rationale for 
choosing Iceland as a study site is based on the international notoriety it has 
gained from recent events, and the serious and cumulative threat posed to the 
aviation industry, both within and beyond Europe (Eiser et al., 2015). This study 
expands on previous hazard research conducted in Iceland, primarily because it 
accepts that the management network is continually evolving. For example, the 
introduction of cross-sector initiatives, projects and task forces (Sigmundsson et 
al., 2013a; Palma et al., 2014; Hicks et al., 2014) continue to provide windows 
through which the infrastructure of the network can be observed. Finally, Iceland 
allows this PhD research to trace how the technical age has redefined the 
structure of hazard management in Europe, analysing the impact of virtual and 
multimedia technologies on the communication process.  
 
1.5: Thesis structure 
The next section of the thesis presents a comprehensive literature review (see 
p.24), firstly addressing the precedent on which interdisciplinarity can be applied 
to hazard management. The review then ventures into sociology and explains 
both Actor-Network Theory and co-production by referring to the influential 
approaches of Bruno Latour (1993; 2005) and Sheila Jasanoff (2004; 2005) 
respectively. Chapter Three presents the methodology (see p.64) and explains the 
rationale for a mixed methods approach that consists of semi-structured 
interviews, participant observations and archival research. The fourth chapter 
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then describes the context in which the study is carried out (see p.91); firstly, it 
alludes to the scientific and social dimensions of Icelandic volcanism, and then 
documents the attempts that have been made since Eyjafjallajökull to improve 
communication. The empirics consist of three chapters tailored to the subsidiary 
research questions (see p.63); Chapter Five is the most holistic as it analyses the 
power dynamics, channels of communication and collaborative practices within 
Iceland’s network. Chapter Six then looks in considerable depth at the concept of 
scale and demonstrates how the use of technology has weakened the existence of 
boundaries between different stakeholder communities. Finally, Chapter Seven is 
more theoretically attuned, with an emphasis on the positionality of the actors 
and institutions that form Iceland’s network; this chapter directly associates 
hazard management with various aspects of social theory.   
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Chapter Two: A review of volcanic hazards, Actor-Network Theory and co-
production 
 
This PhD research explains how knowledge is constructed and communicated 
within Iceland’s hazard network. By studying knowledge exchange from a 
sociological perspective, this thesis presents a subjective analysis of the 
interconnections that bind stakeholder communities. The first section of this 
review assesses contemporary trends in hazard management, and highlights the 
relevance of technical infrastructures, networks and interdisciplinarity (Donovan, 
2012; Barclay et al., 2008; Loughlin et al., 2015). The second section then 
introduces understandings of social constructivism and directly relates them to 
the subject matter, namely hazard networks. The third section of the review 
discusses theoretical interpretations of Actor-Network Theory (ANT), and 
accounts for how it has emerged as a prominent framework within the social 
sciences (Latour, 1993; 2005; 1996a; Law, 1999; 2002; Callon and Blackwell, 
2007). Finally, the fourth section discusses co-production, and focuses primarily 
on the management and resolution of knowledge controversies (Jasanoff, 1996; 
2004; Slovic, 2000; Whatmore, 2009; Landström et al., 2011).  
  
2.1: Transforming hazard and risk management: A sociological perspective  
A succession of catastrophic events in recent decades, such as Hurricane Katrina 
in August 2005 (Schneider, 2005; Bankston et al., 2010), the Haiti Earthquake in 
January 2010 (Bilham, 2010; Williams and Shephard, 2016), and Iceland’s 
Eyjafjallajökull eruption in April 2010 (Guffanti et al., 2012; Bonadonna, 2014; 
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Parker, 2015), appear to have instigated greater sociological research into extreme 
natural hazards. Each of the cases exposed the social and infrastructural 
weaknesses that continue to prevail in the management of meteorological and 
seismic hazards. Academics and strategists alike have taken the view that 
hazardous environments cannot be managed by scientists alone, largely because 
of the potential impacts on the sociological composition of a place or region. For 
example, De Marchi (2015) provides a rather critical commentary of scientists’ 
limitations in forming and activating mitigation policies: 
The distinction between risk assessment and risk management was 
traditionally based on the pretended exclusively scientific nature of 
the former vs. the politically and value constrained character of the 
latter. Risk communication, the last phase of a linear process, was 
customarily devoted to correct the distorted perceptions of lay 
people, unable or unwilling to accept the verdict of the experts… An 
open discussion on the role of scientific inputs in policy decisions 
progressively became to be perceived as both legitimate and urgent. 
Moreover it was not limited to risk issues but moved across 
disciplinary fields and policy issues (De Marchi, 2015, p.150). 
De Marchi accounts for a wholescale transformation in how hazard networks 
need to function; management practices require holism and need to expand 
beyond the realms of science. The sentiments referred to by De Marchi echo 
those of Blaikie et al. (2005) and Wachinger et al. (2013), emphasising the need for 
hazard networks to broaden communication and venture beyond disciplinary 
boundaries. 
 
2.1.1: Performing hazard discourse through the construct of a network  
Network infrastructures allow voices to be incorporated from more diverse 
backgrounds, and can be designed to enhance the interconnectedness of 
stakeholder groups (Paton and Johnston, 2006; Palliyaguru et al., 2014). Whilst 
success is often dependant on the economic development and socio-political 
stability of a hazardous region, networks have previously demonstrated how 
communication can be enhanced and resilience can be improved. For example, 
Donovan and Oppenheimer imply that network infrastructures can strengthen 
connections between stakeholders, literary artefacts and technological devices: 
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Models, methods, reports, laws, social, political and scientific 
networks are all linked through their collective role in managing an 
eruption (Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2015, p.156). 
Writing in the context of Montserrat, Donovan and Oppenheimer refer to actors 
being united by their association with risk. Furthermore, the extract also draws 
attention to the weakening of boundaries and portrays a hazard network as a 
convergent space.  
Therefore, academic literature acknowledges how a network can shape 
the inclusion of actors and stakeholder communities from non-scientific 
backgrounds. Whilst the involvement of socio-political stakeholders has 
previously been explained through socially constructed understandings of risk, 
exhibited in publications such as Beck’s “Risk Society” (Beck, 2014, in Etkin, 
2015), less attention has been attributed to the concept of a network aggregating 
communication channels by using technology. Infrastructure dynamics are 
relevant as hazard networks are messy and unpredictable, largely because their 
components are diverse and constantly evolving (Cronin et al., 2004a). The 
longevity and resilience of any network configuration is undermined unless it can 
be adjusted in-situ (Blaikie et al., 2005). 
However, when explaining how hazard networks are reactive to changing 
compositions and demands, a greater emphasis should be placed on nodal points. 
These are positions at which communication channels intersect and agencies both 
provide and receive data (Mukherjee, 2014). The process of establishing and 
identifying nodal points is defined by Beech (2015): 
As hazard networks become more collaborative, the number of 
channels through which to communicate data and information 
expands. The network itself become so interconnected that nodes 
form… Data nodes are rarely stable and can be repositioned in 
response to crises or technical innovation (p.4). 
As documented in the literature, nodal points can enhance the adaptation and 
resilience of communication channels within a network. The multiplicity of 
channels passing information through nodal junctures can safeguard against 
potential disconnects between stakeholders, agencies or technical devices (Doyle 
et al., 2015). The nodal points within Iceland’s hazard network are relevant to this 
PhD research as such positions can be indicative of decision-making power and 
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network stability. This narrative reflects Cavallo and Ireland’s (2014) views on the 
significance of power relations within networked infrastructures: 
Networked effects are very different to effects in hierarchical systems 
and generally follow power laws (Cavallo and Ireland, 2014, p.12). 
Nodal points are significant to explaining and representing the configuration of 
hazard networks such as Iceland. Data nodes can be interpreted as being 
purposefully designed and constructed in a manner that allows appropriate 
information to be conveyed at the most critical points (Wang and Guo, 2012).  
Previous research has tended to study data nodes in the relatively 
confined context of geospatial probability, primarily in relation to the occurrence 
of seismic risks in urban areas (Carreño et al., 2012). A broader view of nodes 
facilitating knowledge exchange across national and international levels of 
communication has rarely been touched on. In addition, when explaining the 
composition of nodes, academics have often been ambiguous or contradictory. 
For example, studies of wireless or algorithmic data (Pereira et al., 2014; 
Fernandez-Steeger et al., 2015) have referred to the presence and functioning of 
technical nodes such as “automatic sensor nodes” in “Environmental Sensor 
Networks” (Hart and Martinez, 2006, p.177). In contrast, other nodes are 
interpreted as individuals or institutions whose authority enables them to have 
nodal responsibilities (Patwardhan and Ajit, 2007; Samarajiva and Waidyanatha, 
2009). Regardless of form, researchers appear to unanimously attribute value to 
nodes based on their consolidation, maintenance or adjustment of a network’s 
infrastructure (Werner-Allen et al., 2006; Zook et al., 2010). Nevertheless, there is 
a need for greater consistency in how nodes are interpreted; the performativity of 
a node not only provides a lens through which to grasp how a network operates, 
but also has the capacity to explain how stakeholder coordination can be better 
understood (Chen et al., 2008, in Bharosa et al., 2009, p.50). 
The L’Aquila earthquake in Italy (2009) and the Eyjafjallajökull eruption 
in Iceland (2010) can both be viewed as seismic events that demonstrated nodal 
limitations within European networks. For example, the L’Aquila earthquake 
exposed the contentious failure to communicate adequate scientific information 
to the public (Alexander, 2014), whilst the Eyjafjallajökull eruption highlighted 
the breakdown of communication and the failure to ensure the correct protocol 
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was followed (Bolic and Sivcev, 2012). However, Cavallo and Ireland relate 
mismanagement, inaction and mistrust to an inability to contend with uncertainty:  
Many institutions refuse to manage complex risks as they do not 
think to be able to cope with the complexity and uncertainty involved 
(Cavallo and Ireland, 2012, p.162). 
In a similar manner to Cavallo and Ireland, academic literature explaining the 
L’Aquila earthquake has rarely questioned or analysed communication failures 
from nodal perspectives. The network designed to manage seismic hazards in the 
L’Aquila region had nodal characteristics, but these have only been studied in 
relation to data science (Cirella et al., 2009; Marzocchi et al., 2012) and the internal 
dynamics of civil protection centres in Italy (Alexander, 2010). Whilst uncertainty 
is likely to have played a significant role in the breakdown of communication, the 
broader failings that occurred at nodal junctures could be covered to a much 
greater extent. There is a need to consider nodes not only in the transient context 
of where data is aggregated or converged, but also in the holistic context of a 
broader network infrastructure. 
Throughout this PhD research, the terms “institution” and 
“institutionalised” are defined as collective actuarial clusters with an in-built 
synergy to work together, and a legal or moral obligation to act (Cornelissen et al., 
2013; Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014). Selected examples include the Icelandic 
Association for Search and Rescue (ICE-SAR), the Icelandic Met Office (IMO) 
and the London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (London VAAC). This study 
assesses the extent to which the configuration of a hazard network is determined 
by the culture and power relations of institutional entities:  
Institutional theory attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects 
of social structure. It considers the processes by which structures, 
including schemas, rules, norms, and routines, become established as 
authoritative guidelines for social behavior. (Scott, 2005, p.460). 
Recognising institutional theory allows this research to evaluate the impact of 
organisational structures on the management of volcanic hazards. Grossetti 
(2004) highlighted the commanding influence of institutions on the actions, 
communications and mobilisations of networks. By incorporating aspects of the 
social sciences, this thesis applies Grossetti’s narrative to Iceland’s hazard 
management community. However, this PhD research does not view institutions 
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as superficial or rigidly bounded, but explores their complexity, outreach and 
evolutionary capabilities. 
Institutional frameworks are actively deconstructed in this thesis so that 
the individual human and technical actors within them can be subjectively 
analysed. Many influential teachings of deconstruction, most notably those of 
Derrida, have strengthened post-structuralism by establishing difference in the 
meaning of language and text (Derrida, 1976; Derrida and Caputo, 1997). This 
research has applied deconstruction to hazard data, as well as to the mobility and 
characteristics of actors within complex entities such as the IMO and the London 
VAAC. Therefore, a deconstructive narrative is used to identify difference in the 
meanings and features of literary commands, oral interactions, human actors and 
uses of technology. Iceland’s approach to hazard management spans various 
stakeholder communities, so deconstruction is valuable when applying and 
analysing aspects of social theory.  
The continual evolution of Iceland’s network means that its structure can 
be viewed as fragmented and contestable. Therefore, the complexity of the 
network is increasing as the actions of stakeholders and institutions are rarely 
predictable: 
In a complex system… the interaction among constituents of the 
system, and the interaction between the system and its environment, 
are of such a nature that the system as a whole cannot be fully 
understood simply by analysing its components (Cilliers, 1998 viii, in 
Florêncio, 2011, p.76). 
Cilliers’ quote highlights the need for network analysis to focus on the changing 
dynamics of stakeholder interactions. Volcanic hazard networks can generally be 
applied to this interpretation of complexity as many are not “strategically 
ordered” (Law, 1999). Furthermore, technology has also led to Iceland’s network 
becoming increasingly complex; for example, stakeholder relations can be made 
sense of by recognising how participatory devices can further fragment the 
actions of communities and institutions (Pérez-González and Susam-Saraeva, 
2012; Cupples and Glynn, 2014; Khorram-Manesh et al., 2015).  
 
2.1.2: The interdisciplinary expansion of hazard management  
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As academics have strived for greater interdisciplinarity, particularly since the end 
of the science wars and the beginning of the 21st century, closer collaboration 
between the sciences and the humanities has been encouraged (Ashman and 
Barringer, 2005), notably by C.P. Snow in the Rede Lecture titled ‘The Two 
Cultures’ (Snow, 1959). As a result, the scientific knowledge upon which 
understandings of natural hazards are predicted has also been transformed, a 
process that has been further aided by the flexibility of monitoring institutions 
and more techno-centric fieldwork practices. As interdisciplinary motions require 
the “integration of one or more academic disciplines” (Hoffmann et al., 2013, 
p.1), research that has been conducted into the management of natural hazards 
has needed to realign itself by being more openly engaging, postmodern and post-
structural (McEntire, 2007; Donovan and Oppenheimer et al., 2012; Blaikie et al., 
2005). These approaches to hazard management are viewed in a positive manner 
by many academics: 
It is now relatively widely acknowledged that advances in volcanic 
risk reduction research are contingent on the integration of social and 
physical science based knowledge and approaches, and tailored 
communication methods (Hicks et al., 2014, p.1871). 
The extract alludes to a more balanced approach to hazard research, inclusive of 
knowledge from across several disciplines. The approaches of mitigation 
strategists therefore require effective and frequent communication between 
various stakeholder communities.  
Understandings of hazard management have traditionally emerged from 
the sub-disciplines of the physical sciences (geology, physics, chemistry, etc.), but 
academics have instigated an expansion into epistemically softer subjects such as 
sociology, geopolitics and psychology. This transition in how hazards can be 
explained is evident in research related to risk communication: 
The key factors that led to the standardisation of the USGS (United 
States Geological Survey) VALS (Volcano Alert Level System) were 
only marginally related to the current scientific understanding of 
volcanic behaviour and hazards, and how to best represent these in a 
warning, and more driven, ultimately, by the social context of the 
post-9/ 11 U.S., which shaped the broader emergency management 
policy (Fearnley et al., 2012, p.2031). 
Datasets (of monitoring data), like our understanding of the physical 
process, are incomplete and the resulting uncertainty requires a 
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strong subjective element of judgement in the output information 
(Barclay et al., 2008, p.165). 
Whilst Fearnley et al. (2012) use a socio-political narrative to explain what has 
influenced the standardisation of risk, Barclay et al. (2008) refer to the relevance 
of subjectivity. Both extracts therefore demonstrate links to sociology by 
exploring and evaluating the representation of data and information. 
Standardisation allows for greater interdisciplinarity as it regulates communication 
practices in a manner that furthers knowledge and flattens disparities between 
stakeholder communities. For example, hazard knowledge becomes universally 
accessible and can be shared by actors from both scientific and socio-political 
backgrounds.  
However, when analysing the VALS, Fearnley et al. (2012) also draw 
attention to the undermining of context in standardised representations: 
(Difficulties) relate to the simplification of what are complex volcanic 
events and systems, such that more targeted response efforts are 
hindered, but also to an accompanying shift away from the 
description (and explanation) of particular events towards a set of 
warning icons and words that lend themselves to very particular (that 
is, aviation) communities (Fearnley et al., 2012, p.2024). 
The lack of specificity and negation of context therefore counter the positive 
aspects of approaching hazard management from an interdisciplinary perspective. 
With considerable variance between the hazards experienced in many volcanic 
environments, the role that context plays cannot be ignored. Whilst transitions to 
virtual iconographies are enabling hazards to be communicated in real-time, there 
is a need to prevent environmental and socio-political factors from being 
overlooked (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010). If standardisation can be attributed 
to the emergence of increasingly geospatial technologies (Soto et al., 2014), then 
sociological understandings of networks are required to preserve socio-cultural 
diversity. 
Researchers have begun to associate hazard management with humanistic 
and environmental disciplines. The role of science within geophysical 
environments is not discredited, but needs to renegotiate its positionality and 
readjust to a more collaborative and interdisciplinary field of research (Bursik et 
al., 2014; Palma et al., 2014; Leonard and Potter, 2015). Furthermore, focussing 
on the construction and exchange of knowledge represents a movement away 
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from neoclassical views of risk. Hazard networks gain interdisciplinarity by 
extending risk beyond prediction and probability, instead furthering a processual 
approach that can be explained through sociological frameworks such as ANT 
and co-production. Following such a profound overhaul, academic literature 
implies that natural hazards have also needed to be re-envisioned, with greater 
attention attributed to the context and circumstance in which an event takes 
place: 
Disciplinary and cultural differences play a key role in the negotiation 
of dialogue during crisis advice, even where methods are deployed to 
harmonise the scientific opinion (Donovan and Oppenheimer, 
2014b, p.159). 
Donovan and Oppenheimer draw attention to the significant expansion of the 
hazard research community. For example, the extract illustrates how knowledge 
of volcanic hazards should not be confined to the tectonic activity that underpins 
them, but should also recognise “disciplinary and cultural differences”. This 
allows research to be carried out by urban planners, psychologists, policymakers, 
ethnographers and sociologists. A more holistic approach to hazard research is 
likely to reduce conflicts and facilitate dialogue that is transient across stakeholder 
communities (Aspinall et al., 2002).  
The relationship between hazard management and interdisciplinarity can 
be defined by a socio-cultural layering of natural hazards (Webersik et al., 2015). 
Amongst academics, both meteorological and geophysical hazards are now rarely 
viewed as the outcome of solely atmospheric and subterranean processes 
respectively (Paton, 2006; Barclay et al., 2008). The value of scientific evidence has 
not been degraded or become obsolete, but neither are its potentialities 
necessarily determined within laboratories or monitoring stations. Despite 
scientific knowledge continuing to form the precipice upon which actions are 
taken to mitigate risk, information needs to be compatible with socio-cultural 
interpretations. Science must have the capacity to co-exist in accordance with the 
characteristics and ethos of affected communities (Paton, 2006). This mediated 
depiction of a hazards monitoring and response process allows the advantages of 
an interdisciplinary interface to be clearly recognised (Barclay et al., 2008; 
Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2014b). For example, academics tend to agree that 
such set-ups are of significant value to the eradication of “knowledge gaps” 
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(Meyer et al., 2013, p.1365), minimising the potential for risk perception to be 
skewed because of cultural mistrust or alienation.  
Disastrous events such as the Nevado del Ruiz catastrophe of 1985, when 
political ignorance shunned the legitimacy of scientific evidence (Naranjo et al., 
1986; Voight, 1990), have a greater chance of being avoided if an interdisciplinary 
narrative is constructed. Evidence for this claim is provided in analysis of the 
evacuation of the Faldas at Mt Tungurahua (Tobin and Whiteford, 2002), and the 
links between scientists and cultural communities near to Mt Pinatubo in the 
Philippines. In the case of the latter, Garcia and Fearnley estimate that closer 
links between stakeholder communities “generated the political will for the safe 
evacuation of over 60,000 vulnerable people” (Garcia and Fearnley, 2016, p.127). 
This event demonstrated not only the impact of an interdisciplinary approach on 
the acquisition of trust, but also the seemingly harmonious co-existence of 
science and culture in a less economically developed context.  
However, when discussing collaboration and interdisciplinarity, the 
impact of institutional partnerships has been studied to a lesser extent. For 
example, the actions of monitoring and response agencies appear to be 
particularly powerful in preventing scientific hegemony: 
Institutional environments reward normative requirements for 
appropriateness and legitimacy and, in some cases, conformity to 
procedure, presentation, symbols and rhetoric (Fountain, 2001, p.12). 
The extract refers to the collectivity, conformity and holism of many institutions; 
this culture allows institutional entities to contribute to interdisciplinary agendas 
as they are better able to prevent or lessen the detachment of scientific evidence 
from society (Nightingale, 2003). For example, the institutionalisation of hazard 
networks in Europe and North America has often improved the interdisciplinary 
credentials of civil protection services, primarily because it has facilitated stronger 
links between contrasting stakeholder communities.  
Despite this review outlining interdisciplinary approaches to hazard 
management, many observations are not applicable to regions that are blighted by 
war and conflict, or where socio-political tensions are a predominant factor. For 
example, the struggles between scientists and cultural communities surrounding 
Mt Merapi in Indonesia have been extensively documented in academic literature 
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(Lavigne et al., 2008; Donovan, 2010; Mercer et al., 2012). Interdisciplinary action 
has been difficult to achieve in the region largely because of cultural vulnerability: 
Cultural vulnerability is a global indicator of risk that can produce 
unpredictable reactions beyond scientific logic (Donovan, 2010, 
p.118). 
During past eruptions, the influential theological beliefs and cultural traditions of 
several Javanese communities have had a history of directly contradicting science. 
When conflated with a general distrust of the authorities, cultural vulnerability 
can manifest a deeply embedded and continued resistance towards scientific 
representations of risk (Donovan, 2010). Networks therefore need to be carefully 
managed; for example, attempts to extend interdisciplinary action in Montserrat 
are perceived to have provoked additional distrust by expanding communication 
between Montserratian communities and US scientists (Haynes et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, an interdisciplinary agenda has generally become workable in much 
of the economically developed world, where a technical infrastructure has 
transformed stakeholder communication. 
 
2.1.3: Recognising the role and influence of a technical infrastructure  
This literature review has so far covered two relevant aspects of contemporary 
hazard management, namely networks and interdisciplinarity. As forms of 
technology are continually evolving (Bourova et al., 2016), researchers can only 
speculate on their future capability and purpose within hazard networks. 
However, technical innovation has undoubtedly encouraged interdisciplinary 
research of volcanic hazards:  
(Open access technologies) require supportive interdisciplinary 
networks, where scientists and social scientists are willing to work 
together to expose their disciplines to volcanic risk assessment and 
mitigation processes shaped and led by vulnerable communities 
(Barclay et al., 2008, p.174). 
Barclay et al. directly relate interdisciplinarity to technologies that widen 
participation and expand the research community. Therefore, devices and 
software packages are playing a significant role in encouraging a more holistic 
approach to volcanic hazard management in environments such as Iceland 
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(Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2012; Cadag and Gaillard, 2013; McCallum et al., 
2016).  
Tools such as Geosocial, introduced by the British Geological Survey 
(BGS), provide further examples of how scientific institutions are increasingly 
using technology to strengthen their ties with the public (British Geological 
Survey - Citizen science: Geosocial, 2016). However, many researchers have 
studied the impact of these technologies from the perspective of the non-
scientific end-user, rather than from the position of the scientific community that 
is seeking to expand its outreach. In addition, whilst researchers have studied the 
impact of technologies on hazard communication (Van Manen et al., 2015; Bee et 
al., 2014; Kar, 2015), they have rarely explored the process and discussions that 
lead to the innovation of new devices and systems, and the regulatory measures 
that ultimately determine their implementation into a hazard network.  
Situational awareness has become an important consideration when 
communicating seismic hazards, and has influenced the development of technical 
infrastructures (Power et al., 2014; Endsley and Jones, 2013). According to Huang 
and Xiao, situational awareness can be conceptually reduced to simply “knowing 
what is happening in space” (Huang and Xiao, 2015, p.1551). In the context of 
hazard management, the geotagging feature of social media messages can 
improve efficiency by enabling communication to be geospatially assigned 
(Rogstadius et al., 2013). Huang and Cervone elaborate on this observation in 
their analysis of Twitter: 
A few attempts (Huang and Xiao, 2015; Vieweg, 2012) have been 
made to uncover and explain the information Twitter users 
communicate during mass emergencies. Information about causalities 
and damage, donation efforts, and alerts are more likely to be used 
and extracted to improve situational awareness during a time-critical 
event. (Huang and Cervone, 2016, pp.304-305). 
The ability to overcome the challenges created by time and space therefore 
highlights the value of technology; for example, social media can be used to 
identify the geographical regions and end-users to whom mitigation or aid are 
most urgently required (Yin et al., 2012). The participatory elements and real-time 
characteristics enable the hazard to be managed through a largely unstructured 
but well integrated network: 
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Twitter communication is largely public and can be monitored, and 
members of the disaster-affected population can be employed as a 
sensor network (Rogstadius et al., 2013, p.4:2). 
The extract highlights how the inclusion of the public weakens the structure of 
networks, allowing them to be viewed as interoperable and allowing hazard 
information to be mediated at will (Gencturk et al., 2015). Social media platforms 
such as Twitter effectively illustrate how technical infrastructures provide 
accessible spaces within which communication can be channelled and public 
engagement can be improved (Herfort et al., 2015). 
The ability to openly source information and practice citizen science are 
key to understanding technical infrastructures in networks such as Iceland. For 
example, Barclay et al. (2008) outlined how open source data has led to greater 
transparency and trust through the development of “deliberative and inclusive 
processes” (Barclay et al., 2008, p.172). These approaches to hazard 
communication influence policy frameworks and actively encourage participation 
from non-scientific stakeholders. Whilst geospatial software’s now appear to be 
well established in this regard (Alam et al., 2015; Rossi et al., 2015), methods of 
“crowdsourced human-based computation” (Rogstadius et al., 2013, p.4:2) have 
been studied to a lesser extent in Icelandic or European contexts. Furthermore, 
the success of “Volunteered Geographic Information” (Zook et al., 2010; 
Dransch et al., 2013) during the Canterbury earthquake in New Zealand in 2010 
(Doyle et al., 2015), and the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan in 2011 
(Peary et al., 2012), highlights the need to further expand real-time 
communication and participatory technologies.  
Technical infrastructures have dual purposes within hazard management; 
for example, they are intended to renegotiate “knowledge management” (Yates 
and Paquette, 2011, p.7), whilst also improving the methods used to source data. 
The uptake of user-orientated technologies such as social media is “making peer-
to-peer communications and public participation more visible” (Sutton et al., 
2008, p.624). This has improved the transparency of hazard information and 
expanded the outreach of scientific institutions. A technical infrastructure should 
not be viewed in its entirety through the capability of a device or software 
package, but should be assessed on its links to a plethora of end-users (Scolobig et 
al., 2015; Thierry et al., 2015), and ability to reflect the holism of a hazard 
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network. This section of the review has intended to demonstrate how networks 
and interdisciplinarity form conceptual bridges between volcanic hazards, 
innovative technologies and stakeholder communities. 
 
2.2: Constructing and communicating knowledge 
When explaining how knowledge is constructed and communicated, academics 
such as Demeritt and Slovic have both focussed on the importance of 
circumstance and “social negotiation” (Demeritt, 1998, p.176). Several subject 
areas ranging from nanotechnology (Schillmeier, 2015) to globalisation (Teschke 
and Heine, 2016), and geopolitics to risk management, have either reinforced or 
criticised the concept of knowledge being socially shaped. Constructivist 
explanations of knowledge have emerged from diverse and sporadic disciplinary 
backgrounds: 
Social constructionism draws its influences from a number of 
disciplines, including philosophy, sociology and linguistics, making it 
multidisciplinary in nature (Burr, 2015, p.2). 
As a result, academics have often struggled to define and explain constructivism 
in a coherent manner. Boghossian (2001) arguably provides the clearest and most 
widely applicable definition: 
To say of something that it is socially constructed is to emphasize its 
dependence on contingent aspects of our social selves (Boghossian, 
2001, p.1). 
Constructionism cannot solely be applied to how knowledge is shared, but can 
also relate to why particular knowledge strands exist. Therefore, constructivist 
approaches have the potential to improve understandings of trust in complex 
hazard networks, largely because they can be used to explain the social 
construction of information flows.  
 
2.2.1: Defining Social Constructionism: Links to science and technology 
In one of the most influential texts on social constructionism, Knorr-Cetina 
(2008) claimed that the process of constructing “knowledge-centred practices” 
(p.195) can be assimilated to the “relational dynamics” (p.196) that exist between 
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objects. Knorr-Cetina (1983) had earlier outlined the links between social 
constructionism and science, highlighting the transformation of several 
dichotomies: 
The constructive operations with which we have associated scientific 
work can be defined as the sum total of selections designed to 
transform the subjective into the objective, the unbelievable into the 
believed… and the painstakingly constructed into the objective 
scientific fact (Knorr-Cetina, 1983, p.122). 
Therefore, science is viewed as the objective and factual imprint of knowledge, 
minus the subjectivity of social constructionism. Whilst both Knorr-Cetina and 
Bruno Latour have drawn on the epistemic background from which social 
constructionism has emerged (Latour and Woolgar, 1979), there are significant 
tensions in how constructivist movements are interpreted. Nevertheless, both 
social constructionism and ANT accept that scientific knowledge cannot be 
isolated from processes and networks.  
ANT and co-production have both been influenced by the Strong 
Programme of scientific knowledge (Bloor, 1983), and the debates stemming 
from the Sokal Hoax (Weinberg, 1996). These movements addressed the concept 
of knowledge being a unifying force and highlighted how postmodernism 
contradicts the more traditional descriptions and understandings of science: 
Critics of constructivism claim that viewing scientific discovery this 
way opens the gate to non-scientific influences and arguments, 
thereby undermining factuality (Racovita, 2013, p.676). 
The Sokal Hoax and the Strong Programme both expanded on the rejection of 
positivism and reductionism. In the case of the Sokal Hoax, mathematical 
physicist Alan Sokal, carried out an academic hoax that challenged the 
postmodern tendencies of a journal (Weinberg, 1996; Sokal, 2000). Sokal wholly 
opposed the removal of fact and objectivity from the physical sciences. On the 
other hand, David Bloor’s development of the Strong Programme was an attempt 
to strengthen the profile of sociology within the sciences (Bloor, 1984; Sismondo, 
2010), primarily through the four tenets of causality, impartiality, symmetry and 
reflexivity (Manicas and Rosenberg, 1985). The programme was heavily criticised 
but strengthened the profile of social constructivism (Woolgar, 1981; Lynch, 
2000) and aided the development of the field of Science and Technology Studies 
(STS). The Sokal Hoax and the Strong Programme therefore approached 
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constructivism from contrasting perspectives, but enriched its standing in both 
the physical and social sciences.  
The holistic scope of constructivism allows ANT and co-production to 
have tenuous links with “technoscience” (Patton, 2004, p.67). Whilst knowledge 
has previously been associated with the politicisation of science, academic 
literature increasingly refers to the interdependence of science and technology 
(Lawhon and Murphy, 2012; Wesselink et al., 2013):  
Technological innovation would not be possible without scientific 
problem-solving; nor could scientific discovery be imagined without 
technological means to enable new experimental methods and 
approaches (Jasanoff, 2010, in Frodeman, 2010, p.194). 
Jasanoff outlines the intrinsic relations and interactions that allow science and 
technology to be viewed as co-existing and wholly inseparable. The combination 
of scientific and technical processes defines a constitution of knowledge, rather 
than an exchange of information. 
However, technical devices are shaped not only by the physical science 
that leads to their engineering and construction, but also by the influences of 
socio-political communities. Therefore, approaches such as the Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT) are also relevant to this study: 
If it is accepted that a variety of relevant social groups are involved in 
the social construction of technologies and that the construction 
processes continue through all phases of an artefact’s life cycle, it 
makes sense to extend the set of groups involved in political 
deliberation about technological choices (Bijker, 2010, p.72). 
Bijker illustrates how the construction of technical “artefacts” and knowledge 
need to be explained through the co-evolution of society and technology.  
Constructivism cannot be viewed as one-dimensional, but can be interpreted 
through the creation and strengthening of “shared mental models” (Levine et al., 
1999, p.270). These ensure that knowledge is co-constructed and “socio-political 
contestations” (Nightingale, 2003, p.80) have a better chance of being negotiated. 
Both knowledge management and the construction of technology are therefore 
significant when exploring the complexity and technical infrastructure of hazard 
networks  
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2.2.2: Applying constructivism to hazard management 
Academic literature has mobilised constructionism to explain the extension of 
hazard management beyond the physical sciences (Alexander, 2013b; Jasanoff, 
1998; Renn, 1998; Wilkinson, 2001; Horlick-Jones and Sime, 2004; 
Weichselgartner and Pigeon, 2015). Whilst not dismissing realism, Beck 
demonstrates the need for risk to be constructed in the context it is situated: 
According to Beck himself, “[t]he decision whether to take a realist 
or constructivist approach is… a rather pragmatic one… I am both a 
realist and constructivist” (Beck, 2000: 211-2). With this somewhat 
puzzling statement Beck means to say that while risks are out there 
(realist ontology), it depends upon cultural, subjective and social 
categories which risks are selected for treatment (Aradau and Van 
Munster, 2007, p.96). 
Aradau and Van Munster recognise that a realist approach is insufficient in the 
context of many situations where a society or stakeholder community is perceived 
to be at risk. Connections can be made to the views of Latour and Woolgar 
(1979), whose illustration of the need for science to become socially inclusive 
theorised the construction of postmodern networks.  
Furthermore, Renn claims that risk perception is accountable for “socially 
mediated consequences” (Renn, 1998, p.57); this draws attention to the pivotal 
role played by circumstance. The construction of risk allows scientific knowledge 
to be repositioned so that it has no epistemic superiority over society: 
Concepts come from experts and are subject to subjective alteration 
or manipulation. Most of these ideas emphasize the active role that 
people play in constructing the meaning of risk and in the role of 
communication as a transforming power, indicating the need to 
consider risk as an appreciation, a reading or a ‘imaginary’ and not as 
something external to people. It is important to consider perceptions, 
attitudes and motivations both individually and collectively (Cardona, 
2004, p.44). 
Focussing on the subjective characteristics of risk enables constructivist narratives 
to be applied in a manner that transforms, but does not remove, science 
(Jasanoff, 1998; Renn, 1998). However, in the context of volcanic hazards, 
Donovan (2012) found that scientific information can be opposed rather than 
mediated, with negative impacts on the society affected. For example, 
constructing risk in accordance with communities near to Mt Merapi in Indonesia 
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has proven to be an arduous task, and one that has not significantly reduced 
social vulnerability or the conflict between science and culture.  
However, writing in relation to Mt Pinatubo in the Philippines, Gaillard 
(2008) highlights the need for a co-construction of knowledge that allows risk 
perception to be positioned in the context of the everyday. This would allow 
representations of risk to not only respect cultural traditions, but to also relate to 
the socio-economic uncertainties of local actors. The co-construction of 
knowledge, as well as “inter-agency” trust (Salter, 1997, p.64), are reliant on the 
implementation of technologies that can encompass multiple stakeholder 
communities (Steelman and McCaffrey, 2013). These include the Google Crisis 
Response platform (Gibson et al., 2015), the construction of which exhibits key 
aspects of both technoscience (Brown and Rappert, 2000; Echeverría, 2003) and 
the SCOT approach (Bijker, 1990; Pinch, 1996; Klein and Kleinman, 2002).  
Social constructionism can arguably influence the evolution of hazard 
networks in less economically developed regions, where the social shaping and 
uptake of innovative technologies are currently in their infancy (Chipangura et al., 
2016). Furthermore, in many European and North American contexts, 
“artifactual constructivism” (Instone, 2004, p.133) can be used to examine the 
widening of decision-making practices. For instance, artifactual constructions are 
relevant to hazard management as they allow conventions and instruments to 
either adapt or expand channels of communication. This improves the exchange 
of knowledge between science and society, and provides an effective means of 
communicating scientific facts. Admittedly, it would be a bold assumption to 
apply all natural hazards and technologies to this constructivist doctrine, but 
nevertheless it highlights an approach to hazard management that remains largely 
unexplored.  
 
2.3: Actor-Network Theory: Applying sociology to hazard management  
This next section of the review focuses on a sociological approach that is deeply 
embedded within network geographies. Emerging from the field of STS, the 
ANT framework has developed to tackle complexity and lessen the epistemic gap 
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between modernism and postmodernism (Stalder, 1997). It’s broad understanding 
is defined in the following extract: 
…a disparate family of material-semiotic tools, sensibilities and 
methods of analysis that treat everything in the social and natural 
worlds as a continuously generated effect of the webs of relations 
within which they are located. It assumes that nothing has reality or 
form outside the enactment of those relations. Its studies explore and 
characterise the webs and the practices that carry them (Law, 2009a, 
in Banks, 2011). 
ANT therefore seeks to analyse the associations that create knowledge and 
constitute networks. Value is attributed to use of language and dialogue, and their 
ability to weaken the epistemic binary of nature and culture.  
As networks are deconstructed, ANT refers to their individual 
components as “actors”, regardless of their human or non-human characteristics:  
Actors (1) construct common definitions and meanings, (2) define 
representativities, and (3) co-opt each other in the pursuit of 
individual and collective objectives (Bardini, 1997, p.516). 
ANT can be used to analyse the construction and evolution of information 
channels, explaining how knowledge is transformed between actors. Therefore, 
the concept of actors is integral to understanding the flexibility of networks 
(Callon, 1999) and the formation of agency structures (Murdoch, 1998). For 
example, the dynamics that exist between actors can define the dichotomies of 
science and society, human and non-human, modern and postmodern. However, 
whilst these dualisms will be explored in this review, there are considerable 
variations in how ANT can be understood as a sociological framework. For 
instance, academics have used numerous approaches to study and define 
technical actors, translation and “black-boxed” knowledge (Goodman, 1999, 
p.27). How can ANT relate to sociality? Where does the translation and 
mediation of knowledge begin and end within a complex network? What is the 
role and power of technical objects? 
 
2.3.1: Geographical engagements with Actor-Network Theory 
This review primarily covers Bruno Latour’s understanding of ANT, considering 
the predominant aspects of his interpretation at length, before applying them to 
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Iceland’s hazard network. In seminal papers titled “We Have Never Been 
Modern” (1993) and “Reassembling the Social” (2005), Latour denies modernity 
has existed. This approach has influenced many geographical engagements with 
ANT; for example, Nick Bingham’s expansion of technological determinism and 
social constructionism referred extensively to Latour (1993). Bingham recognised 
technology’s place in a world where material objects and humans are intrinsically 
connected (Bingham, 1996; 1999). Therefore, Bingham and Latour both theorise 
networks in a manner that transcends modernity, with mediated forms of 
communication providing new methods of following or travelling with the world.  
Furthermore, Bingham and Thrift (2000) approach ANT from the 
perspective of time and space, and analyse the work of Serres and Latour (1995) 
to explain the partiality and circulation of space within networks. By perceiving 
space to be fluid and evolving, Bingham and Thrift (2000) are able to recognise 
and describe relativity. However, Thrift also draws attention to the weaknesses of 
ANT, highlighting how Latour’s interpretation downplays human capability 
(Thrift, 2000), conflicts with understandings of complexity (Thrift, 1999), and 
redefines the local and the global according to networked connections (Thrift, 
1996). Other geographical engagements with ANT have included those of Steve 
Hinchliffe, who refers to Latour when explaining practices of embodiment and 
representation (Hinchliffe, 1996).  
Hinchliffe focuses to a lesser extent on the creation of knowledge and 
describes human and non-human relations through power, ontology and the 
denaturalising of boundaries between nature and culture. Writing in the context 
of relational ethics, Sarah Whatmore also addresses the work of Latour when 
referring to these ontological divisions. For example, Whatmore analyses the 
relativity of nature and culture in the text titled “Hybrid Geographies” (2002), 
and focusses on the configuration of networks and spaces. Both Hinchliffe and 
Whatmore approach ANT from an environmental perspective, but their work 
varies as Whatmore has also referred to mediation, expertise and context when 
explaining how knowledge is constructed (Whatmore, 2006). Therefore, ANT can 
span multiple branches of geography, and Latour’s ideology can be approached 
from technological, ontological and environmental perspectives.  
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2.3.2: Understanding the emergence of Actor-Network Theory  
ANT has risen from an ethnographic base and has developed into an analytical 
framework that explains the construction and mobilisation of knowledge. 
Latour’s rejection of modernity allows his understanding of actor-networks to 
theorise the development of a middle ground between nature and society: 
(Nature and culture) are both premature attempts to collect in two 
opposite assemblies the one common world. This is what I have 
called the Modern Constitution (Latour, 2005, p.254). 
Social theorists have used the Modern Constitution to account for the erosion of 
pure and “distinct ontological zones” (Latour, 1993, p.10), and to describe the 
circulatory process that allows knowledge to “crisscross ideologies” (Latour, 
1993, p.3). For example, Latour refers to the division between natural and cultural 
binaries in his outline of the “first dichotomy” [see Figure 2.1, p.44] (Latour, 
1993, p.11); as knowledge is translated with the development of an actor-network, 
this dichotomy is progressively weakened. 
 
Figure 2.1: An illustration of the epistemic transition and evolution of knowledge within 
actor-networks (Source: Latour, 1993, p.11). 
In the second dichotomy, the mediation and translation of knowledge form 
hybrid networks between nature and culture, nonhumans and humans. These 
networks lack stability and emerge from the evolution of alliances, connections 
and communication channels. However, the dichotomies outlined by Latour are 
wholly interdependent, and this has been explained in Van Krieken (2002):  
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Without translation, hybridification and mediation, ‘the practices of 
purification would be fruitless or pointless’. Without purification, ‘the 
work of translation would be slowed down, limited or even ruled out’ 
[Latour, 1991/1993: 11] (Van Krieken, 2002, p.263). 
Therefore, as actor-networks develop, they do so as a result of purification and 
translation existing simultaneously; one dichotomy does not precede or have 
superiority over the other.  
In one of the most notable works to cover ANT, Callon (1984) illustrates 
the insecurity of networks when studying the science of scallops at St. Brieuc Bay. 
Callon’s understanding of translation is explained by Law (2009a): 
(The science of scallops is) a web of relations that makes and 
remakes its components. Fishermen, scallops, and scientists are all 
being domesticated in a process of translation that relates, defines, 
and orders objects, human and otherwise. Callon adds that they hold 
themselves together but they do so precariously. All it takes is for one 
translation to fail and the whole web of reality unravels… translation 
is always insecure, a process susceptible to failure (Law, 2009a, 
p.145). 
By deconstructing the science of scallops, Callon outlines the transformation of 
natural, ecological and scientific laws on the one hand, and anthropogenic, social 
and technical acts on the other. Callon does not distinguish between the non-
human and human components of the network, but draws attention to the 
evolutionary nature of interactions. Therefore, whilst the weakening of purified 
binaries can be understood relatively easily, explaining the process of translation 
and the durability of alliances proves to be arduous as relations are unstable.  
Latour referred to translation in the context of science being extended 
beyond the laboratory. As scientific knowledge is communicated between actors, 
the purified elements are eroded to the extent that the boundary between science 
and society is transcended: 
By the end of the story "no one can say where the laboratory is and 
where society is" (Latour, 1983, p.154, in Murdoch, 1997, p.736). 
Latour has been eager to draw attention to the dissolution of dualisms (Demeritt, 
1998); the legitimacy, truth and boundaries of knowledge are instead determined 
by connections between natural and social communities. Academic literature has 
supported Latour’s interpretation and has applied it to the translation of 
knowledge within economic, organisational and logistical contexts (Farias and 
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Bender, 2012). Latour has also described how knowledge is mediated by 
distinguishing between mediators (actants that initiate, transform or translate 
knowledge) and intermediaries (actants directing or transporting knowledge 
without making modifications). However, Latour’s understanding has also been 
criticised on numerous occasions: 
Latour provides an "asymmetrical reading of the mediation process, 
which is overly oriented towards the contribution of things to the 
production of the social order, almost neglecting the reverse, that is, 
the 'sociality' of the stability of things (Habers, 1995, p.273, in 
Walsham, 1997, p.472). 
In his review of ‘We Have Never Been Modern’, Habers questions Latour’s 
account of how mediation takes place. Latour focuses on interaction between the 
non-human and the human, whereas Habers recognises the situational context 
(the sociality) in which knowledge is mediated. Therefore, approaches to ANT 
can often be viewed as contrasting, particularly in relation to how humans and 
objects (things) are perceived.  
However, from a technological perspective, a Latourian approach views a 
device or system as an influential “agent” that provides “mobilized” and 
“connected lines” of communication (Latour, 1993, p.118). The technical 
components of actor-networks therefore manifest traceable channels of 
connectivity:  
Every branching, every alignment, every connection can be 
documented, since it generates tracers (Latour, 1993, p.118). 
Latour’s interpretation is supported by Callon (1999) and Law (2009a), who also 
describe how technology explains the translation of knowledge in complex and 
evolving networks. The mobility of technical actors is key to understanding how 
knowledge can be mediated (Lowe, 2001), regardless of an objects’ mundanity or 
sophistication. Furthermore, technology can also explain why Latour’s approach 
is predicated on power equity; the hierarchical elements of networks are flattened 
as human and non-human engagements construct hybrids (see Figure 2.1, p.44). 
Technological objects play a significant role in neutralising the balance of power 
within actor-networks. 
The conceptual positioning of technology and power is further reflected 
in Latour’s seminal publication titled “Aramis”: 
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In connecting together all kinds of things, what we then have are 
'hybrids' formed from the mixing up of subjects and objects, humans 
and nonhumans… Aramis duly raises up the (nonhuman) 'poor 
objects' of the world for our (human) 'attention and respect' as 
coequal 'social' agents. (Laurier and Philo, 1999, p.1048) 
The extract relates to how both the non-human and the human can be united 
under the umbrella term “actors” (Latour, 1996b, p.374), essentially components 
of a networked constitution that have powers defined by their connectivity (Law, 
1999; Callon, 1999; Allen, 2003). Aramis refers to a subordination of the human 
from a position of perceived dominance to one equal to that of a non-human 
object. For instance, power is neutralised as human actors depend on technology 
for the provision of communication channels; this prevents the non-human from 
being subsumed. However, Latour’s approach implies that human actors are not 
accountable for their own actions, rendering “impossible” any degree of 
responsibility (Banks, 2011).  
When analysing Iceland’s hazard network, the research presented in this 
thesis deviates from Latour’s views as it approaches ANT from a less ideological 
perspective. For example, it does not deny the existence of sociality or define 
interactions by connectivity alone. Furthermore, despite remaining loyal to the 
broad and post-structural elements of Latour’s approach, this study rejects power 
equity and assesses the extent to which power dynamics are influenced by specific 
actors and institutional entities. Nevertheless, the inclusion of ANT and 
recognition of Latour is justified as the construction and mediation of knowledge 
within Iceland’s network is seldom attributed solely to human actors. The 
research explores the connectivity and remit of partnerships, objects and 
technological systems, reflecting Latour’s approach to the non-human elements 
of networks.  
Pyyhtinen and Tamminen (2011) are amongst the many academics who 
have explained the conflict between Latour and Foucault’s (1982; 2007) use of 
sociality to define power relations: 
While Foucault focused exclusively on games of truth where the 
object of knowledge is man, Latour’s concerns are not confined to 
the boundaries of the human sciences. Instead, he characteristically 
studies the ‘hard sciences’ by focusing on laboratories, microbes, 
technology and the like (Pyyhtinen and Tamminen, 2011, p.136). 
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Whilst the extract refers to the stark contrasts between the Latourian and 
Foucauldian interpretation, both approaches take the view that power is 
determined and problematised at a holistic scale (Collier, 2009). This thesis 
approaches power dynamics and knowledge management from multiple 
philosophical perspectives; the interdisciplinary scope and contextual focus of the 
research ensures aspects of both Latour and Foucault can be appreciated.  
Writing in the context of Vanuatu and Montserrat respectively, 
researchers such as Cronin et al. (2004b) and Haynes et al. (2008) have previously 
used ethnography to illustrate how power and knowledge can be purposely 
structured in hazard networks. These interpretations of power conflict with the 
post-structural lens of Latour’s approach to ANT. For example, Haynes et al. 
(2008) and Earle (2010) associate power with levels of trust between scientific 
and socio-political stakeholder communities. Earle (2010) illustrates how power 
dynamics are influenced by egalitarian attitudes, inequalities and segregation. On 
the other hand, Latour (2005) argues that trust and context cannot be separated; 
trust itself contextualises the lived experiences of networks, as well as the human 
and non-human actors within them (Wright and Ehnert, 2010). Therefore, 
conceptual gaps exist between interpretations of power within hazard networks, 
and the broad parameters of Latour’s explanation of ANT. 
Differentiating between the human and the non-human has become 
increasingly contentious in networks that are influenced by sophisticated 
technologies (Murdoch, 1998; Law and Mol, 2001). For example, as devices and 
systems (objects) have become participatory and inclusive of the human, it is 
increasingly difficult to position them as part of a human or non-human 
dichotomy. This point has been contextualised by both Callon (1984) and 
Cresswell et al. (2010) in their application of ANT to electric vehicles and 
healthcare respectively. In addition, Latour claims that “no technology is first and 
foremost technological” (Latour, 1996a, p.32); this implies a dynamic level of 
human or non-human agency is ever present from the point at which a device is 
entrained into a network. Furthermore, artificial intelligence has proven that 
technology can become self-sufficient and adapt to environmental or 
circumstantial changes (Del Casino, 2015; Tatnall and Davey, 2015). The 
programming and self-determination of objects, devices and robots therefore 
allows them to be positioned in the grey area between the human and the non-
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human (Avgerou et al., 2004). This enables the technological constitution of 
networks to be critically explored and analysed. Haraway (1991) claimed the 
middle ground between dichotomies is manifested from technology that takes the 
form of cyborgs and tricksters, further illustrating the level of humanistic control 
possessed by devices and systems.  
Establishing where humanistic elements of control begin and end are 
relevant to not only understanding the mobility of technical objects and 
networks, but also for studying the partiality of knowledge. For example, non-
human actors are broadly characterised by malleability and transcendence 
(Dolwick, 2009); the non-human can be construed as the attributes of networks 
that undermine stability and act as transporters of knowledge that is only ever 
partial (Oppenheim, 2007). On the other hand, human components tend to be 
defined by “immanence” and materiality (Hillier, 2005, p.271). Human elements 
do not, therefore, migrate according to circumstance and are recipients of the 
partial knowledge communicated by non-human counterparts (Albertsen and 
Diken, 2004). The partiality of knowledge within actor-networks illustrates the 
need for this review to briefly address the process through which epistemologies 
are established.  
Scientific knowledge is generally viewed as an abstract element that can 
only be defined once it becomes an accepted theory. Therefore, the philosophy 
of science (Kuhn, 1962; Bergmann, 1978) and the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (SSK) contradict the concept of partiality. Whereas logical positivism 
defines science based on its verifiability (Ayer, 1966; Bergmann, 1978), the 
philosophical approach of Thomas Kuhn (1962) viewed the revolution of 
scientific knowledge as a cyclical process, determined by the acceptance or 
rejection of a paradigm. The philosophy of science therefore provides little 
leverage for knowledge to be viewed as partial. Meanwhile, the SSK purports that 
evidence and facts are socially conditioned and develop according to social 
influences (Shapin, 1995; Bloor, 2004). Therefore, the SSK neglects the role of 
the non-human and does not allow for partiality; it is criticised for being too 
reductive by sociologists such as Law (2009b). 
Hassard and Callon are amongst numerous scholars who have highlighted 
the role of partial knowledge in the development and evolution of actor-
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networks. By referring to the processual emergence and disconnection of actors, 
understandings of ANT generally imply that knowledge is partial and situated in 
relation to connections and objects:  
The situatedness of knowledge draws attention to the spatialities of 
knowledge: knowledge is always situated and because of this partiality 
it is always multiple. It is also territorialized through various forms of 
inclusion and exclusion, meaning that it can be to varying intensities 
in or out of the “proper” spaces [Law, 2000] (McFarlane, 2009, p.5). 
However, Cole (1992) argues against these interpretations by claiming that 
knowledge can exist as a scientific whole without partiality or relativity. Different 
epistemologies therefore emerge from how the construction, mobility and 
aggregation of knowledge can be perceived. For example, Latour’s defines 
knowledge through the construction of a “black box” (Latour, 1987, p.1), namely 
the position at which an actor-network stabilises and the components can “act as 
one” within a “wider organisational field” (Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000, p.10). 
The convergence of different partial strands of knowledge at these points 
temporarily constitute fact.  
However, philosophers such as Manuel DeLanda have explained the 
convergence of partial knowledge through the lens of Assemblage Theory (AT). 
DeLanda focuses primarily on how knowledge can be renegotiated or exchanged 
by fluid and transitional power relations (DeLanda, 2006). As a realist, DeLanda’s 
approach to social complexity and knowledge is influenced by the proliferation of 
material and territorial relationships. Whilst understandings of AT can be applied 
to the context of this PhD research, they are overlooked on the basis that its 
inclusion could make the study unmanageable. ANT and co-production are 
preferred as they offer an optimal contrast in sociological approaches to complex 
networks, whereas DeLanda’s narrative is associated primarily with systems and 
bodies. Furthermore, ANT enables networks to be deconstructed to the level of 
each individual actor, object and channel of communication; it therefore 
facilitates a more rigorous exploration of Iceland’s hazard network than could be 
afforded by AT. As the research covers both ANT and co-production, it is 
already conceptually dense and there is a need to maintain coherence and lucidity. 
 
2.3.3: Establishing links between Actor-Network Theory and natural hazards  
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ANT can be of considerable value to studies of hazard management, primarily 
because it can explain the evolution and translation of knowledge. When 
scientific evidence is communicated through complex network infrastructures, 
translation can account for changes in how data and facts are represented:  
Science does not always provide simple “black and white” accounts 
of events that are amenable of smooth translation into law or policy 
(Drake, 2016, p.48). 
Drake (2016) illustrates the critical role translation plays in ensuring that scientific 
knowledge can be deciphered by decision-makers from a broad spectrum of 
stakeholder communities. However, despite Drake writing in the context of an 
Indonesian mud volcano, many attempts to apply translation to hazard networks 
have overlooked geological and geophysical events, and have been tailored to 
manmade or technological hazards.  
Potts (2009) reflected on the impact of translation when explaining how 
the London bombings were communicated in 2005. In the following extract, 
Potts describes how technologies such as Flickr have the capacity to translate 
photography into hazard information: 
In the case of the London Bomb Blasts Community on Flickr, Storey 
(group moderator) served as the researcher attempting to funnel 
information through the obligatory passage point of this photo 
pool… the focal actor is both Storey, as moderator, and Flickr, as the 
site of the obligatory passage point. Storey’s ability to aggregate the 
images he found on Flickr and to encourage others to add them to 
the photo pool certainly was the first step toward transforming the 
community into a network. However, it is also the participants’ 
understanding of Flickr that allows these translations to take place. 
(Potts, 2009, p.289) 
Potts refers to the impact and effectiveness of engagement between technical and 
human actors during crisis situations. The extract outlines the construction of an 
information hybrid that is collectively composed of humans, objects and digital 
channels of communication (Whatmore, 1997). Potts’ narrative also resonates 
with both Callon’s account of translation (1984) and Latour’s focus on the 
“collection of signs, language and texts” within actor-networks (Laurier and 
Philo, 1999, p.1053). Neither human nor non-human actors are privileged in 
Potts’ description, and knowledge is synthesised across social and technical 
boundaries. Therefore, this example of how knowledge can be translated 
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illustrates connections between contemporary methods of hazard 
communication, and multiple aspects of ANT.  
Both Potts (2009) and Drake (2016) explain hazard communication in a 
post-structural context and refer to the transformation of boundaries. ANT can 
be used to analyse the mobility of “boundary spanners” (Owen et al., 2013, p.9) 
within hazard networks; these can include individual actors or objects that have 
the capacity to collaborate across social, scientific and technological boundaries. 
Researchers have often approached boundary spanning from either an 
institutional or policy-orientated perspective (Alemanno, 2011; Neisser, 2014). 
However, there is a need to analyse the specific processes that fragment and 
weaken boundaries to the extent they become invisible within networks (Gieryn, 
1983; 1999; Hackett et al., 2008; Hård and Jamison, 2013). This requires taking a 
holistic view of boundary relations, and embracing ANT by recognising the 
diversity of human and non-human actors: 
If ANT has a project or a general ambition, it is first of all to 
highlight the frailty of the modernistic worldview (Latour, 1993) and 
underline how the making of society demands association of diverse 
elements (Van Der Duim et al., 2013, p.5). 
If applied to hazard management, ANT can explain the need for networks to be 
analysed from a post-structural perspective; this approach can undermine the 
existence of boundaries between stakeholder communities from scientific and 
social backgrounds. 
However, Barron et al. (2014) appear to question the legitimacy of 
approaching hazard networks from relational standpoints. For example, when 
discussing hazard management in Papua New Guinea, Barron et al. (2014) identify 
a temporal contrast between the global media’s representation of volcanic hazards 
and the relative confinement of the Papua New Guinea culture: 
The vulcanologists with their gases, and the ABC reporter with his 
map locate the volcanoes firmly within the global westernised 
scientific temporality of the arrow of time stretching along a single 
dimension to end at a definite conclusion; ring of fire, and 
consecutive, ordered eruptions; cause and effect…Papua New 
Guineans were denied access to this temporality. All the expert 
vulcanologists and seismologists were white. They located the 
volcanoes within a well-defined, global, scientific space, but the local 
space was trivialised (Barron et al., 2014, pp.122-123). 
   55 
 
The temporal gap implies a disconnect between local and global actors, 
undermining the relational approach to networks described by ANT. In regions 
where cultural or spiritual narratives can be less passive, such as Papua New 
Guinea, iconographic connotations of volcanic hazards contravene the western-
centric approach to science. A holistic interpretation of networks therefore 
appears to lack both credibility and substance, primarily because developments do 
not lead to the mergence of scientific and social ontologies.  
Unlike Potts (2009), Barron et al. (2014) focus on sociality rather than the 
presence or absence of technical actors. Potts recognised the impact of 
innovative technologies on the translation of knowledge following the London 
Bombings in 2005, but Barron et al. (2014) do not refer to the adoption or 
rejection of participatory devices in Papua New Guinea. Therefore, technology 
appears to be a determining factor when establishing how ANT can explain the 
adaptability of hazard networks. Technical actors play a significant role in 
mobilising knowledge, reconceptualising hazards and eroding the binary of nature 
and culture (Yamin et al., 2005). In addition, technical devices provide 
communication channels that allow stakeholder interactions to be traced:  
Given our current technology and ability to trace the connections 
people make across multiple technologies, Web sites, and groups 
online, we can study the pathways and better understand how people 
find and exchange information in crisis situations (Potts, 2009, 
p.284). 
The extract reflects on how technology has the capacity to facilitate and perform 
public engagement within hazard networks. Therefore, by studying the use of 
technical actors, researchers can assess how the complex elements of networks 
can be overcome, and how connections can evolve in a way that improves the 
resilience of various stakeholder communities.  
A techno-centric approach to hazard management demonstrates the 
malleability of non-human actors, but the impact of technology is ultimately 
determined by the willingness of an educated and informed public to engage with 
communication devices and systems: 
Pure technical or structural solutions along with the demand for an 
‘absolute protection’ against the negative impacts of natural hazards 
are hardly achievable (Kuhlicke et al., 2011, p.806). 
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Here, Kuhlicke et al. illustrate how technology cannot act alone, and needs to be 
intrinsically related to multiple stakeholder communities. This view further 
reinforces the relevance of constructivist approaches such as ANT; for example, 
actor-networks theorise the development of connections and alliances between 
human and non-human actors. However, sociality cannot be ignored in the way 
Latour implies, largely because technical actors are situated within hazard 
networks, and their evolution primarily stems from contextual dynamics:  
Critical infrastructure is materialized in different ways, depending on 
how rationalities and technologies of risk management intra-act with 
other social and political practices, discourses, forms of knowledge 
and materialities (Aradau, 2010, pp.502-503). 
Aradau (2010) illustrates the constructivist elements of hazard management, but 
deviates from Latour’s approach by referring to the relevance of materiality. 
Hazard networks can resonate with understandings of ANT, but the links are 
often speculative and remain understudied in academic circles. For example, few 
researchers have studied the growth of real-time hazard information from a 
constructivist perspective.  
Approaches such as ANT have the capacity to explain and analyse the 
evolution and mobilisation of knowledge; from a Latourian point of view, 
volcanic hazard networks can be interpreted as interdisciplinary hybrids. For 
example, the interactions within them amalgamate geology, technology, politics 
and culture. When outlining his approach to ANT, Latour (1993) referred to the 
hole in the ozone layer as a network that collectively instils natural and cultural 
elements. Latour’s interpretation of the ozone layer also explained how scientific 
knowledge can be “absolutely and irreversibly transformed” (Latour, 1993, p.111) 
following engagement with human actors. If the same narrative is applied to 
volcanic hazards, then tectonic processes and physical landforms can be 
assimilated to what Latour termed the “hard parts of nature” (Latour, 1993, p.55). 
Once translated, descriptions and understandings become increasingly subjective 
and represent a fusion of relational elements from across multiple disciplines. 
From this perspective, Latour’s interpretation of ANT can be used to explain 
how representations of risk evolve, and how a modernistic binary of nature and 
culture can be diminished in hazard networks. 
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However, whilst the evolving ontology of volcanic hazard networks can 
relate to Latour’s approach to ANT, several constraints can be identified. Firstly, 
Latour’s interpretation of actor-networks does not explain institutionalisation:  
For Latour, individual entities lie at the core of reality (Bryant et al., 
2011, p.294). 
Latour accepts that actors can be clustered, but deconstructs networks to the 
level of individual components. Therefore, sufficient scope is not provided for 
institutional frameworks to be recognised. In contrast, researchers have often 
tailored explorations of volcanic hazard networks to the actions of meteorological 
organisations or civil protection departments (Paton et al., 1998; Scott and 
Travers, 2009). Secondly, critics of ANT have claimed that Latour’s interpretation 
overlooks the concept of scale (Corpataux and Crevoisier, 2016) and cannot be 
assimilated to the everyday. For example, Latour dismisses objectivity and refers 
to the core or nucleus of an actor-network as a “central vantage point” that is 
“incomprehensible” (Latour, 1993, p.13). The applicability of ANT can therefore 
be questioned as understandings of this unfathomable central position are vague 
and inconclusive. Despite these limitations, this section of the review has referred 
to numerous resonances between ANT and hazard networks such as Iceland.  
Beth Greenhough has also explored the geographies of Iceland’s scientific 
network, and has established epistemic links with ANT. From the perspective of 
her genome mapping project, Greenhough views Iceland as a “natural 
laboratory” for genetic research (2006a, p.226), and a scientific space with 
boundaries that are unstable and negotiable. Greenhough’s approach to science 
studies recognised the human and non-human dichotomy, as well as knowledge 
exchange and boundary relations. Constructivist elements are also reflected in the 
following interpretation of Iceland’s interconnected and evolutionary field site: 
The island-laboratory/field itself (Iceland) becomes increasingly 
complex, defined not only by the practice of genetic epidemiology, 
but by a whole series of other approaches which bring with them 
new means of entering and engaging with the field site/island-
laboratory (Greenhough, 2006a, p.231). 
Here, Greenhough refers to the scientific network being subjected to external 
influences and interdisciplinary engagements; these collectively remove the 
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laboratory from isolation and allow the wider world to connect to its complex 
and unique characteristics (Greenhough, 2006a; 2006b).  
This research resonates with Greenhough’s approach as it also views 
Iceland as a field site with fragmented boundaries, and uses social science to 
analyse its complex and interdisciplinary evolution. Whereas Greenhough’s study 
focussed on genetics, the research presented in this thesis tailors the island-
laboratory to the management and communication of volcanic hazards. The 
impact of social science on the scope and expanse of the research space was 
discussed by Greenhough (2006a) through the metaphor of seascapes:  
The notion of seascapes and the disorder they evoke shift the 
grounds (or waters?) upon which we might imagine Iceland as a 
laboratory from a closed space of analysis to an open contested site 
of scientific and social exploration (Greenhough, 2006a, p.235). 
Social interventions are considered disruptive to the field site, primarily because 
they add subjective narratives that can span multiple disciplines and research 
communities. However, before explaining the development of new research 
spaces, the ideology and characteristics of the island-laboratory need to be 
recognised beforehand.  
Greenhough’s study is relevant to this thesis as it explains how connective 
engagements prevent detachment and lead to the progressive destabilisation of 
Iceland’s boundaries (Greenhough, 2006b). Furthermore, the approach of 
Greenhough (2006a; 2006b) can also be related to Whatmore’s (1997; 2006) work 
on the exchange of knowledge and information. For example, by exploring 
biotechnology, Greenhough (2006b) addresses the resolution of knowledge gaps 
and the participation of diverse publics. Further links can also be identified 
between the island-laboratory concept and understandings of ANT. For instance, 
boundary objects were a key element of Latour (1993; 2005) and Callon’s (1999) 
approaches; Greenhough explores boundary objects by analysing the 
construction, communication and consumption of medical records. Finally, 
Greenhough (2006b) acknowledges that she approached the field site from an 
external position, and had already developed an understanding and perception of 
the island-laboratory. The same principal applies to the research documented in 
this thesis, again reflecting the resonance between these studies of Iceland and 
their relations to ANT. 
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2.4: Understandings of co-production  
Whilst the process of translating knowledge can highlight the links between ANT 
and hazard management, there is also a need to establish how knowledge is 
produced. Therefore, constructivist approaches such as co-production (Jasanoff, 
2004; Whatmore, 2009) are also relevant to this thesis. Co-production 
conceptually expands on the generation and negotiation of knowledge; it can be 
succinctly defined by Jasanoff (2004) and Lane et al. (2011): 
Increasingly, the realities of human experience emerge as the joint 
achievements of scientific, technical, and social enterprise: science 
and society, in a word, are co-produced, each underwriting the 
other’s existence (Jasanoff, 2004, p.17). 
Knowledge is co-produced through a process of dynamic, collective 
learning involving those for whom an issue is of particular concern 
(Lane et al., 2011, p.18). 
The value of co-production is derived from its ability to explain knowledge 
management. For example, in the context of volcanic hazards, co-production can 
be used to analyse the impact of stakeholder communities on the generation of 
both knowledge and technology. Co-production can also theorise how technical 
devices, models and systems are incorporated and used in complex networks such 
as Iceland.  
From an interdisciplinary perspective, understandings of co-production 
can explain the relationship between science and society, and the process of 
resolving the tensions between them. Scientific, technical and social practices are 
not interpreted as individual façades of reality, but are engaging, experiential and 
interactive:  
The ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature 
and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live 
in it. Knowledge and its material embodiments are at once products 
of social work and constitutive of forms of social life; society cannot 
function without knowledge any more than knowledge can exist 
without appropriate social supports (Jasanoff, 2004, pp.2-3). 
Jasanoff refers to the interdependency and co-existence of knowledge and 
society; there is a need to simultaneously account for both when constructing 
devices and methods that are intended to resolve controversies. The extract also 
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refers to the process of generating knowledge, and highlights the relevance of 
social dynamics. 
Defined as “generative events” (Whatmore, 2009, p.588), knowledge 
controversies are central to the co-production of knowledge, and are explained in 
the context of climate change by Barry (2012): 
Consider the emergence of (knowledge) controversies around the 
idea of climate change. Certainly, there have been a whole series of 
efforts to develop appropriate transnational mechanisms and 
institutions to address the problem of climate change (Andonova et 
al., 2009; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010). However, these efforts have 
occurred in conjunction with burgeoning disputes about the urgency, 
extent, causes and consequences of the problem itself. The 
controversies surrounding the governance of climate change have not 
just been about issues of state sovereignty (Paterson, 1996), 
environmental justice (Adger et al., 2006; Roberts and Parks, 2007) or 
the design of carbon markets (Mackenzie, 2008), but also about the 
reliability of models and data (Barry, 2012, p.325). 
Barry draws on the complex way in which climate change is governed and 
explains how controversies can only be addressed when knowledge is co-
produced by scientific, technical and socio-political communities. In an influential 
account of co-production, Lane et al. (2011) use the example of flood risk 
management to demonstrate how controversies can be resolved by models that 
transform public involvement and representations of risk. Controversies are 
relevant to this thesis as they conceptualise the process through which epistemic 
divisions can be remedied, and conflicting interpretations of an event can be 
overcome (Whatmore, 2009). Furthermore, they have seldom been referred to 
directly in academic literature that relates to volcanic hazard management.  
However, controversies do not only exist in the form of perception and 
knowledge, but also as technical controversies when there are compatibility issues 
between devices and end-users. The resolution of controversies can impact on 
networked infrastructures, and requires the redistribution of scientific and socio-
political expertise: 
In the event of knowledge controversies public scrutiny of 
environmental expertise intensifies, foregrounding the technologies 
that transact between the knowledge production practices of 
environmental science and the regulatory protocols instituted by 
environmental policy agencies… At the heart of these accounts is a 
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redistribution of expertise in the face of environmental (and other) 
uncertainties on two related fronts (Whatmore, 2009, pp.588-589). 
Despite expertise being context-dependent and conceptually challenging to 
define, the extract demonstrates how it can be renegotiated to facilitate co-
production. In addition, Whatmore (2009) recognises the critical role technology 
plays in mobilising expertise, and ensuring it has the ability to transcend scientific 
and socio-political communities.  
Therefore, co-production accounts for the profound impact technical 
devices and models can have on knowledge management and the infrastructure 
of networks such as Iceland. This is reflected in the development of participatory 
approaches such as deliberative mapping:  
A participatory, multi-criteria, option appraisal process that combines 
a novel approach to the use of quantitative decision analysis 
techniques with some significant innovations in the field of 
participatory deliberation (Burgess et al., 2007, p.299). 
Here, the extract refers to how deliberative mapping is designed to improve 
participation and coalesce expertise (Jasanoff, 2004; Lynch and Cole, 2005; 
Stirling, 2006). The process purposely exploits the mobile and transparent 
attributes of innovative technologies, primarily to co-produce knowledge in a way 
that transforms the involvement of communities from both scientific and social 
backgrounds (Aspinall, 2006; 2010; Donovan, 2012). 
 
2.4.1: Co-production and the management of hazards 
Hazard research has intrinsic connections with how aspects of co-production are 
theorised; for example, the generation and resolution of knowledge controversies 
has been explained in the context of flood risk modelling and public engagement 
(Whatmore, 2009; Landström et al., 2011; Lane et al., 2011): 
The framing that we brought to the experiment was a wider context 
of trying out a different means of practising science, in which both 
academics and the public worked together to co-produce knowledge 
rather than starting out to address a particular flood risk problem 
using a particular sort of method (Lane et al., 2011, p.25). 
The extract draws on the collaborative engagement between science and the 
public, and describes an experiential approach to the remodelling of flood risk.  
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Jasanoff (2004) also implies that risk is compatible with co-production because it 
provides controversies to solve. However, in comparison to flood risk 
management and climate change, the process of co-producing knowledge has 
rarely been applied to geological and geophysical hazards.  
Nevertheless, when co-production and knowledge controversies have 
been studied in the context of volcanic activity, boundary relations and liminality 
have been the subject of much discussion. For example, Donovan and 
Oppenheimer (2015) refer to co-production in their work, and focus on the 
weakening and transcendence of epistemic boundaries: 
Political factors affect the ways in which scientific reports are framed, 
for example, just as politicians’ interpretation of scientific 
information will affect the decisions that are made (e.g. Jasanoff, 
1990, 2004, 2005): scientific reports and risk decisions are co-
produced (Lövbrand, 2011; Kuhlicke and Demeritt, 2014). 
Coproduction occurs through the negotiation of uncertainty and 
authority in attempts to make evidence-based decisions, and it occurs 
as scientists and policymakers engage in boundary work… The 
liminal nature of risk assessment - not only between scientists and 
policymakers, but often on the edge of scientific philosophical 
boundaries - necessitates a broader discussion of meaning and 
uncertainty in understanding the co-production of science and social 
order (Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2015, p.155). 
The extract relates co-production to the changing dynamics of authority and 
uncertainty in the decision-making process. When explaining how boundaries 
between science and society can be renegotiated, Donovan and Oppenheimer 
(2015) draw attention to the liminal aspects of hazard management. For example, 
liminality exists in the form of documents, scientific reports and artefacts; the 
mobility and engagement of these communicative objects facilitates co-
production. This narrative of boundary relations is also reflective of Latour’s 
approach to ANT, but Donovan and Oppenheimer focus on the process of 
negotiation rather than connectivity.  
As boundaries fragment and methods of communication become 
increasingly diverse, explorations of hazard networks need to account for the co-
evolution of individuals and institutions (Rip, 2002; Graffy and Booth, 2008; 
Wyborn, 2015). For example, an improved ability to negotiate and neutralise 
knowledge controversies often stems from greater democracy in the decision-
making process:  
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Computer simulation modelling can be employed to further a civic 
rationale in public engagement, so as to produce a more democratic 
science (Landström et al., 2011, p.1630). 
Landström et al. (2011) refer to a simultaneous transformation of science and the 
public. However, success and sustainability are dependent on devices and models 
that enable individual citizens and scientific institutions to co-evolve. Both the 
co-production of knowledge and the co-evolution of stakeholder communities 
have been reflected in an increasing body of academic literature that studies the 
use of social media in hazard networks (Chatfield et al., 2013; Stone et al., 2014; 
Mee and Duncan, 2015). For example, platforms such as Facebook and Twitter 
have been significant to co-producing knowledge of various natural hazards; 
these include Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (Cool et al., 2015), the 
Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand (Yin et al., 2012), and the Tōhoku 
earthquake and tsunami in Japan (Cho et al., 2013).  
Social media illustrates how devices and software packages can be used to 
democratise communication and improve the resolution of knowledge 
controversies: 
Co-production of knowledge over time can also build trusting 
relationships and resilience (Stone et al. 2014). We propose the use of 
a smartphone application (app), myVolcano, to promote citizen 
science, combined with real-time analysis of social media… In 
combination, these will capture new data in real time, enable dialogue 
and provide redundancy (Mee and Duncan, 2015, p.3). 
By drawing specifically on the transformation of citizens into “active subjects” 
(Jasanoff, 2003, p.241), Mee and Duncan (2015) explain how co-production 
encourages a bottom-up approach to hazard communication. Social media and 
smartphone applications allow stakeholder communities to co-construct and 
negotiate “hybrid” knowledge (Wisner et al., 2012, p.772). Hybridity emerges 
from dialogue that technical systems encourage to be transparent and 
participatory; this enables the complexity of hazard networks to be overcome, 
and resolves controversies by improving stakeholder cohesion. Therefore, 
explaining co-production in the context of how natural hazards are managed 
provides evidence of the relativist turn (Rayner, 2012; Birkholz et al., 2014).  
However, whilst Donovan and Oppenheimer (2015) have referred to co-
production in the context of volcanic hazards, it’s theorisation of how volcanoes 
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can be managed remains understudied. For instance, interdisciplinary research 
councils, partnerships and committees have collectively transformed the structure 
of volcanic hazard networks and can be interpreted as evolutionary attempts to 
minimise local and cultural controversies. The construction of these innovative 
bodies and stakeholder alliances has encouraged both the co-production and co-
evolution of knowledge; this has renegotiated the adaptability and engagement of 
various scientific and socio-political communities. Co-production is of relevance 
to this PhD research as Iceland’s approach to volcanic hazard management is 
both transformative and participatory.  
 
2.5: Hazard management, Actor-Network Theory and co-production  
This concluding section of the review provides a summary of the interdisciplinary 
links between hazard management and approaches to constructivism. Boundary-
work, knowledge exchange and relationality can each be observed to theorise 
networked infrastructures such as Iceland. Firstly, this review has referred to how 
ontological boundaries can be progressively weakened in networks that are 
designed to manage volcanic hazards. By assessing the relevance of “boundary 
spanners” (Owen et al., 2013, p.9) and information artefacts, this chapter has 
explained how constructivism can theorise the complexity and adaptability of 
hazard communication. Boundaries are generally defined by uncertainty and 
durability (Stalder, 1997) in constructivist approaches; for example, Latour’s 
interpretation of actor-networks undermines boundaries by focussing on the 
connections of individual actors. Similarly, co-production marginalises boundary 
spaces by explaining how science, society and technology can synchronously 
construct knowledge and information. The empirics refer to multiple examples of 
boundary spanning technologies, and use interdisciplinary narratives to analyse 
the boundary relations within Iceland’s network. 
Secondly, partial knowledge is intrinsic to postmodern interpretations of 
hazard management, and explains why a mixed methods approach has been used 
in this study of Iceland (see pp.64-66). Partiality can be theorised by both actor-
networks and co-production; for example, ANT considers knowledge to be 
partial until actuarial connections develop a black-box (Latour, 1987; 1993). 
Meanwhile, co-production describes how partial knowledge exists when social, 
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scientific or technical controversies are unresolved. The empirics examine the 
ways in which the connections and adaptations of Iceland’s network ensure 
knowledge can evolve from partial strands of quantitative data, to graphics and 
descriptions that can resonate with stakeholders from socio-political 
backgrounds.  
Finally, this review has drawn on relationality to assimilate hazard 
management with understandings of actor-networks and co-production. For 
instance, ANT analyses the relational engagements between human and non-
human actors, and implies that “nothing is ever sewn up” (Law, 1992, p.386). 
Therefore, actor-networks are able to theorise the dynamic stakeholder relations 
within networked infrastructures such as Iceland. On the other hand, co-
production resonates with relationality by referring to how knowledge can be 
generated through collaboration between scientific, technical and socio-political 
communities. Both ANT and co-production associate relational engagements 
with the connectivity and construction of technology. The empirics outline how 
devices and systems are used to manage volcanic hazards in Iceland, and then 
assess their impact on stakeholder participation and the relational metaphysics of 
the network. From a theoretical perspective, this study is authentic as researchers 
have rarely combined aspects of both ANT and co-production, and have tended 
to view these approaches in isolation. This thesis analyses associations between 
the physical and social sciences, and regularly converses between conceptual 
theory and practice.   
 
2.6: Outlining the subsidiary research questions 
The following subsidiary questions resonate with the interdisciplinary narrative of 
this review and are intended to provide a reflective analysis of Iceland’s network:   
1) How have negotiations of power dynamics and technical actors 
impacted upon trust, collaborative practices, and flows of 
information in Iceland’s volcanic hazard network? 
2) What impact has stakeholders becoming sensitised to technology 
had upon the scale at which volcanic hazard networks have the 
capacity to adapt?  
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3) To what extent can Actor-Network Theory and co-production be 
used to interpret interactions between individual stakeholders and 
institutional entities?  
Each question is designed to instigate subjective discussions of the common 
ground between the social, scientific and technical elements of volcanic hazard 
networks. Therefore, the questions are purposely holistic and exploratory, and 
can relate to the evolutionary processes of Iceland’s approach to hazard 
management.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three: A methodology for studying Iceland’s volcanic hazard 
network from an interdisciplinary perspective 
 
The preceding chapter explained the interdisciplinary premise of this PhD 
research, and highlighted the need for Iceland’s network to be studied using a 
mixed methods approach. As the research relates to constructivist concepts such 
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as Actor-Network Theory [ANT] (Latour, 1987; Law, 1992; Callon, 1999) and co-
production (Whatmore, 2009; Landström et al., 2011), qualitative analysis is 
required to interpret Iceland’s geophysical environment. This approach allows the 
humanistic and socio-political characteristics of the network to be described 
through emotive arguments and opinions. The first section of this chapter refers 
to the philosophical context in which the methodology has been devised. Each of 
the three data collection methods, as well as the ethical considerations, are then 
outlined before the approach taken to conducting qualitative data analysis is 
explained (Attride-Stirling, 2001). 
 
3.1: Methodological context 
Nightingale (2003) and Fielding (2012) both imply that a mixed methods 
approach allows for additional flexibility in the collection and analysis of research 
findings. From this perspective, the semi-structured interviewing of stakeholders, 
participant observations of hazard management practices, and archival research 
of policymaking and social media use, are viewed as suitable methods for 
conducting fieldwork that is applicable to the research objectives (see p.20). 
These objectives were based on several assumptions; firstly, that an exploration 
of Iceland’s network will exhibit a level of cohesiveness that brings together 
individual actors, technologies and institutional entities. Secondly, that 
opinionated evidence and first-hand experience of the network can be gained 
from engaging with scientists, policymakers and members of the public. It can be 
argued that this thesis takes for granted, and effectively black-boxes (Latour, 
1987), the role, uptake and use of technology within Iceland’s network. Whilst 
these assumptions can open the research up to potential flaws, the mixed 
methods approach is best equipped to minimise setbacks and gather qualitative 
evidence.  
 
3.1.1: Philosophical perspectives 
This PhD research is positioned from the philosophical perspective of grounded 
theory (Rowlands, 2005; McGhee et al., 2007; Wyatt, 2013); for example, it starts 
with a research question and uses data analysis to build theoretical interpretations 
   68 
 
of a complex hazard network (Iceland). A grounded approach allows sociological 
concepts and trends to be identified based on the research question and 
objectives. The holistic and interdisciplinary scope of the research also uses 
constructivist approaches to analyse stakeholder interactions within Iceland’s 
networked infrastructure. However, whilst the research can reflect elements of 
interpretive social science (Schwartz-Shea, 2014), the grounded approach is 
maintained as the data presented is ultimately tailored to the research question.  
Each of the individual methods (semi-structured interviewing, participant 
observations and archival research) provide a means of gaining valid information 
that explains the sociology of Iceland’s network. Collectively, these methods 
allow for a robust and triangulated exploration of Iceland’s approach to volcanic 
hazards (Nightingale, 2003). The research findings refer to partial or situated 
knowledge (Hesse-Biber, 2012), but primarily convey an interdisciplinary 
narrative: 
Linking methods provides opportunities to examine the partiality of 
knowledge produced in different theoretical and methodological 
contexts (Nightingale, 2003, p.79). 
“Mixing methods” allows for the notion that such knowledges are 
partial and that different vantage points - for example interview 
participants’ perspectives versus researchers’ results from observation 
- will produce different views of particular processes and events 
(Nightingale, 2003, p.80). 
A complete ethnographic reflection of Iceland’s network is almost impossible to 
achieve as a result of its complexity and evolution. Furthermore, this study 
collects data from numerous institutions in Iceland, the UK and Europe. Due to 
the nature and breadth of the research, an ethnographic approach was not 
suitable as no single community or institution could have been studied in 
considerable depth (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995; Scott-Jones and Watt, 
2010).  
Therefore, the research was orientated towards analysing the connectivity 
of stakeholders, rather than describing the internal dynamics of a specific 
community or institution. The fieldwork benefitted from being multi-sited, and 
not having to integrate wholly with one site; the value of the research stemmed 
from its ability to explore and analyse many sites with reasonable depth (Marcus, 
2009). In addition, the limited timeframe and affordability of this study are also 
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indicative of why an ethnographic exploration of the network was not feasible or 
appropriate in the context of the research. This explains why assumptions needed 
to be made prior to the fieldwork taking place, and why qualitative methods were 
used to describe and analyse decision-making processes (Nightingale, 2003).  
A mixed methods approach enabled the holism of Iceland’s network to 
be studied, primarily because it extended the scope and diversity of participants. 
The intention to study a plethora of stakeholder communities also explains the 
rationale for choosing semi-structured interviews, participant observations and 
archival research as suitable methods. Firstly, semi-structured interviews were 
opted for on the basis that the format would allow the research findings to reflect 
personalised experiences of the network:  
(Semi-structured interviewing) enables interviewees to provide 
responses in their own terms and in the way that they think and use 
language. It proves to be especially valuable if the researchers are to 
understand the way the interviewees perceive the social world under 
study (Qu and Dumay, 2011, p.246). 
Here, Qu and Dumay illustrate how the semi-structured approach allows an 
individual’s perception and mobility to be explored (Matthews and Rose, 2014). 
Furthermore, the semi-structured format also provides the flexibility to snowball 
participants (Seidman, 2013); interviewees could be asked whether they knew of 
other actors who could participate in the study. 
When considering the interdisciplinary focus of the research, semi-
structured interviews appear to be the most appropriate option for studying the 
positionality of stakeholders. However, quantitative measures could also have 
been used during the fieldwork, notably questionnaires or surveys that provide 
free response sections. A quantitative approach may have eased the process of 
data analysis (see pp.89-90), primarily by enabling it to be less time-consuming 
(Gill et al., 2008; Ott and Longnecker, 2015). In addition, questionnaires and 
surveys are likely to have allowed for contributions from a larger number of 
stakeholders, with the potential to identify general trends in hazard awareness and 
the use of technologies (Bird, 2009).  
However, quantitative procedures are less likely to reflect individual roles 
and contributions (McIntosh and Morse, 2015; Mann, 2016); semi-structured 
interviews can explore the specific interactions, perceptions and attitudes of each 
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interviewee. For example, lines of questioning are not pre-determined, and 
responses can be probed once an answer has been given; in contrast, 
questionnaires and surveys do not facilitate ongoing discussion. Furthermore, the 
“informal feel” created by the semi-structured format allows emotion and 
opinion to be seamlessly integrated and openly expressed in the interview process 
(Adams and Cox, 2008, p.22). Therefore, a quantitative approach is less 
compatible with the research question and objectives; the value of the fieldwork 
stems from the richness of the empirical data. Other advantages of qualitative 
methods include the interviewee having the ability to control the flow of semi-
structured interviews, and influencing the questions that are asked. 
Participant observation is also a valid method for this research as it 
facilitates close contact with a range of stakeholders in institutional environments, 
allowing cultures and actions to be explored (Khagram et al., 2010; Fazey et al., 
2014). However, the problems associated with “going native” (Gold, 1958, p.221) 
were also considered prior to the fieldwork; the observations risked becoming too 
involved with the institutions, and potentially clouding the research perspective 
(O’Reilly, 2009). Whilst the observations required empathy, steps were taken to 
lessen the risk posed. For example, numerous stakeholder communities were 
observed in a short space of time across Iceland; this prevented the research from 
becoming aligned to a single institution. In addition, observations were completed 
in one visit, and many were focussed specifically on an exercise or task; this 
minimised the risk of the research being skewed by a prolonged period of 
engagement. Therefore, the mixed methods approach and the design of the 
fieldwork meant that observations did not impact on the objectivity of the 
research. 
Whilst not culturally focussed in the same manner as anthropological 
studies of hazard networks (Oliver-Smith, 1996), this research uses participant 
observations to analyse knowledge exchange, particularly within institutional 
settings. The shadowing of stakeholders has been central to this approach: 
Shadowing research does not rely on an individual’s account of their 
role in an organization, but views it directly… shadowing can 
produce the sort of first-hand, detailed data that gives the 
organizational researcher access to both the trivial or mundane and 
the difficult to articulate… shadowing examines those individuals in a 
holistic way that solicits not just their opinions or behaviour, but 
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both of these concurrently. Thus, actions are contextualized…. and 
every opinion is related to the situation which produced it 
(McDonald, 2005, p.457). 
Shadowing allows real-time interactions to be identified and analysed (McDonald, 
2005; Czarniawska-Joerges, 2007), and for uses of technology to be observed at 
first-hand. However, shadowing also risked participants acting abnormally once 
they were being observed and left the study vulnerable to researcher bias 
(Kawulich, 2012); both issues were taken into consideration when the findings 
were being analysed. 
The evidence gathered from both interviews and observations has 
generally been compatible with the interdisciplinary narrative of the research, but 
the management of the data has required “qualitative content analysis” (Elo et al., 
2014, p.1). This has led to the findings being colour-coded (Attride-Stirling, 
2001), and the extensive use of both Microsoft Word and NVivo. NVivo is a 
software package that is purposely designed to analyse large amounts of 
qualitative data; its development and application have been explained by Bazeley 
and Jackson (2013). As the study generates a considerable volume of information, 
NVivo has been used to organise the findings and establish connections between 
the various interview transcripts and observation reports. Therefore, NVivo has 
been integral to data management, and has enabled interpretive evidence to be 
sourced efficiently. 
Aspects of power, trust, technology and communication were repeatedly 
discussed during both the fieldwork and archival studies; these broad themes can 
also be associated with the sociological frameworks that underpin the research. 
The findings were thematically analysed and colour-coded according to these four 
categories; this process enabled the data to be refined (Cresswell, 2013; Kitchin 
and Tate, 1999), and provided evidence of the grounded philosophy of the 
research (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012; Charmaz, 2014). Once the data had 
been categorised, an inductive approach ensured the coding remained open and 
the data was not rigidly bound by the category to which it was assigned (Elo et al., 
2014). However, the evidence is presented in an interdisciplinary context within 
this thesis, and the speculative nature of many findings contributed to an 
exhaustive data selection process (see pp.89-90).  
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3.1.2: Methods adopted by similar studies of volcanic hazards 
Mixed methods research appears to be gathering pace within geography, and 
particularly in studies of contemporary hazard management (Barclay et al., 2008; 
Bird et al., 2009; Fearnley 2013; Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2014b; 2015). 
Chapter Two refers to natural hazards being explored and analysed from 
interdisciplinary perspectives, and this trend has highlighted the relevance and 
application of mixed methods. For example, Donovan and Oppenheimer’s 
(2014b) study of Montserratian volcanoes analysed the interface between science 
and policy. The research gathered qualitative evidence through a mixture of semi-
structured interviews and participant observations. The coding system used to 
organise and manage the findings mirrors the approach to qualitative data analysis 
outlined in this methodology (see pp.89-90). Prior to the work of Donovan and 
Oppenheimer, Haynes et al. (2007) had also used the Montserratian context to 
apply mixed methods to risk research: 
This ‘mixed’ methodology approach allows us to more fully identify 
the complexity of the issues that relate to risk perception and map 
comprehension and permits more confident conclusions [Horlick-
Jones et al. 2003] (Haynes et al., 2007, p.128). 
Here, Haynes et al. (2007) refer directly to the merits of mixed methods, and 
explain the impact of the approach on how risk can be perceived, mapped and 
analysed; the methodology consisted of interviews and the statistical analysis of 
questionnaires. Therefore, multiple studies have applied a mixed methods 
approach to the complex and less economically developed context of Montserrat. 
Furthermore, mixed methods have been used in an Icelandic context by 
Bird et al. (2009), and in a North American context by Fearnley (2013). In a study 
focussing on volcano alert levels, Fearnley (2013) used archival information and 
semi-structured interviews to conduct research at volcanic observatories in North 
America. Meanwhile, Bird et al. (2009) illustrated the relevance of mixed methods 
to understanding public perceptions. The research used questionnaires and face-
to-face interviews to extract quantitative evidence of how risk is envisioned in the 
region of Þórsmörk, Southern Iceland. Collectively, these examples of approaches 
to mixed methods provide evidence of its increasing presence in studies of hazard 
management, and its positive impact on the interpretive capacity of researchers.  
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3.2: Research timeframe and location 
This next section will outline the timeframe and locations used to conduct this 
PhD research, with fieldwork carried out in both Iceland and the UK. Due to the 
varied geographical locations, the research took place during separate fieldwork 
periods:  
1. March-April 2014: A five-week fieldwork period spent in Iceland, 
during which 36 semi-structured interviews (see Table 3.2, pp.75-76) 
and 5 participant observations were conducted (see Table 3.5, pp.82-
83). 9 monitoring or response agencies were contacted and 
researched, along with community-based stakeholders in Vík (Vík í 
Mýrdal) and Höfn (Höfn í Hornafirði). 
 
2. August and October 2014: Two separate pieces of fieldwork, each 
with a duration of 5 days, were conducted in the UK. The August 
fieldwork took place at the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the 
Cabinet Office in London. The October fieldwork was based at the 
London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (London VAAC) in Exeter 
and Diamond Aviation in Bournemouth. 10 semi-structured 
interviews (see Table 3.3, p.76-77) and 3 participant observations 
were carried out (see Table 3.6, p.83).  
 
In addition, 18 Skype interviews were conducted intermittently between April and 
December 2014 (see Table 3.4, pp.77-78). Stakeholders that were unreachable in 
person, primarily due to time, geographical or financial constraints, were 
contacted in this manner. 
 
3.2.1: Fieldwork conducted in Iceland (4th March 2014 - 8th April 2014) 
The fieldwork was mainly conducted at institutional headquarters in or around 
the capital, Reykjavík (see Figure 3.2, p.71). However, community-based research 
also took place in Vík (Lat 6°.25'N, Long 19°1'W) and Höfn (Lat 64°15'N, Long 
15°13'W). 
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Figure 3.1: The location of the three research sites in Southern Iceland (Source: Google Maps. 
Date accessed: June 2016). 
Initial visits were made to four prominent Icelandic institutions at the beginning 
of the fieldwork, namely the national aviation service provider (Isavia), the 
Department of Civil Protection (CP), the University of Iceland (UoI) and the 
Icelandic Met Office.  
 
Figure 3.2: Locations of the monitoring and response institutions in Reykjavík, where 
preliminary visits were made (Source: Google Maps. Date accessed: June 2016). 
During these preliminary visits, discussions were held in relation to what 
interviews could be arranged, and what observations were feasible when 
considering the duration, finance and objectives of the research. Each visit was 
pre-arranged by email communication prior to the fieldwork commencing, and 
Reykjavík 
Vík 
Höfn 
IMO 
UoI 
CP 
Isavia 
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made a significant impact on how the research progressed. For example, the visits 
not only allowed for a ‘meet and greet’ with leading representatives, but also 
enabled potential interviewees to be identified and contacted at the earliest 
opportunity. Therefore, the planning of the research was improved, and a 
fieldwork schedule was constructed.   
Interviews and participant observations followed and were carried out on 
a regular basis with an extensive range of stakeholders from scientific, social and 
political backgrounds. Many of the participant observations were conducted 
relatively early during the fieldwork, and most of them provided networking 
opportunities that led to an increased number of interviews taking place in the 
latter weeks. Similarly, interviews conducted with the UoI led to contact being 
made with representatives of FutureVolc, an EU-funded project that is designed 
to encourage collaboration in the monitoring of volcanic hazards in Europe (see 
pp.103-106). As the fieldwork progressed, it adopted the snowballing method to 
broaden the range of interviewees (Seidman, 2013; Davies and Hughes, 2014; 
Lucas, 2014).  
Snowballing is defined as when “samplers recruit and interview some 
volunteers, afterward asking for referrals to other potential respondents” (Lucas, 
2014, p.394). By widening the scope of the research, the snowball technique made 
a significant contribution to the data collected. However, the reliance on the 
snowballing method can be challenged as it left the research vulnerable to 
sampling bias; respondents may have been inclined to mention colleagues who 
have similar views and outlooks to their own. Therefore, the range, 
representation and authenticity of the interview sample can be questioned. 
However, these concerns were recognised prior to the fieldwork, and measures 
were taken to mitigate against them. For example, the initial sample consisted of 
interviewees from civil protection services, scientific institutions, academic 
research communities and the aviation industry; this measure ensured there were 
a diverse range of participants from the outset.  
Whilst much of the research took place in Reykjavík, the fourth week of 
the fieldwork was spent engaging with the communities of Vík and Höfn (see 
Table 3.1, p.73), in the south and east of Iceland respectively. Four days were 
spent in Höfn (23rd - 26th March), with a further three days in Vík (27th - 29th 
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March); this time allowed for semi-structured interviews to be conducted in both 
communities, and also at nearby farms. Institutions such as the UoI were 
returned to during the final week of the fieldwork, and follow-up interviews were 
conducted. These were also semi-structured and were designed to expand on the 
data that had been collected previously.  
Table 3.1: Fieldwork timetable for Iceland (March - April 2014) 
Week One: 
4th - 9th 
March 
 Initial meetings with four key institutions that had been 
contacted prior to the fieldwork (the IMO, the CP, the 
UoI and Isavia). 
 Several interviews and observations were arranged. 
Week Two: 
10th - 16th 
March 
 A tour of the IMO, meeting the Natural Hazards 
representatives. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted. 
 The VolcIce exercise was observed at the IMO and Isavia. 
 Follow-up interviews were conducted at Isavia. 
Week Three: 
17th - 23rd 
March 
 Observations of IMO forecasting, including a tutorial of 
the software programs that are used to gather, program 
and share data and information. 
 Interviews were conducted with members of the 
FutureVolc project at the UoI. 
Week Four:  
23rd - 29th 
March 
 Interviews were conducted with farmers, community 
leaders and members of the public in and around Höfn 
and Skaftafell National Park, as well as members of the 
Icelandic Red Cross in Vík and Þórsmörk Nature Reserve. 
Week Five: 
30th March - 
8th April 
 A tour of the media facilities at the CP, semi-structured 
interviews were also conducted. 
 Follow-up interviews carried out at the UoI in Reykjavík. 
 Preliminary arrangements made for UK-based fieldwork, 
following contact with the London VAAC and the British 
Geological Survey. 
 
3.2.2: Fieldwork conducted in the UK (August and October 2014) 
When interviewing or observing Icelandic institutions, notes were taken when 
participants referred to the collaborative links between Iceland and the UK. The 
semi-structured format of the interviews enabled these links to be probed, and 
numerous UK-based contacts were named. Once the fieldwork in Iceland had 
concluded, emails were sent to these persons or organisations; the research 
agenda was explained and a potential interview or observation was requested. 
Following several positive responses, the research was expanded to the UK and 
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the fieldwork was designed to explore the stakeholder cohesion between the two 
countries. However, unlike the research conducted in Iceland, the UK-based 
fieldwork was considerably focussed and agency-specific:  
1) August 2014: 3 interviews were conducted at the CAA and 
Cabinet Office in London, with an emphasis on policymaking and 
governance. 
2) October 2014: 7 interviews were conducted at the London VAAC 
in Exeter and Diamond Aviation in Bournemouth, along with two 
participant observations; this research focussed on monitoring 
practices and responsibilities.  
In contrast to the snowballing method, the interviews and observations 
conducted in the UK were pre-planned and targeted directly at leading 
institutions. Furthermore, the UK fieldwork was carried out on a much more 
restricted budget, and was supported by a grant from the Royal Geographical 
Society.  
Nevertheless, the five-day duration of both research periods in the UK 
(August and October) enabled interviews to be flexibly scheduled with several 
relevant personnel. However, as the duration was not prolonged, unlike in 
Iceland, any follow-up interviews were conducted via Skype at a later date. 
Despite the financial and temporal limitations, the October research did lead to 
an unanticipated visit to Diamond Aviation at Bournemouth Airport, where an 
additional interview and observation were carried out. The methods and styles of 
data collection were largely unchanged between the field sites in Iceland and the 
UK; this enabled the research to examine the set-up of approaches to volcanic 
hazard management in both countries. The next section of this methodology 
refers to the specific process through which various stakeholder communities 
were interviewed, observed and researched. 
 
3.3: Research methods and materials 
3.3.1: Semi-structured interviewing  
Interviews were a significant part of the research conducted at each of the study 
sites in both Iceland (see Table 3.2, pp.75-76) and the UK (see Table 3.3, p.76-
77), and generated invaluable qualitative evidence. In addition, semi-structured 
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interviews were also carried out intermittently via Skype with Icelandic, UK and 
global actors (see Table 3.4, pp.77-78); this demonstrates the scope and expanse 
of the research. The identity of participant(s) has remained anonymous 
throughout the fieldwork and transcription process, with contributors generally 
being referred to in this thesis through the title of the institution they represent 
(see pp.88-89 for a more extensive outline of the research ethics). An institutional 
role or position may occasionally be referenced, but only when the participant(s) 
cannot be traced. 
Table 3.2: Interviews conducted in Iceland (March - April 2014) 
Organisation 
and interview 
location(s) 
Number 
of 
interviews 
Type and role of 
organisation 
Background and 
range of interviewees 
University of 
Iceland, 
Reykjavík 
6 A leading research 
institute for volcanic 
and earth science in 
Iceland, also a 
founding member of 
the FutureVolc 
community. 
Interviewees were 
largely academics, 
PhD’s and scientists 
from geophysical, 
geographical and 
sustainability 
backgrounds.  
Icelandic Met 
Office, 
Reykjavík 
7 The meteorological 
agency responsible 
for monitoring 
natural hazards. 
Interviewees included 
specialists in volcanic 
hazards, seismic 
development and ash 
dispersion. 
Department 
of Civil 
Protection, 
Reykjavík 
4 The service provider 
for emergency 
management in 
Iceland. 
Interviewees varied 
from departmental 
managers, project 
managers, PhD’s and 
specialists in hazard 
response.  
Isavia, 
Reykjavík 
Airport 
4 The service regulator 
for air navigation in 
Iceland. 
Interviewees were 
from aviation 
backgrounds and 
included project 
managers, exercise 
coordinators and air 
traffic control experts. 
Environment 
Agency of 
Iceland, 
Reykjavík 
1 An institution 
promoting public 
awareness of 
environmental risks, 
such as volcanic gas 
hazards. 
The interviewee was a 
researcher and 
environmental 
specialist. Data was 
provided from an 
interdisciplinary 
perspective. 
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Reykjavík 
Metropolitan 
Police, 
Reykjavík 
2 Reykjavík-based 
police, influential in 
responding to risks 
throughout Iceland. 
Interviewees included 
department managers 
and personnel who 
were responsible for 
communicating 
through social media. 
Icelandair, 
Keflavík 
Airport 
1 The national airline 
of Iceland with 
experience of flying 
during volcanic crises, 
e.g. Eyjafjallajökull. 
A representative was 
interviewed, offering 
an insight into how the 
airline adheres to 
advice and takes 
appropriate decisions 
during times of 
volcanic activity.  
Icelandic Red 
Cross, Vík 
2 A volunteer society 
assisting in hazard 
response. 
Interviewees were 
community-based 
volunteers. The 
response measures 
taken during an 
eruption were outlined.  
Icelandic 
Association 
for Search and 
Rescue (ICE-
SAR), 
Reykjavík, Vík 
and Höfn 
3 Search and rescue 
organisation trained 
in responding to a 
range of hazards that 
occur across Iceland. 
Interviewees included 
personnel that had 
been involved in 
preparation and 
prevention exercises. 
Miscellaneous 6 Various community 
roles/responsibilities. 
Community leaders 
and farmers 
contributed.  
 
Table 3.3: Interviews conducted in the UK (August and October 2014) 
Organisation 
and interview 
location(s) 
Number 
of 
interviews 
Type and role of 
organisation 
Background and 
range of interviewees 
London 
Volcanic Ash 
Advisory 
Centre, Met 
Office, Exeter 
7 The forecasting 
agency responsible 
for monitoring and 
modelling plumes of 
ash from erupting 
volcanoes. 
Interviewees included 
strategic operations 
and technical 
managers, researchers 
in natural hazards, and 
the atmospheric 
dispersion and air 
quality teams. 
Civil Aviation 
Authority, 
London 
1 The regulatory body 
and policymaker for 
aviation in the UK. 
A representative of the 
CAA provided an 
overview of how UK 
airspace is governed 
during a volcanic 
eruption. 
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Cabinet 
Office, 
London 
1 The department of 
central government 
responsible for 
governing risks posed 
to the UK, including 
volcanic gas hazards. 
An interview was 
conducted with a 
project manager who 
was responsible for the 
arrangement the 
Cabinet Office had 
with managing volcanic 
gas.  
Diamond 
Aviation, 
Bournemouth 
Airport 
1 An aviation 
consultancy and the 
location of the 
Meteorological Office 
Civil Contingencies 
Aircraft (MOCCA). 
A technical specialist 
took part in an 
interview that focussed 
primarily on the use of 
the UK Met Office’s 
MOCCA aircraft. 
 
         Table 3.4: Interviews conducted via Skype (April - December 2014) 
Organisation 
and interview 
location(s) 
Number of 
interviews 
Type and role of 
organisation 
Background and 
range of interviewees 
Department 
for Transport 
(DfT), 
London 
1 The government 
department 
responsible for 
transport in the UK.  
The interviewee was a 
key member of the 
response team, whose 
objective it is to 
minimise the impact of 
volcanic activity upon 
transportation in the 
UK. 
Nicarnica 
Aviation AS, 
Lysaker, Oslo, 
Norway 
1 A private company 
specialising in the 
development of 
sensors that can 
identify and 
monitor volcanic 
ash plumes. 
An interview was 
conducted with a 
project manager who 
has had close relations 
with monitoring 
institutions in Iceland. 
Norwegian 
Institute for 
Air Research 
(NILU), 
Kjeller, 
Norway 
1 A laboratory and 
research 
consultancy that 
aims to improve 
awareness of 
volcanic hazards 
and the impacts on 
aviation. 
The interviewee was a 
creator of innovative 
technology that could 
be used to identify the 
presence of volcanic 
ash. 
International 
Civil Aviation 
Organization 
(ICAO) 
2 The global regulator 
and policymaker for 
aviation, overseeing 
VAAC’s worldwide. 
Interviewees included 
project managers. 
discussion topics were 
related to the 
policymaking process. 
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UK 
Universities 
(Cabot Inst., 
Bristol; Dept. 
of Earth 
Sciences, 
Cambridge; 
Sch. of Env 
Sci, University 
of East 
Anglia, 
Norwich) 
7 Academic 
institutions studying 
Icelandic volcanism, 
based in the UK. 
Interviewees consisted 
of research fellows, 
research associates, 
professors and PhD’s 
who specialise in 
Icelandic volcanism 
and risk.  
British 
Geological 
Survey (BGS), 
Nottingham 
2 A body conducting 
geoscientific 
research in the UK. 
BGS also produce 
data that 
contributes to the 
monitoring of 
volcanoes in 
Iceland. 
Interviewees included a 
technician and a 
researcher. Interviews 
were intended to 
highlight the links 
between the BGS and 
Icelandic organisations. 
Rolls Royce, 
Derby 
1 A manufacturer of 
engine components 
used on civilian 
aircraft.  
An interview took 
place with a project 
engineer. Questions 
focussed on the 
interaction between 
ICAO, Rolls Royce 
and airlines.  
EasyJet, 
Luton 
1 An airline based in 
the UK. EasyJet 
have played a key 
role in trialling 
technology that has 
been designed to 
mitigate risks posed 
by volcanic activity. 
A representative of the 
airline was contacted in 
relation to EasyJet’s 
trialling of devices such 
as the Airborne 
Volcanic Object 
Imaging Detector 
(AVOID). 
Follow-up 
Interviews 
2 Follow-up 
interviews were 
conducted with 
both the Icelandic 
Met Office and the 
Civil Protection 
following the 
eruption of 
Bárðarbunga (2014-
2015). 
 
A follow-up interview 
was conducted with 
one representative 
from both institutions. 
Interviews were 
tailored to their 
respective monitoring 
and response practices. 
 
The wide range of participating stakeholders illustrates the complexity of 
the research. In addition, it provides evidence of how the targeting of participants 
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became distanced from the original focus on academics and scientists. By the 
second week of the fieldwork (see Table 3.1, p.73), the range of interviewees had 
begun to transcend the institutional boundaries of the IMO, the UoI, Isavia and 
the CP. Personnel from these institutions were initially chosen because of their 
alignment with the network’s exchange of knowledge and information. The pool 
of interviewees gradually expanded as the research developed; for example, 
interviewing representatives of the CP led to contact being made with ICE-SAR, 
the Reykjavík Metropolitan Police and the Icelandic Red Cross. Whilst the 
approaches made to the recommended contacts were not always successful, in 
most cases an interview was arranged in due course. 
Both networking and the exploitation of stakeholder connections were 
vital to broadening the research findings and gaining access to the various 
segments of Iceland’s hazard network. Semi-structured interviewing made 
valuable use of the institutional overlaps and close-knit culture within Icelandic 
society; however, if this study were to be replicated in volcanic environments that 
are more politically or demographically challenging (Indonesia and Central/South 
America for example), considerable difficulties may be experienced. Nevertheless, 
the semi-structured format and snowballing of interviews was integral to the 
research extending beyond institutional headquarters in Reykjavík. Lines of 
questioning were modified accordingly to suit the diverse backgrounds of 
stakeholders, many of whom were not from scientific institutions.  
However, regardless of data being gathered from a holistic array of 
stakeholder entities, the vast majority of interviews took place in either academic 
or workplace environments; these included the IMO and the UoI. On the rare 
occasion that an interview was conducted in a public or domestic location, the 
setting was noted so that any potential impact on the information shared could be 
acknowledged (Herzog, 2005). The equipment used during interviews consisted 
of a Dictaphone, provided free of charge by Aberystwyth University, and a field 
diary for recording notes. This PhD research was principally funded by the 
‘Doctoral Career Development Scholarship’ from Aberystwyth University, and 
the ‘Geographical Club Award’ from the Royal Geographical Society. The 
funding meant that many interviewees were met in person; the face-to-face 
contact was significant as it enhanced data collection by establishing a good 
rapport (Brinkmann, 2014). Interviews conducted at the IMO, and in the 
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community of Vík, varied from twenty minutes to two hours in duration; the 
lengthier interviews reflect the willingness of many participants to engage in the 
research.  
Whilst the semi-structured format enabled lines of questioning to be 
individually tailored to the interviewee, a flexible and amendable schedule was 
drafted and trialled before the fieldwork commenced (see Appendix 1.2, pp.259-
261). For example, questions were divided into three relatively distinct sections, 
titled A, B and C. In section A, questions were asked on the specific role and 
expertise of the individual, with the intention to explore their background and 
positionality within Iceland’s network. This first section often expanded on the 
archival research that had been beforehand. Section B included open-ended 
questions, designed to probe and penetrate the interviewees’ interactions. These 
questions were the most varied between each interview; for example, some 
focussed on mitigation partnerships or the use of monitoring devices, whilst 
others addressed inter-agency communication, social media use, or past 
experiences of volcanic activity. Section B allowed many interdisciplinary 
characteristics of the network to be identified and examined. Finally, section C 
focussed on the future evolution of Iceland’s network, with questions relating to 
how its adaptability and resilience were perceived by various stakeholders. The 
interview schedule facilitated interdisciplinary discussion (Galletta, 2013; 
Matthews and Ross, 2010) and enabled penetrative arguments to reflect the key 
collaborative relationships, power dynamics and channels of communication 
within Iceland’s network.  
However, several challenges were experienced when arranging and 
conducting interviews. Firstly, the fieldwork carried out in Iceland did not take 
place in crisis settings and the only notable signs of activity were speculative 
rumours of a potential event at the stratovolcano, Hekla. If the fieldwork had 
taken place during August 2014, at the time when Bárðarbunga erupted, then the 
information gathered may have varied considerably. Furthermore, the UK-based 
research was conducted at a time when the eruption of Bárðarbunga was 
ongoing; therefore, inconsistencies can be identified in the context of the 
fieldwork. Despite there being few identifiable differences in the tone and 
narrative of the interviews, the situational variance posed an unexpected 
challenge. On the other hand, the timing and sequence of the Bárðarbunga 
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eruption can also be interpreted as beneficial to the research; for example, if an 
eruption had occurred in Iceland whilst the research there was being conducted, 
the ability to collect data may have been significantly reduced. Furthermore, 
follow-up interviews were conducted with both the IMO and the CP following 
the peak of the Bárðarbunga eruption; these enabled situational differences to be 
partially bridged. 
Secondly, exploring Iceland’s network from a sociological perspective 
inevitably led to several misunderstandings of phrases and the research agenda. 
However, no significant problems were experienced as the interdisciplinary lens 
of interpretation was not dismissive of the natural sciences. Therefore, the 
narrative had sufficient scope to recognise and adhere to scientific processes and 
understandings. A further challenge stemmed from interviews covering topics 
that could be considered sensitive or judgemental. Whilst each interview had been 
designed to convey strong and emotive opinions, caution was required when lines 
of questioning touched on the socio-political implications of the Eyjafjallajökull 
eruption. In addition, topics such as the intrusion of the media and the evolution 
of intergovernmental relationships were often only discussed once they had been 
referred to by the interviewee. The preliminary trialling of interviews, conducted 
prior to the fieldwork, identified the discussion subjects that needed to be 
approached discretely.  
A further challenge stemmed from the position of the researcher evolving 
between the separate fieldwork periods; for example, the interviews conducted in 
the UK had been influenced by the data collected in Iceland. Whilst unavoidable, 
the researcher’s perception of the network had inevitably changed, impacting on 
the questions asked and the information sought. Several other issues were also 
experienced during the fieldwork; these included the need to avoid rhetorical 
questions, and the rejection of interview requests. From the large number of 
contacts that were approached (a total of 79), six potential interviewees refused to 
participate, a further seven did not respond to the request, and three cancelled 
because the time and/or location were unsuitable. 
 
3.3.2: Participant observations  
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Participant observations took place at selected sites in both Iceland (see Table 
3.5, pp.82-83) and the UK (see Table 3.6, p.83); some were focused on observing 
a specific agency, tool or stakeholder, whilst others observed monitoring exercises 
that spanned multiple institutions. Like semi-structured interviews, participant 
observations were intended to provide a qualitative account of Iceland’s approach 
to hazard management, as well as first-hand experience of the network.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Table 3.5: Participant observations conducted in Iceland (March - April 2014) 
Observation  Participants Type of observation  Duration 
VolcIce 
(Volcanic ash 
exercise in 
Iceland) 
 
Conducted: 11th 
March 2014 
IMO: Technical 
staff, forecasting 
team and 
volcanic hazards 
co-ordinator.  
 
Isavia: Project 
manager and 
exercise leader. 
  
London VAAC: 
VolcIce exercise 
representative 
(audio call only). 
The observation 
covered the exercise 
debrief, inter-agency 
communications, use 
of technology and in-
house discussions.  
 
The location changed 
between the IMO 
and Isavia, but 
remained in 
Reykjavík.  
The exercise 
was observed 
in its entirety, 
over a 5-hour 
period from 
08.00 until 
13.00 (approx.). 
 
The debrief 
was observed 
from 15.00 
until 16.00 
(approx.).  
Seismic 
monitoring 
equipment and 
software 
demonstration 
 
Conducted: 18th 
March 2014 
IMO: Technical 
staff and 
forecasting team.  
A demonstration of 
how specific technical 
instruments and 
software programs 
are used to construct 
and communicate 
hazard information. 
Actions were fully 
explained and on-the-
spot questions were 
asked. 
Approximately 
two hours were 
spent observing 
the equipment.  
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Media suite 
and facilities 
(tour and 
discussion) 
 
Conducted: 31st 
March 2014 
 
 
CP: Individual 
staff members 
experienced in 
communicating 
with the media. 
A tour was given of 
the in-house facilities 
provided for 
domestic and 
international press 
conferences. A 
discussion between 
participants was 
observed and 
highlighted how the 
CP communicate 
with media outlets. 
The tour and 
discussion 
lasted for 
approximately 
one hour 
(combined).  
Isavia control 
room tour and 
demonstration 
 
Conducted: 21st 
March 2014 
Isavia:  Project 
managers and air 
traffic operations 
staff.  
Isavia provided a tour 
of the control room 
and demonstrated 
how it functions 
during a volcanic 
crisis. 
The tour and 
demonstration 
took two hours 
to complete 
(approx.).  
University of 
Iceland group 
discussion  
 
Conducted: 1st 
April 2014 
UoI: Research 
staff, academics 
and members of 
the FutureVolc 
project. 
 
Participants were 
from the 
Institute of Earth 
Sciences at the 
UoI. 
A discussion meeting 
was observed without 
any intervention from 
the researcher. Topics 
included the 
FutureVolc project.  
The discussion 
lasted for 
approximately 
one and a half 
hours. 
 
Table 3.6: Participant observations conducted in the UK (October 2014) 
Observation Participants  Type of observation  Duration 
VolcIce:  
Volcanic ash 
exercise (guide 
and tutorial) 
 
Conducted: 2nd 
October 2014 
 
 
London VAAC: 
Both the 
strategic 
operations staff 
and forecasting 
team were 
involved. 
The guide included a 
demonstration of the 
specific actions taken 
by the London 
VAAC at various 
points within the 
VolcIce exercise. 
Reference was made 
to the exercise that 
had previously been 
observed in Iceland. 
The exercise 
was not studied 
in real-time but 
the 
demonstration 
took place over 
a period of 
approximately 
two hours.  
   87 
 
MOCCA 
aircraft tour 
 
Conducted: 3rd 
October 2014 
 
London VAAC: 
Technical staff 
responsible for 
the MOCCA 
aircraft. 
The MOCCA aircraft 
was introduced, and 
the on-board 
equipment and 
monitoring facilities 
were explained. On-
the-spot questions 
were asked. 
The tour of 
MOCCA lasted 
approximately 
two hours 
during a visit to 
Bournemouth 
Airport. 
UK Met Office 
forecasting 
room (tour and 
demonstration) 
 
Conducted: 4th 
October 2014 
 
UK Met Office: 
Contributors 
included project 
managers and 
forecasters. 
The use of 
technology and the 
process of 
communication were 
both demonstrated 
during a tour of the 
forecasting facilities 
at the UK Met 
Office. 
Approximately 
one hour was 
spent 
completing the 
tour and 
demonstration. 
 
Both scientific and aviation communities were observed during the 
research, with a specific focus on their means of communicating and use of 
sophisticated technology. By observing the actions of both individuals and 
stakeholder groupings, it became apparent how data is transferred and where 
communication channels are most valued. Some of the observations were 
unplanned and opportunistic, and were conducted as the research developed; 
examples include the tour of the media suite at the CP and the demonstration of 
seismic monitoring equipment at the IMO. However, the observation of the 
VolcIce exercise had been pre-arranged following communication with both the 
IMO and Isavia. Each observation involved shadowing stakeholders; this allowed 
on-the-spot questions to be asked and demonstrated Iceland’s network in action 
(McDonald, 2005). By frequently asking on-the-spot questions, the research could 
penetrate the thoughts and explanations of the observed participant.  
Shadowing reinforced the interconnected vision of the network as 
observations often allowed for a broad and holistic process of communication to 
be explored in real-time. Therefore, it became possible to identify where 
knowledge or information were actively co-produced, power was distributed, and 
the network was configured (McDonald, 2005). All observations were location 
specific and most were carried out within agency headquarters; the only exception 
was the observation of the MOCCA aircraft, which took place off-site at 
Bournemouth Airport. The agency setting added to the authenticity of the 
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observations, primarily because it enabled stakeholder communication to be 
studied in a dynamic space that is operational during periods of volcanic activity. 
An informative field diary was used in each observation to record notes, diagrams 
and key quotations (see Appendix 3.1, p.266).  
The qualitative nature of the field diary incorporated time-specific detail 
and description; therefore, it became a powerful attribute that had the capacity to 
record and explain any discrepancies. Furthermore, many observed actions could 
not be orally recorded and video was not an option due to the need to maintain 
anonymity. As a result, the field diary provided a means of recording individual 
communications and uses of technology; entries were initially short-hand in form 
due to time constraints, but were expanded upon when time allowed. Following 
each observation, the data in the field diary was coded accordingly and links to 
the interdisciplinary premise of the research were established. The observations 
varied considerably in duration, and this demonstrated the flexibility of the 
methodological set-up (see Table 3.5 [pp.82-83] and Table 3.6 [p.83]).  
During the observations, technical tools and software’s were not used at 
first-hand by the researcher; the exposure to them resulted from demonstrations 
of how they would be used, in crisis situations, by the actors responsible. The 
format of observations also had few commonalities; for example, some actively 
explored the VolcIce exercise step-by-step, whilst others required the researcher 
to be a silent observer. Furthermore, there were considerable disparities in the 
number of participants; for instance, some observations were specific to a 
department within an agency, and involved only five or six staff members. In 
contrast, other observations spanned collaborative engagements and addressed 
numerous actors from both scientific and non-scientific backgrounds.  
However, whilst participant observations were largely successful, 
problems and constraints were experienced. For example, the observation of the 
VolcIce exercise was particularly problematic as it was carried out at an 
international scale across multiple institutions. The original intention was to 
conduct the observation at the IMO and Isavia in March 2014, and at the 
London VAAC in October 2014. However, due to a combination of the 
Bárðarbunga eruption (in August 2014) and a change in the responsibilities of the 
agencies involved, the October exercise could not go ahead as planned. 
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Nevertheless, the London VAAC were cooperative and used a demonstration of 
the exercise to illustrate the actions that would otherwise have been taken. 
Furthermore, this problem with the research is reflective of the tenuous, complex 
and unpredictable nature of volcanic hazard management. The problems 
experienced were unavoidable as the feasibility of the fieldwork meant the 
London VAAC could not be visited prior to the Bárðarbunga eruption. In 
addition, policy changes were enrolled whilst the fieldwork was ongoing, and this 
questioned the long-term relevance of exercises such as VolcIce (see pp.114-117). 
These structural changes to Iceland’s network were beyond the control of this 
study and reflected the evolving dynamics of hazard networks. 
 
3.3.3: Archival research  
Both semi-structured interviews and participant observations were influenced by 
archival research. For example, when preparing for the fieldwork, or addressing 
any ambiguities that were accrued over the course of it, many policy documents, 
social media platforms and literary materials were frequently referred to and 
consulted.  
Table 3.7: Archival research completed as part of the fieldwork 
Topic Source Contribution to 
fieldwork 
Time 
conducted 
VolcIce 
exercise 
Internet-based: 
Exercise reports 
were accessed and 
archived from links 
on the London 
VAAC website (see 
References, p.239).  
These reports 
provided an 
insight into the 
outcomes of 
previous exercises, 
as well as 
structural changes 
and the use of its 
outputs. 
January - 
March 2014: 
Prior to the 
fieldwork in 
Iceland. 
Department of 
Civil Protection 
resources 
Literary-based: 
Access was gained 
to CP resources that 
illustrated the 
mapping of risks.  
Cartographic 
materials 
highlighted the 
municipal division 
of risk 
management in 
Iceland. 
March - April 
2014: During 
the fieldwork 
conducted in 
Iceland. 
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Decision-
making within 
the aviation 
industry 
Internet-based: 
The evolution of 
the decision-making 
protocol was 
researched. Policy 
documents were 
accessed to identify 
trends following 
Eyjafjallajökull. 
Archiving policy 
alterations allowed 
the empirics to 
address the 
dynamism of both 
governance and 
decision-making 
within the aviation 
industry.  
April - August 
2014: Between 
the Iceland and 
UK-based 
fieldwork. 
AVOID 
technology  
Internet-based: 
Documentation of 
the testing process 
was studied (see 
appendix 3.2, 
p.268). Websites 
included EasyJet 
and NILU. 
 
This research 
expanded on the 
understanding of 
AVOID, as 
discussed during 
interviews in 
Iceland. 
May - June 
2014: 
Following the 
fieldwork in 
Iceland. 
UK 
intervention 
during the 
Eyjafjallajökull 
eruption (2010) 
Internet-based: 
Minutes of 
Scientific Advisory 
Group for 
Emergencies 
(SAGE) meetings, 
and Cabinet Office 
Briefing Room 
(COBR) reports, 
were studied (see 
appendices 4.1 
[pp.269-270] and 
4.2 [pp.271-272]). 
The minutes 
enlightened the 
researcher on the 
close links 
between Iceland 
and the UK, 
following the 2010 
eruption of 
Eyjafjallajökull. 
August - 
October 2014: 
Between the 
Iceland and 
UK-based 
fieldwork. 
Social Media 
use during the 
Bárðarbunga 
eruption (2014-
2015) 
Internet-based:  
Social media sites 
were monitored 
daily for a duration 
of three months. 
Communications 
(messages, graphics) 
on Facebook and 
Twitter were stored 
(see Appendix 3.2, 
p.267). 
Archiving social 
media interactions 
allowed the 
research to analyse 
the real-time use 
of such platforms 
in crisis situations. 
Pages studied 
included the IMO 
and the CP. 
August - 
October 2014: 
During the 
Bárðarbunga 
eruption, and 
prior to the 
fieldwork 
conducted in 
the UK 
 
Prior to the fieldwork being conducted in Iceland, much of the archival 
research centred on the discovery of background information. The actions of 
leading institutions such as the IMO and the London VAAC were researched to 
gain an understanding of the general structure of Iceland’s network. However, as 
the fieldwork evolved, and the study adapted to events such as the Bárðarbunga 
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eruption, the archival research became less pre-empted and more reactionary. 
Policy and material extracts were stored in a Word document and colour-coded in 
accordance with the thematic analysis (see pp.89-90). The information gathered 
was largely subjective and the most relevant segments were used to either 
influence the empirics, or to present evidence in the form of direct quotations. 
Much of the archival research was conducted in an office environment in the 
UK, or within institutional settings whilst on location in Iceland.  
As many policy documents, exercise reports and social media resources 
have an openly accessible presence on-line, much of the information could be 
gathered without restrictions; the potential problems associated with archiving 
information have therefore been reduced. In addition, the digital presence of 
many documents and materials improved the efficiency of the research; for 
instance, resources could be accessed without needing to travel in person. 
However, much of the information collected towards the beginning of the 
research has inevitably become less accurate, and has since been updated. 
Nevertheless, the archival research that has been carried out has made a valuable 
contribution to the interpretive capacity of the research findings, and has 
facilitated a subjective analysis of Iceland’s complex network.  
 
3.4: Research ethics 
When conducting both semi-structured interviews and participant observations, 
measures were taken to ensure that ethics and integrity were maintained at all 
times. For confidentiality and anonymity purposes, the names and identities of 
those participating were omitted from recordings and transcripts. Instead, 
reference has only been made to the agency or institution to which they are 
associated. These measures were intended to maximise clarity and trust between 
the researcher and the participant; interviewees are likely to be have been more 
inclined to share information that may not otherwise be divulged if they were 
identifiable (DiCiccio-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). Assurances were offered 
through an informed consent document (see Appendix 2.1, pp.262-263) and an 
information sheet that clearly outlined the aims and objectives of the research 
agenda (see Appendix 2.2, pp.264-265). Each interviewee was required to sign the 
documents before the interview or observation could proceed. In addition, 
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participants were given multiple opportunities to ask questions and raise any 
concerns they may have had. When presenting the data in this thesis, in the form 
of interview extracts and direct quotations, the institutional position or role of the 
respondent may also be referenced, but only when their anonymity can be 
maintained. 
Participants also had the choice of whether a Dictaphone was used to 
record interview discussions. If there were objections to the Dictaphone, then 
notes were taken in a qualitative field diary instead. Following each interview or 
observation, participants were able to access a completed transcript and had the 
option of removing information that they felt should not have been included. 
These measures were necessary as observations sometimes recognised human 
error, and interviews often became personalised or focussed on a specific event 
or responsibility. When Skype was used to conduct an interview, the informed 
consent document was signed electronically or posted, and a Dictaphone 
continued to be used with the interviewee’s permission (Sullivan, 2012).  
However, ethical issues were experienced as some stakeholders were 
incorporated into the research whilst an observation was ongoing. For example, 
the forecasting team at the IMO interacted with the observed participants during 
the VolcIce exercise, and additional contributors joined a discussion meeting that 
was convened at the UoI. On both occasions, participants were observed whose 
engagement had not previously been anticipated, and who had not been briefed 
beforehand. This problem was unavoidable as the need to preserve the 
authenticity of the observations meant that they could not be interrupted or 
ended prematurely. Instead, each participant was retrospectively informed of 
what had taken place, and only once they had given their consent, could the 
observation be referred to in this thesis. Although some participants sought 
reassurance, there were no objections and the potential impact on the research 
was reduced.  
 
3.5: Qualitative data analysis 
The practice of transcribing the semi-structured interviews, and analysing the 
information documented in the field diary, was initiated shortly after the 
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fieldwork in Iceland and the UK had concluded. Each interview was transcribed 
in full and then stored electronically in a Microsoft Word document. The 
transcription process extended until January 2015 due to the large quantity of 
information gathered. A thematic analysis (Attride-Stirling, 2001) was then carried 
out with the aid of an NVivo software package (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013); this 
led to the evidence being colour coded when it related to communication, 
technology, power or trust (see Appendix 1.1, pp.255-258). The analysis also 
identified the use of scientific or technical language, and multiple references to 
specific research projects and initiatives; these have since been explained in 
Chapter Four (see p.91).  
The vast quantity of data collected has meant a level of choice regarding 
the use of evidence in this thesis. When analysing the research findings, some 
quotations were deemed to be powerfully expressive and of greater value to the 
empirics. Participants often referred directly to interactions between leading 
institutions and stakeholder communities, and mentioned specific technologies 
when providing examples of how Iceland’s network continues to evolve. These 
findings are of considerable value to the research and are strategically positioned 
in this thesis. Furthermore, there has been a need to include quotations from 
across a wide range of stakeholder communities, both scientific and non-
scientific. This ensures the findings are reflective of the network’s holism and 
prevents speculative arguments from being dominated by evidence from a one-
sided pool of participants. Therefore, the inclusion of selected quotations is 
determined by the quality of the content and the variation in the background of 
participants.  
However, quotations are not simply outlined or alluded to briefly; due to 
the interdisciplinary focus of the research, this thesis intersperses quotes with 
extensive discussion that resonates with social theory. The subjective analysis of 
Iceland’s network allows theory and practice to interact in a critical and 
speculative manner. Each of the approaches covered in this methodology were 
implemented effectively (semi-structured interviewing, participant observations 
and archival research), and have provided interpretations of the network that are 
of value to an interdisciplinary research agenda. Despite some notable 
constraints, the mixed methods approach has been compatible with the 
situational context of this PhD research.  
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Chapter Four: A contextual overview of Iceland’s hazard network 
 
This chapter provides a bridge between the methodological base of the research 
and the empirical evidence derived from the fieldwork. By exploring the projects, 
technologies and organisations that have been set-up between recent eruptive 
episodes, the context of the study is outlined. The eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull 
(2010), Grímsvötn (2011) and Bárðarbunga (2014-2015) have each provided 
opportunities to exhibit communication practices within Iceland’s network. The 
first section of this chapter draws on the specificities of Icelandic volcanism, and 
uses them to explain how Iceland’s approach to hazard management tailors itself 
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to this study. An outline of the network’s development follows and reference is 
made to how it has transformed since the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in 2010. 
Recent eruptions in Iceland have had profound impacts on the UK; this has led 
to a robust strengthening of relations between the two countries. Much of the 
data presented in this chapter has emerged from archival research conducted 
following the fieldwork in Iceland (see Table 3.7, pp.86-87).  
 
4.1: Icelandic volcanism: Unearthing the need for a complex hazard 
network 
Iceland is located part-way between the continents of Europe and North America 
(64.9631° N, 19.0208° W), along the highly active Mid-Atlantic Ridge. This has 
resulted in the country experiencing significant levels of intense volcanic activity: 
Iceland is a high volcanic-risk area at an international level because its 
30+ active volcanic systems generate relatively frequent and powerful 
eruptions (Sigmundsson et al., 2013a, p.1). 
The density of volcanic landforms within Iceland is extraordinarily high for a 
relatively small but geologically turbulent island; for example, unpredictable 
volcanic eruptions occur at regular intervals of approximately four or five years. 
The environment is also defined by multi-hazard events of both geological 
(volcanoes, earthquakes, jökulhlaups) and climatic (avalanche, flood, violent 
storms) origin (Bell and Glade, 2012). A sophisticated and flexible managerial set-
up is therefore required to respond to the changing dynamics and situations 
(Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2015; Loughlin et al., 2015).  
 
4.1.1: The geology of Icelandic volcanism 
Iceland’s array of seismic hazards infinitely stems from the country’s location on 
an active hotspot, along the divergent boundary that constitutes the Mid-Atlantic 
Ridge. With the North American and Eurasian plates moving apart at an average 
rate of approximately 2-5 centimetres per annum (United States Geological 
Survey - Understanding Plate Motions, 2016), the fissures beneath the earth’s 
surface have manifested rift zones within which a vast majority of Iceland’s 
volcanic landforms are found. Figure 4.1 (p.92) and Figure 4.2 (p.93) highlight the 
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location of Iceland’s volcanic systems in relation to the complex geological 
setting: 
 
Figure 4.1: The geographic spread and density of Iceland’s volcanic systems, around which a 
complex hazard network is designed (Source: Icelandic Met Office - Earthquakes and 
Volcanism page. Date accessed: May 2016). 
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Figure 4.2: A diagram of Iceland’s geology, highlighting the location of the plate boundary 
and the volcanic zones (Source: Thordarson and Larsen, 2007, p.121). 
Therefore, Icelandic volcanoes are closely aligned with the plate boundary, but 
volcanism in Iceland should not be considered uniform. For example, disparities 
exist between the types of volcanic landforms and eruptions that occur. 
Landforms include stratovolcanoes, calderas and fissures such as Eldgjá, whereas 
eruptions can be either effusive (Laki, 1783-1784) or explosive (Eyjafjallajökull, 
2010). As a result, the hazards stemming from Iceland’s volcanic events can be 
contrasting; primary hazards include lava flows, pyroclastic flows, ash fall and gas 
pollution, whilst secondary hazards include jökulhlaups and debris flows. With 
each hazard varying in temporality, characteristics and impact (Thordarson and 
Larsen, 2007), the mitigation of risk is challenging and stringent mechanisms are 
required to monitor and respond to ongoing activity. 
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4.1.2: Anthropogenic vulnerabilities associated with Iceland’s volcanoes 
The 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull instigated international publicity and 
notoriety towards Icelandic volcanoes (Budd et al., 2011). However, the 
catastrophic impacts of volcanic activity have been felt historically, notably during 
and following the effusive fissure eruption of Lakagígar (Laki, 1783 - 1784). The 
eruption claimed the lives of approximately one quarter of Iceland’s population, 
largely because of crop failure and the consequential famine across Europe. This 
case demonstrated not only the severity of the risks posed by volcanoes in 
Iceland, but also the vulnerability of humanity (Witham et al., 2015). Grattan et al. 
(2003) established that increased mortality rates in England, and across Europe, 
had coincided with the eruption of Laki: 
July 1783 - June 1784 is recognized as containing a one-star mortality 
crisis, indicating an annual mortality rate 10 - 20% above the 51- year 
moving mean; which qualitatively describes the state of the nation’s 
health in the period as ‘unhealthy’. In fact, the national death rate for 
1783-1784 has been calculated to have been 16.7% above the 
projected trend for this period (Grattan et al., 2003, p.405). 
The risk of volcanic gas and haze continues to be a potential future threat to 
European countries; these hazards are very different compared to those caused 
by short duration or explosive eruptions such as Eyjafjallajökull. 
However, in more contemporary times, the impacts of explosive 
eruptions have been magnified by the vulnerability of Europe’s dense aviation 
hub and transatlantic flightpaths. These key transport links are prone to ash-
induced disruption stemming from Icelandic volcanism. Therefore, the pivotal 
location of Iceland between two economically developed continents (Europe and 
North America) is symbolic of the many unique characteristics and challenges of 
this volcanic environment (see pp.92-93). Iceland’s sparse but highly educated 
population of approximately 330,000 people (Statistics Iceland, 2016), also 
highlights the need for a specialised approach to hazard management. Whilst 
much of the population is demographically centred on the capital city, Reykjavík, 
at a relatively safe distance from many of Iceland’s volcanoes, the country has an 
array of natural and social particularities that add to the resilience of the network. 
Iceland’s seismic and socio-economic credentials collectively make the island 
nation a complex, resilient and intriguing volcanic environment to study. 
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4.2: From Eyjafjallajökull to Bárðarbunga: Developing Iceland’s hazard 
network 
Iceland’s specific characteristics and attributes, both geological and social, 
illustrate the need for a resilient and adaptable approach to managing volcanic 
hazards. This section of the chapter describes the changes that have been made 
to the network following a series of large-scale eruptions since 2010. Recent 
eruptive episodes have tested the dynamism of the network and have 
reconfigured the connections that exist between individual stakeholders and 
institutional entities. Both the domestic and international set-ups are evolutionary, 
but also contrasting; this reflects the network’s diversity.  
The Department of Civil Protection (CP) and the Icelandic Met Office 
(IMO) occupy leading roles at a domestic level in Iceland, but are reliant on a 
plethora of institutions for support and expertise. The actions of the CP are 
bound by the Civil Protection Act: 
To prepare, organise and implement measures aimed at preventing 
and, to the extent possible, limiting physical injury or damage to the 
health of the public and damage to the environment and property 
(Department of Civil Protection - Civil Protection Act, 2008, article 
1). 
Therefore, the CP are primarily responsible for coordinating actions at the 
national scale; response measures require extensive planning and are divided into 
three phases (uncertainty, alert and emergency). The structure of the CP has 
various levels of engagement, and strategies for responding to an event can be 
regionalised to municipal authorities (see Figure 4.3, p.96). However, 
responsibilities are ultimately devolved to the “National Commissioner of the 
Icelandic Police” (Elíasson, 2014, p.104), with command centres taking a leading 
role during times of emergency, and administering actions that are intended to 
alleviate risk. Several institutions actively work alongside the CP on a regular 
basis; these include the Environment Agency of Iceland, the Icelandic Police, and 
the Icelandic Association for Search and Rescue (ICE-SAR).  
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Figure 4.3: The systematic structure of the civil protection service in Iceland (Source: Elíasson, 
2014, p.104). 
Meanwhile, the IMO are responsible for “monitoring natural hazards in 
Iceland and conducting research in related fields” (Icelandic Met Office - 
Mission, 2016). The IMO’s domestic partners include the University of Iceland 
(UoI) and Isavia, Iceland’s aviation service provider. Both the CP and the IMO 
work across numerous natural hazards and have extensive affiliations with 
academic research. However, neither can be viewed in isolation as they are both 
required to communicate with a wide range of stakeholders, and are wholly reliant 
on technical devices and software packages. Ideologically, the IMO and the CP 
focus on different stages of the hazard management process (monitoring and 
response respectively), but their actions inevitably overlap and the level of 
engagement between them is considerable. 
 
4.2.1: Instigating change: The eruption of Eyjafjallajökull (20th March - 23rd June 2010) 
The first of Iceland’s large-scale volcanic events, since 2010, was the now 
notorious eruption of Eyjafjallajökull; the impacts were widespread as dense 
volcanic ash was emitted and posed a threat to aviation. Fears of the ash eroding 
the engines of civilian aircraft, and leading to engine failure as a result of abrasion 
and overheating, prompted disruption to the aviation industry across Europe. 
Whilst other risks included potential damage to an aircraft’s fuselage and 
interaction with contaminated air, the vulnerability of engines are viewed as a 
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critical risk (Miller and Casadevall, 2000, in Alexander, 2013a). Incidents such as 
British Airways Flight 009 (Tootell, 1985; Johnson and Casadevall, 1994; Witham 
et al., 2012), when a passenger aircraft experienced engine failure following 
contact with an ash cloud from Mount Galunggung in Indonesia, had raised 
awareness of the dangers associated with volcanic ash. As a result, the aviation 
industry reacted to the Eyjafjallajökull eruption in a cautionary manner.  
However, the physical impacts of Eyjafjallajökull cannot be understated; 
for example, the phreatomagmatic eruption measured four on the Volcanic 
Explosivity Index [VEI] (Szakács and Seghedi, 2013). The volatile interaction of 
water and magma produced concentrations of ash that led to the shutdown of the 
aviation network across Europe. In addition, Eyjafjallajökull illustrated how the 
prevailing wind direction and meteorological forecast has the capacity to re-
energise the spread of highly viscous volcanic material (ash, dust and pyroclastic 
deposits). For example, the wind direction extended the distribution of ash across 
the Western and Central European landmass (Petersen et al., 2012; Ripepe et al., 
2013), expanding the geography of the airspace affected: 
The combination of a prolonged and sustained eruption of fine ash 
and persistent northwesterly winds transporting the ash towards 
southeast, resulted in dispersal of ash over a large part of Europe 
(Gudmundsson et al., 2012, p.1). 
Whilst the eruption affected rural Icelandic communities such as Fljótshlíð, and 
led to numerous evacuations, the expanse of the ash plume (see Figure 4.4, p.98) 
and the concentration of very fine ash particles meant that the greatest impacts 
were felt at an international scale. Levels of uncertainty cannot therefore be 
entirely related to the aviation industry’s lack of preparedness, but can also be 
explained by seismic and locational factors.  
   102 
 
 
Figure 4.4: A satellite photograph of the ash plume emanating from Eyjafjallajökull in 
2010, headed in a south-easterly direction and being transported towards mainland Europe and 
the UK (Source: British Geological Survey [BGS] - Volcanoes: Icelandic ash research page. 
Date accessed: May 2016). 
Nevertheless, whilst the Eyjafjallajökull eruption was ongoing, monitoring 
techniques were available to record ash dispersal in real-time. The lack of 
communication between the aviation industry and scientists undoubtedly 
prolonged the crisis. The five-day closure of European airspace (15th-20th April 
2010), and the cancellation of 95,000 flights by 21st April 2010 (eventually 
reaching over 100,000), were arguably as much an outcome of the aviation 
industry’s mismanagement as they were the result of seismic and meteorological 
processes (Sammonds et al., 2010; Wilson et al., 2014). Closer discussion has since 
been instigated between scientific institutions and the governing bodies of the 
aviation industry. Whilst the eruption was ongoing, amendments were made to 
the protocol for closing airspace; this enabled airspace across Central Europe to 
be reopened, but also reflected the chaotic and reactionary response to the event:  
Under pressure from airlines, the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 
established ad hoc thresholds for safe ash concentrations that 
allowed the resumption of commercial flights (Sammonds et al., 2010, 
p.3). 
   103 
 
The mobilisation of the threshold reflects the improvisation of the aviation 
industry’s approach to handling the crisis; it also exposed the knowledge gap 
between policymakers and scientists.  
Alexander (2013a) is amongst the many researchers who have been 
critical of the aviation industry, and implied that the strategy for managing the 
crisis was based on a “passive ‘wait and see’ approach” (Alexander, 2013a, p.14). 
Attention has also been drawn to the political and social conflicts that emanated 
across Europe because of the airspace closure:  
Eurocontrol, the European Organization for the Safety of Air 
Navigation… did not move towards a harmonized approach until 
impelled to do so by the European Commission at a meeting held on 
19 April, well into the crisis (Brannigan 2010, in Alexander, 2013a, 
p.14).  
Here, Brannigan refers to the slow and inadequate response of policymakers and 
strategists, reflected in the lack of coordinated action until the full scale of the 
crisis had become clear.  
However, the notoriety of the event has undoubtedly led to increased 
investment in monitoring technologies, and has improved levels of engagement 
between the aviation industry and the scientific community. These measures have 
helped to elucidate the concentrations of volcanic ash that are considered 
dangerous to aircraft. Therefore, the 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull can be 
interpreted as a watershed moment in managing Icelandic volcanism: 
The event was a moment of truth… it dramatically illustrated that 
Europe’s airspace control and coordination system was divided and 
dysfunctional (Alemanno, 2010, in Parker, 2015, p.102). 
Alemanno recognised how the event represented the failings of the industry, and 
implied that Eyjafjallajökull would directly impact on responses to future volcanic 
events (Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2012).  
 
4.2.2: Post-Eyjafjallajökull: The eruption of Grímsvötn (22nd May - 25th May 2011)  
The 2011 eruption of Grímsvötn had similar characteristics to Eyjafjallajökull, 
which occurred a little over a year earlier. However, as Grímsvötn was a Plinian 
eruption (Marzano et al., 2013), the vast quantities of ash emitted were coarse 
rather than fine. Therefore, the spatial distribution of the particles was much 
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more constrained and the airborne duration was considerably shorter; this limited 
the potential contamination of airspace. Nevertheless, the eruption measured 
VEI 4 (Gudmundsson et al., 2014), and had a significant impact on the 
communities living under the shadow of the ash cloud. Whilst Grímsvötn caused 
relatively little disruption to international air travel, compared to 2010, there 
remained extreme tension within the aviation community at a time when the 
industry was recovering from the economic damage caused by the Eyjafjallajökull 
eruption. In addition, the location of Grímsvötn, beneath the Vatnajökull glacier, 
meant there was the potential for a phreatomagmatic eruption that could produce 
basaltic materials on a level equivalent to Eyjafjallajökull (Gudmundsson, 2012). 
Consequently, fears were heightened in the aviation industry across Europe, and 
the need for continued interaction with scientists became clear.  
Northerly winds were the protagonist for the 15-20 km high plume and 
50-100 km wide umbrella cloud that developed as a result of Grímsvötn; the 
cloud extended from the south of Iceland to Scandinavia and Northern Europe. 
However, unlike the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull, only low concentrations of ash 
were transported (Gudmundsson, 2012). Therefore, the risk posed to civilian 
aircraft in Central and Western Europe remained extremely low. In addition, the 
response of the aviation industry was rigorous rather than precautionary, and 
acknowledged the thresholds for safe concentrations of ash. Despite 900 flights 
being cancelled across Europe during the Grímsvötn eruption (Parker, 2015), the 
assessment of the response strategy was considerably less critical than it had been 
in 2010; for example, it was defined by coherence rather than contradiction.  
At a domestic level, the ash stemming from Grímsvötn impacted on 
surrounding regions, causing poor visibility, road closures, health concerns and 
damage to rural and agricultural communities (e.g. Kirkjubæjarklaustur) across 
Southern Iceland (Eiser et al., 2015). However, despite the widespread impacts 
felt within Iceland, the actions taken by the aviation community remained the 
focus of international media coverage (Budd et al., 2011). The relatively short 
temporal margin between the eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull (2010) and Grímsvötn 
(2011) allowed for rapid and drastic changes in the network to be recognised. For 
example, Parker (2015) identifies several measures that contributed to the aviation 
industry’s improved management and communication of the event: 
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In December 2010, ICAO finalized the revision of its ‘volcanic ash 
contingency plan’ for Europe, including standardized guidelines for 
alerting aircraft when eruptions occur, which procedures should be 
followed, and for the possible closure of airspace. This guidance 
material capitalizes on the crisis learning that took place in the 
Eyjafjallajökull case from 17th to 18th Apr (Parker, 2015, p.102). 
Parker refers to the impact of agreements between scientists and decision-makers; 
the precautionary approach was not ignored, but the amended guidelines had the 
clarity and flexibility required to avoid a prolonged shutdown of European 
airspace. Furthermore, prior to the Grímsvötn eruption beginning, the aviation 
community had been continually active in engaging with scientists and had 
refined the protocol for responding to volcanic hazards (Donovan and 
Oppenheimer, 2012). This progressive movement was indicative of a change in 
the culture of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the 
industry’s governing body. 
However, whilst advances were made between the Eyjafjallajökull and 
Grímsvötn eruptions, lingering tensions between scientists and airlines 
highlighted the need for further improvements to communication and knowledge 
exchange. For example, Ryanair objected to the closure of Scottish airspace and 
disputed scientific claims (Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2012). Nevertheless, 
Parker (2015) suggests that preparatory measures were significantly improved, 
and refers to the influence and scope of training exercises:  
An ICAO volcanic ash simulation exercise took place to test the 
effectiveness of changes and improvements to the ICAO volcanic 
ash contingency plan, ash guidance, and procedures… involved 77 
airlines, 14 air navigation service providers, 10 national regulatory 
authorities, VAAC London, as well as the European Commission, 
EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency), and Eurocontrol… the 
European Crisis Visualisation Interactive Tool for Air Traffic Flow 
and Capacity Management - an interactive tool to support decision 
making of civil aviation authorities, air navigation service providers, 
and airline operators - was tested (Parker, 2015, p.103). 
The exercise Parker refers to was conducted during the intermediate period 
between the two eruptions, and illustrated the collaborative efforts of scientists 
and the aviation industry. Parker (2015, p.103) labelled the exercise a “dress 
rehearsal” and directly related it to the successful management of the Grímsvötn 
eruption. Grímsvötn occurred at a time when the aviation community were 
responding to international scrutiny and undergoing a phase of rapid structural 
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change, influenced by the uptake of new technology (Johnson and Jeunemaitre, 
2011). Parker refers to both a holistic range of participants and the use of 
innovative tools, highlighting the steps taken to avoid another chaotic response to 
a potentially disruptive volcanic event. 
The drastic changes made to the approach of the aviation industry cannot 
be compared to how volcanic hazard management has been transformed at a 
local and national level in Iceland. For instance, Icelandic’s had not generally been 
exposed to the frenzied overseas reaction to the 2010 eruption (Harris et al., 
2012), and the wave of hysteria that swept through European and North 
American media outlets. Therefore, Icelandic institutions were not under pressure 
to alter their approach; for geophysical reasons, the impacts at ground level were 
more severe during the Grímsvötn eruption, but there were few notable 
differences in the CP’s response to the hazard. This is not a criticism of the 
Icelandic authorities, as on both occasions (2010 and 2011), the management of 
the hazard was defined by coherence rather than anxiety.  
 
4.2.3: Between Grímsvötn and Bárðarbunga (29th August - 27th February 2015): Explaining 
FutureVolc and the Emergency Response Coordination Centre 
Following the tumultuous events of the Eyjafjallajökull and Grímsvötn eruptions, 
several European-wide projects were initiated to reduce uncertainty and 
encourage closer engagement between stakeholders (Dumont et al., 2014; Puglisi 
et al., 2014). With over three years of relative quiescence separating the 
Grímsvötn and Bárðarbunga eruptions, many proposals to improve investment, 
communication and dialogue, had come to fruition. The eruption of Bárðarbunga 
lasted for a duration of almost six months (approximately twice the length of 
Eyjafjallajökull in 2010); the separation of the plates was marked by an 
increasingly frequent swarm of earthquakes prior to the main eruption (Riel et al., 
2015). Bárðarbunga’s location (see Figure 4.1, p.92) beneath the Vatnajökull 
glacier (Gramling, 2014) prompted fears of a large-scale phreatomagmatic 
eruption, with the potential to disrupt international air travel. However, following 
a 1.5km fissure eruption within the Holuhraun lava field (Dumont et al., 2015; 
Jónasdóttir et al., 2015; Schmidt et al., 2015), aviation warnings were downgraded 
as the development of an ash cloud became less likely. Instead, effusive basaltic 
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magma formed an extensive lava flow and led to increased levels of gas pollution. 
In response, daily notifications were issued by the CP and the IMO to affected 
regions in Iceland, as well as to Scandinavian countries (Björk et al., 2015). The 
remote location of the volcano minimised the impact on rural communities and 
limited disruption to restrictions on accessibility.  
FutureVolc is an example of a project that was devised following the 
eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull (2010) and Grímsvötn (2011). With the funding of an 
EU grant, FutureVolc contributed significantly to the monitoring of the 2014-
2015 eruption at Bárðarbunga. The project was funded to strengthen the 
monitoring of volcanic hazards in Europe, with stakeholders from both scientific 
and socio-political communities supporting a continental approach. FutureVolc 
comprised of 26 partners from 10 European countries (FutureVolc Project - 
main page, 2016), and incorporated Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre’s (VAAC’s), 
meteorological offices and civil protection services; starting in 2012, the project 
was active for a duration of three and a half years. 
The main aim of the FutureVolc community was to provide a single 
repository for gathering and distributing hazard information; this would allow 
stakeholders to acquire relevant data in an efficient manner. The project also 
intended to centralise monitoring practices, combine knowledge and expertise, 
and reinforce stakeholder engagements with technical instruments. Sigmundsson 
et al. clearly outline the main aims of the project: 
(i) Establish an innovative volcano monitoring system and 
strategy 
(ii) Develop new methods for near real-time integration of multi-
parametric datasets 
(iii) Apply a seamless transdisciplinary approach to further 
scientific understanding of magmatic processes 
(iv) To improve delivery, quality and timeliness of 
transdisciplinary information from monitoring scientists to 
civil protection 
(Sigmundsson et al., 2015, id.11846). 
The scope of end-users to whom the project is intended to reach is notably 
expansive. Each of the aims work towards the integration of data, expertise and 
technical infrastructures within complex networks such as Iceland. 
A key attribute of FutureVolc is the concept of a supersite, namely an 
area with numerous large-scale volcanic hazards, where data and monitoring 
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observations can be integrated. By accrediting an area ‘supersite’ status, the 
project seeks to improve the management and sharing of information 
(Sigmundsson et al., 2013a): 
The supersite concept implies integration of space and ground based 
observations for improved monitoring and evaluation of volcanic 
hazards, and open data policy (FutureVolc Project - Supersites, 
2016). 
The supersite is designed to centralise the study area, and confine relevant 
datasets and communication channels. Contextually, the laboratory landscape of 
Iceland provides an ideal setting for this element of the project to be recognised: 
Iceland is selected as a laboratory supersite area for demonstration 
because of (i) the relatively high rate of large eruptions with potential 
for long ranging effects, and (ii) Iceland’s capability to produce the 
near full spectrum of volcano processes at its many different volcano 
types (Jordan et al., 2013, p.287). 
Here, the high density and varied array of volcanic hazards in Iceland are 
interpreted as environmental qualities that can define what a ‘supersite’ 
represents.  
FutureVolc had been fully enrolled by the time the eruption of 
Bárðarbunga began in 2014; therefore, its contribution to the management of the 
hazard can be assessed. The project impacted on the technical infrastructure of 
Iceland’s network, and this has since been documented: 
During and after the Bárðarbunga unrest, 16 new GPS sites were 
installed. These sites played a major role in constraining the 
deformation field of the dyke intrusion and the subsidence of the 
Bárðarbunga caldera, thus enabling the modelling of the magma 
migration and volume change (FutureVolc Project - Exploiting the 
outcome of FutureVolc report, 2016). 
The report draws attention to the flexibility of the project and its relevance to the 
positioning of technical instruments (Sigmundsson et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
references to the installation of new equipment reflect the investment in the 
“major field campaign” which “took place both on ground and from aircraft” 
during the eruption of Bárðarbunga (FutureVolc Project - Exploiting the 
outcome of FutureVolc report, 2016). The collaborative efforts of the FutureVolc 
community were outlined at length in the report, in addition to the project’s 
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impact on the efficiency of data management, and the improved ability to share 
hazard information.  
As Bárðarbunga allowed FutureVolc to be analysed in the context of an 
active crisis situation, the influence of the project on specific response practices 
can be explored. For instance, communication proved to be far more efficient at 
a domestic level than it was during the eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull and 
Grímsvötn; whilst this could have been caused by a number of factors, the 
‘Exploiting the outcome of FutureVolc’ report made a direct link to the project: 
Following the Holuhraun eruption (Bárðarbunga), a questionnaire 
was distributed to the recipients of the Scientific Advisory Board 
Factsheet. The Factsheet was sent to 774 email addresses (397 in 
Icelandic and 377 in English). The survey reveals that the total 
circulation of the Factsheet was about 8000 recipients. Over 90% of 
responders believe communication and flow of information was 
either better or much better during Bárðarbunga in 2015 than in 
Eyjafjallajökull in 2010 and Grímsvötn in 2011 (FutureVolc Project - 
Exploiting the outcome of FutureVolc report, 2016). 
The FutureVolc community had influenced the introduction of the factsheet (see 
appendices 6.1 [pp.277-278] and 6.2 [p.279]), which the report relates to the 
improved communication of risk. Therefore, by constructing informative 
materials, FutureVolc were instrumental to the exchange and distribution of 
hazard information at a time of uncertainty.  
The “Catalogue of Icelandic Volcanoes” provides a further example of 
FutureVolc’s ability to transform communication practices (Ilyinskaya, et al., 2015, 
p.12391); as a data repository, it can be accessed online and is open to the public. 
By containing and representing vast quantities of information, the catalogue 
enables stakeholders from non-scientific communities to explore Iceland’s 
volcanic systems (see Figure 4.5, p.106). For example, datasets can be customised 
by a wide range of end-users, and communicated in real-time when conveying 
knowledge of ongoing activity. Therefore, the catalogue is a reflection of the 
scope and outreach of the FutureVolc project. However, unlike the factsheet, the 
catalogue was incomplete at the time of the Bárðarbunga eruption, so it was not a 
prominent tool in the management of the hazard. Nevertheless, Bárðarbunga 
“provided a real-world test for FutureVolc, from which further developments 
were identified” (FutureVolc Project - Exploiting the outcome of FutureVolc 
report, 2016); the project remained a work in progress at the time, but the event 
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enabled its various outputs and initiatives to be assessed based on their relevance, 
value and performance. 
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Figure 4.5: The Catalogue of Icelandic Volcanoes, a customisable, informative and user-
friendly output of the FutureVolc project (Source: FutureVolc Project - Catalogue of Icelandic 
Volcanoes. Date accessed: May 2016).  
In addition to FutureVolc, Bárðarbunga also coincided with the 
development of the Airborne Volcanic Object Imaging Detector (AVOID). 
Whilst the implementation of new technology is a rigorous and stringent process 
in the aviation industry, the London VAAC and Isavia adopted precautionary 
attitudes towards Bárðarbunga (which had no disruptive impact on aviation). 
Devices such as AVOID would have provided additional reassurance to the 
aviation industry, and minimised uncertainty. As alluded to earlier in this chapter, 
volcanic eruptions pose a significant threat to the safety of aviation, with the 
engine failures of British Airways flight 9 (Tootell, 1985; Johnson and Casadevall, 
1994) and KLM flight 867 (Przedpelski and Casadevall, 1994; Casadevall, 1994), 
providing timely reminders of the danger that volcanic ash poses to civilian 
aircraft: 
Volcanic ash in the upper troposphere, where jet aircraft fly, can 
cause jet engine failure (loss of power), damage to turbine blades and 
pitot static tubes, with the possibility of the loss of the aircraft and 
lives (Prata and Tupper, 2009, p.239). 
Here, Prata and Tupper stress the vulnerability of aircraft to the impacts of 
volcanic activity; this explains why mandatory action was taken to ground aircraft 
across Europe during the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull. Aviation provides an 
intriguing stakeholder dynamic as it highlights how engineers, policymakers and 
the service sector are invariably linked to volcanic hazard management. The onus 
may appear to be on the manufacturing of aircraft engines and their resilience to 
ash, but the aviation industry has found that it needs to approach volcanic 
hazards from a holistic perspective.  
The disruption caused by Eyjafjallajökull has undoubtedly influenced the 
innovation of devices such as AVOID. Leading specialists in aviation research, 
such as Dr Fred Prata (the inventor of the device), have sought to establish 
mechanisms for identifying dangerous concentrations of volcanic ash from on-
board civilian aircraft. The AVOID device provides a means of monitoring ash 
100 kilometres away in a precise and efficient manner (Prata et al., 2012); Adam 
Durant, from the Norwegian Institute for Air Research (NILU), compared the 
technology “to a weather radar for ash” (Durant, 2012). The device allows an 
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aircraft to track the movement of volcanic ash and to react instantaneously to the 
real-time data it receives whilst airborne. Therefore, the aircraft is prevented from 
making contact with ash as pilots can be informed, in real-time, of where it is safe 
to fly. In addition, airspace can be opened and closed intermittently according to 
where ash is recorded; this reduces the potential for widespread disruption.  
As AVOID is mobile and flexible, it could be used on a wide range of 
aircraft; its extensive and thorough testing has been vital to its implementation 
(see Figure 4.6, p.108), and has strengthened the relationship between NILU, 
Airbus and EasyJet:  
EasyJet estimates that 100 aircraft (20 of which would be EasyJet’s) 
across Europe fitted with AVOID equipment, would provide 
comprehensive coverage of the continent enabling airlines to supply 
monitoring information to the authorities to support the new 
processes and procedures that were introduced after the eruption of 
Eyjafjallajökull in 2010 (Nyeggen, 2016). 
The role of EasyJet illustrates a robust level of engagement between the aviation 
industry and science. Influenced by projects such as FutureVolc (Prata et al., 
2013), this collaborative approach has been integral to the largely successful and 
highly ambitious trialling of the AVOID technology.  
 
Figure 4.6: A diagram outlining how the AVOID device has been trialled. The aircraft, 
equipment and resources used have required collaboration between industry and science (Source: 
Witze, 2013, p.423). 
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Testing has taken place on multiple occasions and in different geographical 
regions; it has used civilian aircraft, provided by EasyJet, to identify ash at 38,000 
feet. Therefore, trials have proven to be highly representative of a real-life 
situation in which the technology would be deployed. Furthermore, the accuracy 
of ash plume detection has meant few problems have been identified with the 
equipment; this has strengthened the case for implementing the device.  
However, before AVOID is used on civilian aircraft, it is required to pass 
through a rigorous assessment process. This is overseen by ICAO, and leads to 
devices and systems being ranked according to Technology Readiness Levels 
(TRL’s):  
 
Figure 4.7: Technology Readiness Level definitions (Source: National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. Date accessed: August 2016). 
A TRL number is obtained once the description in the diagram has 
been achieved. For example, successfully achieving TRL 4 (lab 
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environment) does not move the technology to TRL 5. TRL 5 is 
achieved once there is component/breadboard validation in a 
relevant environment. The technology remains TRL 4 until the 
relevant environmental validation is complete (National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration [NASA], 2016). 
Aviation primarily uses the NASA definitions for TRL’s; devices such as AVOID 
are required to demonstrate their suitability for use on aircraft at each individual 
level (see Figure 4.7, p.109). TRL 1 and TRL 2 relate to the transition of science 
into the research and development of a technology. Studies seek to identify the 
attributes and characteristics needed for a device or system to function 
appropriately. TRL 3 and TRL 4 then account for the invention and feasibility of 
the device; these levels seek to validate its position and performance in a 
laboratory setting. TRL 5, TRL 6 and TRL 7 follow by assessing the performance 
of a prototype in a realistic and “relevant environment” (NASA, 2016), initially at 
ground level and then in space (see Figure 4.7, p.109). These stages are integral to 
the future development of the technology as they allow specific characteristics to 
be assessed. Finally, TRL 8 and TRL 9 account for the final stages of the 
development and integration process, covering the launch and operationalisation 
of the device or system. 
TRL’s in the aviation industry are not intended to prevent or restrict the 
implementation of devices such as AVOID, but are designed to be a “primary 
mechanism for judging the state of development of technologies” (Newton et al., 
2007, p.20). At the time of writing, AVOID had reached the final stages of the 
process; its implementation was widely expected to quell the heightened sense of 
anxiety in the aviation community. For example, the device lends itself to the 
policy reforms and changes that have been made to the process of closing 
airspace. In line with other global regions, Europe has made the transition to 
enabling airlines to be responsible for whether their aircraft fly during periods of 
volcanic activity. These changes to the decision-making process, passed down by 
ICAO, are intended to reduce conflicts and “enhance organizational capacity for 
effective improvisation (Lutz and Lindell 2009; Moynihan 2009; ‘T Hart 2013)” 
(Parker, 2015, p.102). Therefore, the additional freedoms granted to individual 
airlines removes them from the stringent governance of the aviation authorities, 
and generally devolves responsibility. This decentralisation of decision-making 
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within the aviation industry is likely to have been influenced by the 
Eyjafjallajökull eruption.  
Eyjafjallajökull, Grímsvötn and Bárðarbunga have each impacted on 
projects or technologies that now feature prominently in Iceland’s approach to 
managing volcanic hazards. Whilst not specifically tailored to Iceland, the EU’s 
Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) played a key role in 
responding to the eruption of Bárðarbunga (2014-2015). The ERCC was set-up 
by the European Commission’s Civil Protection Mechanism in 2013, primarily to 
promote cooperation in responses to hazards across Europe. Countries and 
organisations can share expertise and resources by communicating through the 
flexible hub the centre provides:  
It (the ERCC) contains round-the-clock staff, high-tech information 
and communication systems, and three operational centres to 
coordinate the EU’s role in up to three simultaneous events (Rhinard, 
2015; in Bossong and Hegemann, 2015, p.263). 
Here, Rhinard refers to the qualities that allow the ERCC to provide specialised 
assistance to its members and states, strengthening their resilience. Eyjafjallajökull 
may have had an impact on the creation and structure of the centre, but any links 
are speculative and ambiguous as the ERCC is equipped to respond to a plethora 
of natural and manmade hazards (seismic activity, flood events, wildfires, etc.). 
Bárðarbunga (2014-2015) remains one of the largest natural hazards that 
the centre has dealt with, and although the risk to life was relatively low, the 
reaction of the ERCC demonstrated the flexibility of hazard management in 
Europe. During the eruption, the centre’s “Common Emergency Communication 
and Information System” was used to distribute advice and guidance (Bossong 
and Hegemann, 2015, p.259); this highlighted the relevance of the ERCC to 
Icelandic volcanism. Furthermore, when responding to Bárðarbunga, the centre 
worked alongside the FutureVolc project to produce maps, flash reports and 
satellite images. These collaborative efforts informed the public of the area’s most 
at risk of being flooded because of the eruption. However, a FutureVolc 
deliverable found a rather mixed response when assessing the impact of the 
ERCC on the Icelandic public. For example, the report established that only 2% 
of respondents learned about the eruption through the ERCC (p.11), with many 
having the opinion that the centre’s outputs and information could have appeared 
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more “authoritative” (FutureVolc Project - Deliverable 3.4, 2016, p.17). On the 
other hand, there was a positive reaction to the communication between the 
ERCC and the CP; it was widely perceived to have contributed to a more 
coherent approach to volcanic hazard management.   
 
4.3: The dynamics of Iceland - UK relations 
The volcanic events in Iceland between 2010 and 2014 have further expanded 
relations between UK and Icelandic institutions, and have illustrated how the 
network infrastructure that binds the two countries plays a significant role in risk 
reduction. First and foremost, the network is designed to facilitate the sharing of 
hazard information, both for domestic and international purposes. Iceland and 
the UK constitute an intensely communicative entity, within a much larger 
European and global community of research, collaboration and governance. For 
example, leading institutions such as the IMO are dependent on a working 
relationship with the London VAAC, and vice versa. Secondly, the network is 
underpinned by a multitude of formal and informal research partnerships; many 
of these exist between academic and scientific agencies in both countries. For 
instance, the BGS and the UoI have a long-standing partnership that has 
transcended each of the three large-scale eruptions addressed in this thesis. 
Thirdly, the network has played an increasingly significant role in authorising and 
enforcing policies; for example, the involvement of the Cabinet Office and the 
Department for Transport (DfT) illustrates the active role now played by the UK 
government. This final section of the chapter examines the projects, exercises and 
collaborations that consolidate the ties between Iceland and the UK. 
 
4.3.1: Explaining the UK’s intervention 
As demonstrated during Eyjafjallajökull, the UK is particularly vulnerable to 
volcanic activity in Iceland, and potentially at risk of both transport disruption 
and gas pollution (Reuter, 2015). Iceland and the UK are therefore inseparably 
linked when managing volcanic hazards; the Volcanic ash exercise in Iceland 
(VolcIce) is indicative of this relationship as it strengthens inter-agency links 
between the London VAAC, the IMO and Isavia. Furthermore, ICAO legislature 
   117 
 
dictates that the London VAAC (based in Exeter) are accountable for 
notifications of ash in the airspace covering Iceland and Northern Europe.  
 
Figure 4.8: The areas of responsibility for each VAAC, administered by ICAO (Source: 
International Civil Aviation Organization - Handbook on the International Airways Volcano 
Watch, p.2-12. Date accessed: May 2016). 
During the creation of the nine VAAC’s in the 1990s, Iceland was placed in the 
London VAAC’s area of responsibility; as a result, the models, observations and 
forecasts that the London VAAC use have significant value in the decision-
making process. The eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull and Grímsvötn have 
demonstrated the London VAAC’s prominent role (Parker, 2015) and strategic 
position within Iceland’s network. However, the London VAAC is not isolated 
and shares a close working relationship with the Toulouse VAAC, illustrated 
through the channels of communication existing between them.  
Although the UK has no active volcanoes, the socio-economic problems 
that were caused by Icelandic volcanism in 2010 has led to both explosive and 
effusive eruptions being recognised on the National Risk Register (Cabinet Office 
- National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies, 2015). The vulnerability of the UK 
means that a political, social and economic incentive is now provided for UK-
based institutions to play a significant role in managing volcanic hazards. For 
instance, the Met Office (UK) and the BGS have both contributed to the 
formation of collaborative groups such as the Natural Hazards Partnership 
[NHP] (British Geological Survey - Natural Hazards Partnership, 2016). In 
addition, the Cabinet Office and the DfT are responsible for actively intervening 
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in the management of gas and ash-based hazards respectively. Finally, UK-based 
academics have continued to play an active role in studying and monitoring 
volcanic environments in Iceland. This has been reflected in the evolving 
relationship between the BGS and the IMO: 
BGS has worked in collaboration with the Iceland Met Office to 
install new seismic stations in the vicinity of Eyjafjallajökull and 
Katla. These stations are providing real-time data to enable detailed 
monitoring of any future eruptions (Baptie, 2015). 
Collaborative affiliations between Iceland and the UK have had a profound 
impact on the technical infrastructure of the network, and have improved 
monitoring practices in regions that are sensitive to either volcanic or multi-
hazard events. Therefore, the series of relationships that have developed between 
the two countries have been paramount to risk reduction in Iceland, the UK and 
Europe.  
 
4.3.2: The VolcIce Exercise  
The VolcIce exercise was set-up in 2008 and preceded the eruptive episodes 
covered in this thesis. VolcIce simulates volcanic activity in Iceland and models a 
situation whereby airspace is contaminated with ash. A response is then required 
from each of the participating institutions:  
(VolcIce) Involves mainly IMO, Isavia and London VAAC where the 
responses to the initial phase of an eruption are tested and the 
operational personnel are trained in the use of the contingency plans 
at each institute (Þorkelsson et al., 2012, p.115). 
The exercise ensures that various stakeholder communities are “practised at their 
response to an eruption and that the communication chain is working effectively” 
(Met Office [UK] - London VAAC main page, 2016); organisational 
responsibility is a key element of the exercise. As VolcIce is conducted on a 
monthly or quarterly basis, it provides “a good opportunity to test the flow of 
information” between each of the participating institutions (World 
Meteorological Organization - WMO VAAC ‘Best Practice’ Workshop Report, 
2015, p.23). Although the format and structure of the exercise has been amended 
on numerous occasions because of policy alterations, VolcIce was conducted 
prior to the Eyjafjallajökull eruption (Þorkelsson et al., 2012). 
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The frequency of the exercise maintains and strengthens the robust 
relationship between the institutions involved. This explains why blame for the 
lack of clear communication during the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull was attributed 
to the aviation industry, rather than to the London VAAC, the IMO and Isavia. 
In contrast to ICAO and many of the aviation authorities, the VolcIce 
participants had well-prepared contingency plans; these enabled the VolcIce 
community to respond to Eyjafjallajökull in a near faultless manner. The exercise 
protocol was also activated during the eruption of Grímsvötn (2011), and again 
reflected the communicative efficiency of the participating institutions. For 
instance, the monitoring process was initiated by the IMO contacting both the 
London VAAC and Isavia to inform them of an eruption beginning. Updates on 
the airborne conditions were then exchanged on a regular basis in the form of 
Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET).  
A SIGMET is a packaged form of communication, commonly used and 
globally recognised within the aviation industry. The outline of a SIGMET does 
not change and allows information to be shared in a standardised format (see 
Figure 4.9, p.115); notifications are applicable to all situations, regardless of the 
individual, institution or means through which they are communicated. The 
construction and exchange of SIGMET’s is a circulatory process within the 
VolcIce exercise and ensures “good communications between IMO forecasters 
and Isavia ATC (Air Traffic Control)” (Þorkelsson et al., 2012, p.115). When used 
to monitor volcanic activity, SIGMET’s originate from the IMO and are issued 
intermittently at intervals of three or six hours. 
 
Figure 4.9: A template for a standard SIGMET, used extensively in the VolcIce exercise 
(Source: Isavia - VolcIce Exercise. Date accessed: May 2016). 
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Another key feature of the VolcIce exercise is the use of the Numerical 
Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment (NAME). The NAME software 
was used during both the Eyjafjallajökull and Grímsvötn eruptions (Millington et 
al., 2012), and is integral to the success of monitoring exercises in Iceland. 
Despite being designed for nuclear and chemical dust, NAME can forecast the 
movement of volcanic ash beyond the region in which an eruption has taken 
place (Jones et al., 2007). The London VAAC claim that the software has 
“enabled the more flexible use of airspace” (Met Office [UK] - Ash Dispersion 
Leaflet, 2016), and refer to its impact on managerial and decision-making 
practices. In addition, NAME has strengthened institutional relationships (see 
Figure 4.10, p.116); for example, the software is used by the London VAAC but 
is reliant on data and information that is sourced by the IMO. The visual outputs 
produced by the software are then shared with Isavia and other aviation 
authorities. As a verifiable forecasting tool, NAME allows both Icelandic and 
UK-based institutions to accurately predict what regions are likely to be affected 
by dangerous concentrations of ash. From a UK perspective, the DfT and the 
CAA also recognise the impact of NAME, highlighting its broader relevance 
beyond the VolcIce exercise. 
 
Figure 4.10: The position of the NAME “Dispersion Model” in the monitoring network 
(Source: Met Office [UK] - London VAAC main page. Date accessed: May 2016). 
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However, whilst SIGMET’s and NAME are effective attributes of 
VolcIce, the idealistic setting of the exercise is much more controlled than a real 
volcanic eruption. Therefore, the arrangements require flexibility as the spread of 
end-users that are requesting access to information is likely to be more 
ambiguous in a crisis situation. For example, the communication process was 
transformed during the Eyjafjallajökull eruption (2010), and expanded far beyond 
the confines of the VolcIce community: 
At the end of the first week of the summit eruption changes were 
made to the collaborative working procedures between the IMO and 
London VAAC in order to improve the information flow. The 
creation of the VAR (Volcanic Ash Report, sent from on-board 
aircraft) was an important step forward, in addition to a direct link 
which was established between the scientists at IMO and the 
Atmospheric Dispersion Group at the UK Met Office (Þorkelsson et 
al., 2012, pp.119-120). 
Here, Þorkelsson et al. illustrate how an active crisis can redefine the monitoring 
and communication process that is central to VolcIce. Nevertheless, in the case 
of Eyjafjallajökull, the IMO highlighted the sophistication of the set-up by using 
NAME to produce and update “a table of forecasted ash contamination at several 
airports based on the information from the UK Met Office” (Þorkelsson et al., 
2012, p.115). Crises therefore demand dynamism and adaptability in the 
relationships that exist between each of the participating institutions. 
The structure of VolcIce ensures that inter-agency relationships can be 
continually assessed and amended; for example, the exercise produces a report 
that outlines a series of aims, objectives and recommendations (see Appendix 5.1, 
pp.273-275). These are agreed on during the debriefs that take place both within 
and between the IMO, the London VAAC and Isavia. Recommendations can 
relate to how SIGMET notifications are distributed, the specific coding of 
exercise messages, or the monitoring of phone calls that are made to aviation 
authorities or airlines. VolcIce also provides several additional outputs, including 
Volcanic Ash Graphics (see Figure 5.4 [p.149] and Figure 5.5 [p.150]); these are 
produced by the NAME software.  
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4.3.3: Beyond VolcIce: A complex affiliation  
Whilst the relationship between Iceland and the UK can be defined by the 
VolcIce exercise, an increasing number of software programs, research groups 
and stakeholder partnerships are intended to strengthen the collaborative 
engagement between the two countries. For example, the Scientific Advisory 
Group for Emergencies (SAGE) and the NHP both illustrate how deeply 
integrated the UK and Iceland are when managing volcanic hazards. SAGE and 
the NHP have individual roles to play in translating the data provided by the 
NAME system; these groups are relevant to a wide range of stakeholders 
including airlines, management strategists and policymakers. Both groups, as well 
as the VolcIce exercise, are also underpinned by a “memorandum of 
understanding” (Dash et al., 2013, p.57) between Icelandic and UK-based 
institutions. This agreement is intended to provide greater clarity, cooperation 
and stability in the decision-making process.  
SAGE is a group that provides the scientific and technical expertise 
required to guide decision-making during the UK government’s Cabinet Office 
Briefing Room (COBR) meetings (see Appendix 4.1, pp.269-270). The group 
covers a wide range of hazards and ensures the UK government are equipped 
with the information needed to make appropriate decisions in crisis situations 
(Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies - main page, 2016). In the context of 
volcanic activity, SAGE became relevant when meetings were held during the 
2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull. The group initially discussed the potential 
dangers of allowing civilian aircraft to fly through contaminated airspace, with 
evidence provided by the BGS, the Natural Environment Research Council 
(NERC), the Met Office (UK) and the DfT. However, it was not until the third 
meeting (19th May 2010) that personnel from Icelandic institutions, namely the 
IMO and the UoI, directly contributed (see Appendix 4.2, pp.271-272). By this 
stage, discussions were focussed on the technology being used to assess the ash 
plume. Although SAGE was not activated during the eruptions of Grímsvötn 
(2011) and Bárðarbunga (2014-2015), Icelandic volcanoes remain a considerable 
risk to the UK, and a potential hazard for SAGE to address.  
The NHP has also strengthened interactions between Iceland and the 
UK; the group has enabled stakeholders from across an array of UK institutions 
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to bring together knowledge and expertise. Better coordination is a key aim of the 
partnership, and explains some of its unique features; these include the “daily 
hazard summary assessment service” and the “hazard impact model” (Natural 
Environment Research Council - Activities: Natural Hazards page, 2016). The 
daily summary is intended to inform and update members of an active crisis, 
providing them with a reliable service that can improve their preparedness, 
resilience and exchange of knowledge. Meanwhile, the hazard impact model 
resembles aspects of the FutureVolc project; for example, it aims to “combine 
data and expertise from partners to identify the impact on populations, areas and 
assets from a range of natural hazards” (British Geological Survey - Natural 
Hazards Partnership, 2016). Both the NHP and the FutureVolc project focus on 
the integration of efforts to monitor and mitigate risk. The scope of these 
partnerships has undoubtedly encouraged greater interactions between 
institutions in Iceland, the UK and Europe.  
 
4.4: Concluding remarks 
This chapter provides a descriptive and analytical account of Iceland’s hazard 
network, and explores the impact of large-scale volcanic eruptions between 2010 
and 2014. Underpinning the exercises, projects and transitions covered in this 
chapter, are the evolving power dynamics between actors and institutions, the 
collaboration and trust of stakeholder communities, and the multi-scale platform 
on which many initiatives are designed. Iceland’s network infrastructure has been 
transformed to develop a flexible approach to decision-making and knowledge 
exchange. Contextually, this PhD research accounts for Iceland’s unique 
characteristics; these include its rich cultural values, its political stability with 
Europe and North America, and the positive relationship between Icelandic 
society and scientific knowledge. The following empirics use sociology to explain 
the adaptation, resilience and holism of Iceland’s approach to volcanic hazard 
management; communication channels are analysed at length to assess the 
connectivity of individual stakeholders and institutional entities.  
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Chapter Five: Exploring power dynamics and technical actors: Illustrating 
collaboration and trust in Iceland’s hazard network 
 
Collaboration and trust are integral features of Iceland’s network and are 
important considerations when analysing the development of communication 
channels. This chapter carries out an in-depth exploration of how a network's 
relational and technical infrastructure can renegotiate power dynamics. 
Stakeholder connections impact on the decision-making process and influence 
Iceland’s efforts to mitigate risks stemming from volcanic activity (Donovan and 
Oppenheimer, 2012; Eiser et al., 2015). As networks become increasingly 
complex, the use of technology can be studied to explain how human and non-
human actors engage in a manner that is flexible and holistic (Moynihan, 2009). 
Therefore, elements of Actor-Network Theory [ANT] (Latour, 1993; 2005) and 
co-production (Jasanoff, 2004; Bijker et al., 2012) can be associated with dynamic 
approaches to hazard management. 
The first section of this chapter uses multiple case study examples to 
explain how power can be renegotiated within Iceland’s network. In the subject 
area of hazard management, power is conceptually defined by decision-making, 
policymaking and the responsibility to take effective action (Pearce, 2003). The 
chapter then focuses on Iceland’s innovative use of technology, influenced by 
interconnections between social, scientific and technical actors. The Airborne 
Volcanic Object Identifier and Detector (AVOID), and the Numerical 
Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment (NAME), provide two examples 
of the technological strides made within Iceland’s network to combat ash-related 
threats to the aviation industry. These devices and software packages have the 
capacity to facilitate information flows and transform how knowledge is 
communicated. By explaining the impact of power and technology on the 
collaboration and trust of stakeholders, this PhD research analyses the 
construction of an adaptable and resilient approach to volcanic hazard 
management. Despite being context-dependant and temporally binding, this study 
accounts for the evolution of knowledge exchange (Haynes et al., 2008; Donovan 
et al., 2012; Eiser et al., 2015).  
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Whereas Latour used the interconnections of individual actors to discuss 
power (1993; 2005), this study approaches power dynamics from a transitional 
perspective and refers to the expanse and authority of institutional entities. 
However, this chapter also analyses the relational characteristics of individual 
actors to explain how decision-making powers are becoming increasingly 
decentralised from leading institutions. Therefore, this research can resonate with 
aspects of how Latour interpreted power in his description of ANT. 
Furthermore, this chapter assigns power to technical devices and systems, as well 
as to informative materials and communication instruments. However, whilst this 
research accepts that power can be attributed to both human and non-human 
actors, it does not discredit or remove sociality in the same manner as Latour (see 
p.45 and p.47).  
Allen (2003) analysed Latour’s approach to power and explained the 
impacts of mediation and translation: 
(Latour) speaks of a ‘translation’ model of power where everyone 
shapes the overall process according to their own interests and 
preferences as the ‘order’ is passed down the line (Allen, 2003, Part ll: 
6). 
Despite being rather critical of some aspects of Latour’s work, Allen (2003) refers 
to the influence that technical objects can have on the formation, process and 
mobility of actuarial connections. Therefore, this chapter can relate to Allen’s 
analysis as it draws on digital and virtual technologies to explain how hazard 
knowledge can be translated by multiple stakeholder communities. Finally, this 
study has resonance with constructivist approaches to power as it accounts for 
how flows and channels have been developed to circulate information through 
Iceland’s networked infrastructure. This narrative reflects Castells’ (2007) 
reference to power in his literature on the network society. For example, Castells 
associated power dynamics with mobile flows of resources such as information, 
knowledge and ideas. Therefore, from a thematic perspective, this chapter reflects 
multiple interpretations of power by explaining how power relations can 
continually evolve in response to technologies, policymaking and stakeholder 
connections.  
 
   126 
 
5.1: Renegotiating power relations:  The evolution of actor communication 
In the context of Iceland’s approach to volcanic hazard management, power 
relations are ambiguous and difficult to define, primarily because the networked 
infrastructure is not fixed and is continually changing. Power often stems from 
the evolution and repositioning of human and non-human actors, a fluid process 
that highlights “stakeholder influences” (Rowley, 1997, p.887). As a dynamic and 
multi-hazard environment, Iceland’s network requires actuarial mobility for risk 
to be adequately controlled (Slovic, 1999). Therefore, the sharing of information, 
the capacity to communicate, and the decentralisation of decision-making are 
influenced by the adaptation of power relations. This first section explores the 
distribution of power and examines the development of trust, as well as the 
construction of collaborative affiliations, between stakeholder communities 
(Pelling, 2003).  
 
5.1.1: Leveraging power: The transient presence of coordinators  
By exploring Iceland’s network, this study found that the power of actors is often 
determined by their transience and connectivity. For example, coordinators and 
decision-makers tend to occupy a strategic position either within or between 
leading institutions. Power can be assigned to technical actors on the basis of 
their ability to deliver information to a broad range of end-users. As Iceland is a 
multi-hazard environment, threatened by both seismic and climatic hazards (Bell 
and Glade, 2012), the actions of coordinators are integral to conveying 
information and responding simultaneously to several hazardous events. By 
conducting observations, this study of Iceland has analysed the role of 
coordinators in leading institutions such as the Icelandic Met Office (IMO) and 
the Department of Civil Protection (CP). Several coordinators are responsible for 
the IMO’s monitoring of the various natural hazards that Iceland endures; these 
coordinator’s leverage decision-making power across the network. Furthermore, 
their privileges bridge stakeholder communities, enabling them to access and 
influence multiple channels of communication. Therefore, the actions of 
coordinators are crucial to determining the adaptability of the network.  
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However, the study established that coordinators do not tend to subsume 
power from other actors. Instead, they consult with multiple stakeholder 
communities by developing and utilising robust channels of communication. 
Therefore, their ability to influence decision-making is not hindered, but their 
scope of engagement is much more holistic; this was highlighted in an interview 
with a Volcanic Hazards Coordinator at the IMO: 
Once I receive information I consult with the people in the 
monitoring room, who will already be observing, and we will go 
through the contingency plans, along with the forecasters on duty, 
the seismologist on duty, and the people on the night shift, and then 
we communicate our findings to the CP or to Isavia (the Icelandic 
Aviation Service) or elsewhere (IMO, March 2014). 
Here, the coordinator provides evidence of their decision-making and 
synthesising powers; the extract also refers to their individual ability to facilitate 
or strengthen collaboration beyond the IMO. By referring to the range of 
supporting actors within the institution, the interviewee illustrates how the 
coordinator can empower numerous stakeholder communities. 
An observation of the debrief that followed the VolcIce exercise 
highlighted the points of engagement within the network. The research found 
that exchanges of information do not erode the coordinators power, but mediate 
their knowledge of the hazard. This process of mediation acknowledges the 
holism of Iceland’s network, and allows decision-making to be influenced by 
multiple stakeholder communities. A similar analysis can be used to define the 
positionality of coordinators and project managers within the CP; powerful actors 
need to engage with stakeholders from both scientific and socio-political 
backgrounds. Therefore, they are required to use “multiple interaction styles” 
(Mynatt et al., 1997, p.13) to communicate effectively. This technique is relevant 
to Iceland as the network environment is complex and institutionally dense.  
Furthermore, this PhD research also found examples of coordinators 
exhibiting an “agency” (Latour, 1999a) that symbolises and defines power. For 
instance, coordinators possess a level of sociality (Latour, 1996a) that provides 
them with a standing in the network from which they can maintain an identity. 
This improves their ability to construct and communicate information, and allows 
them to acquire the trust of supporting actors. However, power is not uniform 
between coordinators as roles vary depending on the institution to which they are 
   128 
 
most closely associated. For example, coordinators tend to be project managers 
when affiliated with industry-specific organisations such as Isavia. In contrast, the 
role of a coordinator at the IMO relates to how a particular type of hazard is 
monitored and prepared for. 
Whilst coordinators have access to a plethora of communication 
channels, this study has found that protocol plays a role in determining the power 
dynamics of Iceland’s network. For example, coordinators at both the IMO and 
the CP follow an arrangement agreed upon between multiple institutions; this was 
discussed during an interview with a director at the IMO: 
We are few, we know each other, we know the key persons here at 
the IMO, and also those at the CP, it is not a formal system but we 
know who to contact when we need to respond to an event (IMO, 
March 2014). 
The interviewee refers to the largely informal set-up within Iceland’s approach to 
managing volcanic hazards. This is both a strength and a weakness; for example, 
it reflects the level of familiarity, trust and synergy between the various 
coordinators, but leaves the system vulnerable when leading personnel change 
and the collaborative set-up is disrupted. Policy frameworks and protocol are 
required to maintain resilience, and to provide additional supports to the current 
relationships between institutions such as the IMO and the CP; the administrative 
system cannot rely on informal contact alone. Therefore, a formal approach is 
needed to preserve cohesion and ensure the arrangement has sufficient 
adaptability to react to staff changes. In addition, formal guidelines also enable 
Iceland’s relatively small population of scientists and planners to work elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between the IMO and the CP does not 
suggest an unhealthy imbalance or secession of power in Iceland’s network. This 
PhD research has identified leading personnel and explored the communication 
channels that evoke close collaboration. Findings suggest that power disparities 
are lessened by the relationality of the network; for example, coordinators have a 
degree of power because of their intrinsic connections to supporting actors 
(seismologists, forecasters, technicians, etc.). Supporting actors are often 
empowered by their shared responsibility to communicate; this was discussed 
during an interview with a project manager at Isavia:  
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I was very content with our people (at Isavia) because they were 
actually focussed, they knew how to run the operations, with the 
telephones they weren’t looking to spot something else, all they were 
focussed on was these telephone calls which they had to make … the 
people in the air traffic control centre, those people who were 
working there, were preparing the first signal to send out to aircraft, 
and these individual efforts help us with making the correct decision 
and what the next action should be (Isavia, March 2014). 
By outlining the responsibilities of supporting actors, the interviewee refers to the 
value of their role in the VolcIce exercise. The extract does not refer directly to 
power relations, but provides evidence of how individual actors work as part of a 
collaborative team.  
 
5.1.2: Collaboration and power: The formation and evolution of the VolcIce ash monitoring 
exercise 
When engaging with coordinators, this study found that their power stems from 
the trust invested in them, from both their institutional colleagues and the wider 
network. For instance, by observing the VolcIce exercise, the research could 
study the dialogue and communication between the IMO, Isavia and the London 
Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC) [see pp.114-117]. As an “international 
multi-organisation volcanic ash exercise” (Met Office [UK] - London VAAC 
main page, 2016), VolcIce is purposely designed to encourage collaboration in a 
controlled and modelled setting. This has enabled the research to examine how 
coordinators maintain trust and strengthen their connections with numerous 
stakeholder communities.   
The format of VolcIce assigns responsibility to each of the participating 
institutions; an interview conducted at the IMO referred to the rationale behind 
the design of the exercise and explained how it facilitates institutional 
collaboration:  
We (the IMO) understood that we had to strengthen communication, 
having been under the London Volcano Ash Advisory Centre 
territory so to speak, so we began to organise these exercises 
(VolcIce) and knew we had to build up this very good relationship we 
have today (IMO, March 2014). 
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The interviewee refers to “London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre territory” 
when explaining why monitoring powers are granted to the IMO and the London 
VAAC. In addition, the extract implies that the VolcIce exercise has been 
organised and developed in-house, reflecting how powers have been 
decentralised from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
However, whilst the participating institutions how been influential in determining 
the structure of VolcIce, collaboration and the distribution of power are 
ultimately determined by ICAO’s policymaking and the territorial allocation of 
airspace (see Figure 4.8, p.113).  
Despite the territorial assignment of VAAC’s being constructed by 
ICAO, the boundaries between them should not be considered arbitrary; for 
instance, this research has found that individual actors from within the London 
VAAC have formed strong alliances with personnel from both the Toulouse 
VAAC and the Montréal VAAC. However, regardless of these overlaps, ICAO 
are the global regulatory body for aviation, and their governance of space is 
undoubtedly a factor when explaining the collaborative engagements between the 
IMO, the London VAAC and Isavia: 
ICAO plays a leading role as the primary issuer of legislation and 
guidelines, and as the designer of the system for dealing with erupting 
volcanoes (Christensen et al., 2013, p.71). 
The extract refers to ICAO having the institutional authority to connect and bind 
the actors that participate in exercises such as VolcIce. This narrative questions 
the extent to which the exercise is indicative of a clustered stakeholder 
community that can self-sufficiently evolve.  
Nevertheless, first-hand observations of VolcIce have allowed this 
research to deconstruct and analyse the specific interactions between actors. For 
example, the research established that many connections have been incrementally 
constructed and temporally strengthened by an actor’s repeated involvement in 
the exercise. Interviews conducted with both coordinators and supporting actors 
have referred to improvements in stakeholder familiarity; this was highlighted by 
an interviewee at the IMO:  
We (the IMO) get updates and messages sent to us by emails, during 
monitoring exercises, but also routinely when there are any signs of 
activity, we have meetings with the IMO and the VAAC (London). 
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Then of course we have telephone calls or communications through 
persons to persons, that’s how we share information and keep each 
other updated, but certainly VolcIce has encouraged us to 
communicate regularly (IMO, March 2014). 
Here, the interviewee directly links the VolcIce exercise to the construction of 
communication channels, both formal and informal; by repeatedly conducting the 
exercise, synergy and trust can be produced and maintained.  
VolcIce has increased the frequency of stakeholder interactions through 
the standard use of telephones and emails, but has also widened channels of 
communication by facilitating information artefacts that have the capacity to 
share hazard knowledge. Examples include advisory notifications containing 
Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET’s); an interview conducted with 
a project manager at Isavia referred to the process through which SIGMET’s are 
communicated: 
The first SIGMET is supposed to go out from the Met Office (IMO) 
and we say to the meteorologist “don’t forget to give us the wind”, 
then we tell the air traffic controllers to look for the wind so that they 
know where it (the volcanic ash) is going; then we come to the 
second SIGMET, the interim SIGMET (Isavia, March 2014). 
When explaining how SIGMET’s are constructed, the interviewee refers to 
meteorologists at the IMO. At both a domestic and international level, the IMO 
have a legal remit that grants them the power to construct and share hazard 
information in monitoring exercises such as VolcIce. Therefore, by exploring the 
communication of SIGMET’s, this study has been able to trace the flow of 
knowledge within the exercise.  
As SIGMET’s communicate information in a standard format, they can 
improve trust and knowledge exchange by ensuring that data can be accessed by 
participants from both scientific and socio-political backgrounds (Fearnley et al., 
2012; Nayembil et al., 2016). The project manager at Isavia also explained the 
importance of collaboration; for example, the meteorologist at the IMO is 
reminded to include data related to wind (see Figure 4.9, p.115). Therefore, whilst 
the artefact is constructed by the IMO, Isavia can influence the information that 
is included; this helps to maintain a balance of power between the institutions. 
However, despite SIGMET’s being digitally formatted and communicated, many 
interviewees did not refer to the role that technology plays in their construction 
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and dissemination. Nevertheless, SIGMET’s widen communication channels as 
the standard format allows them to be deciphered by numerous stakeholder 
communities; this increases the diffusion of power within the network. These 
interpretations support the view of Þorkelsson et al. (2012), who state that 
SIGMET notifications provide “a timely flow of information to stakeholders” 
(Þorkelsson et al., 2012, p.114); the frequency and transparency of SIGMET’s 
allows trust to be maintained, both within the exercise and the aviation industry. 
However, an interview carried out with a forecaster at the IMO 
highlighted how SIGMET’s can represent the institution’s power to initiate 
communication in both crisis and exercise settings:  
Everything starts when the IMO calls Isavia and also the London 
VAAC, this first action triggers the contingency plans at Isavia, and 
also at London VAAC, and then yes the people here (the IMO) will 
continue with their actions and send out a SIGMET (IMO, March 
2014). 
When we are running these exercises, the expectation of the work is 
with the Met Office (IMO) and their observers, we choose the site 
and the height of the ash plume (IMO, March 2014). 
Here, the IMO appear to have a considerable degree of power and are interpreted 
as protagonists of collaboration. This interpretation of institutional responsibility 
represents what Latour termed “a social structure standing above the level of 
interactions” (Latour, 1996c, p.228). Information artefacts such as SIGMET’s 
allow the IMO to instigate the actions that are taken by both Isavia and the 
London VAAC. The IMO collectively stands above the VolcIce interactions as 
they determine the parameters within which the exercise is conducted.  
Despite the IMO having the responsibility to decide the setting for 
VolcIce, the research also found evidence of how their power dynamics cannot 
be viewed in isolation. For example, when observing the debrief that followed the 
exercise, it became apparent that institutional actions and responsibilities were 
underpinned by a “Memorandum of Understanding” (IMO, March 2014), which 
each of the participating institutions had previously agreed upon. Therefore, the 
IMO do not have the power to initiate communication at their own freewill, but 
do so based on multilateral agreements. As an active partner within the exercise, 
the IMO do not subsume or acquisition power from institutions such as the 
London VAAC, and are committed to providing information. This illustrates the 
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need for collaborative engagements and institutional powers to be viewed 
holistically when considered in the context of monitoring exercises such as 
VolcIce.  
The research has viewed the VolcIce exercise as a microcosmic vision of 
Iceland’s network; the actors within it are empowered by the synergy generated 
from their interconnections and an intrinsic level of trust. This study found that 
the exercise can be interpreted as a collaborative core within a complex and 
institutionally dense network; findings suggest that VolcIce has continually 
evolved in response to policymaking and volcanic events such as the eruption of 
Eyjafjallajökull. Furthermore, flexible channels of communication are able to 
prevent power disparities by ensuring that robust connections between the IMO, 
the London VAAC and Isavia can be maintained. The exercise is jointly 
conducted by three institutions, but has the capacity to extend to the broader 
aviation community in times of crisis; the structure of the exercise is not idealised 
(see pp.114-117) and can be negotiated by airlines, aviation authorities and the 
governing body, ICAO.  
 
5.1.3: Repositioning and renegotiating power: Engagement, participation and social media 
The lack of stability and permanence within Iceland’s hazard network appears to 
explain the ease with which actors are repositioned and power is renegotiated. 
For example, VolcIce has in-built connections to the aviation community, but 
also has sufficient leverage for change. This study has established that 
communication channels are increasingly leading to a bottom-up approach to 
managing volcanic hazards in Iceland. For example, citizens and communities 
alike are gaining the power and responsibility to communicate information that 
relates to volcanic activity. The power dynamics of leading institutions such as the 
IMO have not become obsolete, but have been transformed by channels of 
communication that extend their outreach to non-scientific stakeholder 
communities.  
This study of Iceland’s proactive approach to volcanic hazard 
management has illustrated how power relations can be contradictory within 
complex networked infrastructures. For example, several interviewees implied 
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that participation in the VolcIce exercise was largely confined to the IMO, the 
London VAAC and Isavia: 
We only want those (in the exercise) that have been involved in the 
planning from the beginning, those that are going to actually conduct 
the exercise, attend the debrief and contact you directly (Isavia, 
March 2014). 
The extract indicates that the scope of the exercise is much narrower than had 
otherwise been described, with institutional power being centralised. This 
perception of VolcIce contrasts with the community-based approaches to 
mitigation that were referred to in numerous interviews. For instance, discussions 
at the CP outlined a much less authoritative approach to hazard management in 
Southern Iceland. Power can therefore exist in multiple forms within such a 
holistic network; as a result, the communication processes have varying impacts 
on trust and collaboration. 
However, the rather critical view of VolcIce, expressed by Isavia, is based 
on the modelled setting of the mock exercise that was observed within the 
fieldwork. During a volcanic crisis, a greater number of communication channels 
are likely to be utilised, expanding the connections with the aviation industry and 
the media. Furthermore, during the VolcIce debrief, the Isavia representative 
provided a contrasting vision of the exercise’s scope and connectivity: 
We (Isavia) are supposed to call Stavanger, we are supposed to call 
Prestwick, we are supposed to call Edmonton …. Montréal …. And 
then local airlines, it’s a number when you total it all together (Isavia, 
March 2014). 
By referring to the various communication channels, the extract reflects Iceland’s 
capacity to evolve during crisis situations. Therefore, this research has established 
that the network can be adjusted to meet the demands of a dynamic array of 
stakeholders. Analysts have often derided the positionality of the lay public in 
networks that are tailored to hazard management, but in the case of Iceland, a 
proactive approach ensures the balance of power with leading institutions can be 
negotiated.  
Iceland’s network appears to have sufficient flexibility to perform and 
adapt to change, largely because of the willingness amongst socio-political 
stakeholders to engage constructively with both science and technology. For 
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example, the fieldwork led to interviews being conducted with farmers and 
community leaders in the region surrounding Vík in Southern Iceland. 
Interviewees repeatedly referred to their regular participation in monitoring 
exercises, and their use of technology to communicate hazard information: 
We certainly play a more active role than we have done in the past, 
preparing for the hazard is a community effort, but it is important we 
talk with the IMO in Reykjavík, that is very important to us (Farmer, 
near Vík, March 2014). 
The extract refers to the distribution of power, to communities, from a 
hierarchical and institutional elite. In addition, the farmer recognises the 
importance of having a positive relationship with the IMO; this view was also 
supported by interviewees in Höfn. Therefore, the study provides evidence of the 
will of Icelandic society to connect with scientific institutions, widening the 
distribution of communication channels within the network.  
By studying the attitudes of communities such as Vík, this research has 
been able to identify how social media has renegotiated power and encouraged a 
participatory approach to volcanic hazard management (Sennert et al., 2015). 
Platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have empowered community-based 
actors by enabling them to impact on knowledge exchange (Gultom, 2016); these 
privileges and responsibilities were previously accrued and acquisitioned by 
leading institutions such as the IMO and the CP. As powers are increasingly 
decentralised, the cultures and configurations of these institutional entities are 
transformed. Furthermore, social media provides greater transparency between 
stakeholder communities: 
What we (CP) have done is we have built open communications; 
we’ve done this because it’s always important to adhere to your 
responsibility (CP, March 2014). 
Here, the interviewee refers to how participatory methods of communication 
have expanded the outreach of institutions to the lay public; therefore, the CP’s 
“social contract” (Gibbons, 1999, C81) has been widened. This research also 
found that new cyberspaces such as internet forums and newsletters have 
transformed both trust and collaboration. Since the eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull 
in 2010 and Grímsvötn in 2011, these channels of communication have had a 
profound impact on renegotiations of power.  
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The involvement of the public is significant as it readdresses the ‘science’ 
of hazard management. Interviews conducted in both Vík and Höfn highlighted a 
tendency for Icelandic communities to have a deeply rooted belief in science, and 
to not view scientific actors as privileged or authoritative figures. Therefore, 
social attitudes appear to ease and naturalise the process of establishing 
collaboration, reducing knowledge gaps between science and society. This 
transition of power between stakeholder communities has had a considerable 
impact on institutional trust: 
The agency’s scoring on trust with the general public has improved 
since the use of Twitter and Facebook, and now we are one of the 
most trusted agencies in Iceland (CP, April 2014). 
The quotation implies a clear correlation between increased levels of trust and the 
use of social media. Trust can be defined by the increased strength of relations 
between scientists and stakeholders from social, economic and political 
backgrounds.  
In the context of this research, trust is measured by asking interviewees 
questions related to their interpersonal relationships. Although perceptions of 
trust vary, the semi-structured interview format allows individuals to express their 
commitment to prominent stakeholders and institutional entities. This enables the 
research to gauge an understanding of the social capital within Iceland’s network, 
and to extrapolate evidence of trust (Glaeser et al., 2000). The frequency and 
consistency of communications can also present themselves as measures of trust 
between leading institutions and community-based stakeholders. In addition, the 
actions and behaviours of participants in monitoring exercises such as VolcIce are 
indicative of inter-agency trust, and the willingness of stakeholders to engage 
constructively with hazard knowledge from multiple sources. 
Many non-scientific actors have previously been distanced from how 
hazard information is constructed; social media improves levels of trust by 
reducing these disparities: 
Social media has created connections between people and 
organisations, allowing people to ping each other, talk to the head 
scientist for example and ask them questions, it doesn’t matter 
whether they are out in the field or in Reykjavík (IMO, March 2015). 
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The extract implies that a balancing of power dynamics stems from stronger 
levels of stakeholder connectivity. When explaining the impact of social media, 
the interviewee refers to the irrelevance of time and space; for example, 
communication is almost instantaneous and geographical boundaries are removed 
between the individual contributor and the scientist. However, whilst the use of 
social media has been valuable to Iceland and is compatible with its close-knit yet 
diverse stakeholder community, both the CP and the IMO have questioned 
whether participatory technologies can renegotiate power to the same extent in 
other multi-hazard environments.  
By observing the use of social media, this study has been able to provide 
substantial evidence of Iceland’s advocacy of citizen science (see pp.34-36). 
Through smartphone applications and other user-orientated platforms, such as 
MyVolcano and Geosocial, citizen science has become embedded into Icelandic 
society. For example, the IMO and the University of Iceland (UoI) have both 
used methods of citizen science to gather hazard information from the public; 
this has required the institutions to progressively work in collaboration with 
farming communities and small settlements across Southern Iceland. From the 
perspective of citizen science, actions taken to renegotiate power can be 
interpreted as largely social constructs. Interviews carried out near to Þórsmörk 
have highlighted how the Icelandic public are largely attuned to science and 
display an awareness of the impacts of volcanic activity on their lives and their 
culture. In addition, interviews conducted with scientific actors in Reykjavík have 
also illustrated an awareness of how deeply engrained an “open system” is within 
Icelandic society (UoI, 2014).  
Citizen science has strengthened Iceland’s bottom-up approach to hazard 
management, but is not solely responsible for a decentralisation of power from 
institutions such as the IMO and the UoI. For example, an interview conducted 
with an academic at the UoI referred to the longevity of the bottom-up approach, 
but made no reference to social media:  
We have an open system, we have, over many years, built open 
access to everything and they (community-based stakeholders) know 
that, they know that we are not basing this (hazard advice) on some 
secretive information, we have grounded trust, and I think that is 
very important, this open decision and open policy is the right way to 
go for us and for them (UoI, April 2014). 
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The interviewee implies that open engagement predates social media and can be 
construed as a characteristic of Iceland’s homogenous culture. The interviewee 
also views trust and collaboration as “grounded” features, rather than the 
outcomes of newly constructed channels of communication. Furthermore, 
interviews carried out at the CP attributed the successful use of social media to 
participatory and “tech-savvy” attitudes (UoI, April 2014), rather than to the 
innovative engagement of digital platforms.  
However, social media communication has become an integral part of the 
psyche of many at-risk communities in Iceland (Borup et al., 2006). This became 
apparent during an interview conducted with the CP: 
We are seeing over 200,000 Facebook accounts in Iceland at this 
point (March 2014), I think it just has to do with the ease of 
communication, we have needed to react to that (CP, March 2014). 
Here, the interviewee refers to the widespread visibility and extensive use of 
Facebook; the extent to which the platform permeates society means it cannot be 
overlooked by leading institutions such as the CP and the IMO. On the other 
hand, renegotiating power is often a fragmentary process and cannot be allied 
solely to the end-users’ preference for accessing information. Open engagement 
with the public now appears intrinsic to the CP and has been promoted 
throughout the institution: 
Since 2010 we have had an open desk, so we try to put everything 
out there, we need to be trusted and this has made what we are doing 
more transparent, and has broken down barriers, not just to people 
here in Iceland, but elsewhere also (CP, April 2014). 
By referring to “an open desk”, the interviewee reflects how the institutional 
culture of the CP has evolved and now relates to the deconstruction of 
boundaries. The will to remove “barriers” stems from previous incidents of 
public scepticism and increased scrutiny following the highly publicised eruption 
of Grímsvötn in 2011.  
Social, economic and political stakeholder communities have 
progressively moved to a position of power from the margins and peripheries of 
the Icelandic network. An interview conducted with the CP illustrated this trend: 
Before the eruption began (Grímsvötn, 2011), we had at least one full 
blown, full scale evacuation exercise, but since then we have 
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continued to involve the farmers in the area, so we know that 
everybody has something prepared for an event, and that they are in 
a better position to oversee an evacuation if we are unable to reach 
the area (CP, March 2014). 
The interviewee explains the greater inclusion of community-based actors and 
refers to the improved resilience and adaptability of the region. Power appears to 
have been spread and redefined in a manner that has granted social actors a more 
significant voice. Responsibility has also been outsourced as farmers are tasked 
with overseeing an evacuation; this presents evidence of increased trust and 
collaboration, and lessens the disparities in power between leading institutions 
and members of the public. 
Both the IMO and the CP have established collaborative partnerships 
that enable citizens to provide vital hazard information. For example, during the 
Bárðarbunga eruption (2014-2015), a prominent member of the IMO 
demonstrated how social media was being used to facilitate knowledge exchange: 
The IMO are encouraging the public to present information on air 
quality, using social media (Facebook), and this is currently 
happening on a daily basis (IMO, September 2014). 
Here, public engagement allows air quality data to flow in multiple directions 
between the IMO and the communities affected. Therefore, social media has 
strengthened mutual trust and exhibited citizen science during a crisis situation 
(see Figure 5.1 [p.135] and Figure 5.2 [p.136]).  
   140 
 
 
Figure 5.1: An example of how Facebook was used to collect and share information during 
Bárðarbunga (Source: Icelandic Met Office - Facebook page. Date accessed: January 2016). 
 
Figure 5.2: A time-adjustable graphic illustrating sulfur pollution during Bárðarbunga. The 
data was collected through social media platforms, and is displayed on the IMO webpage 
(Source: Icelandic Met Office - Holuhraun [Sulfur Pollution Maps]. Date accessed: January 
2016). 
The actions and transformations of both the IMO and the CP have 
illustrated how trust is not one-dimensional, and needs to be earned by the wider 
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society as well as by leading scientists and hazard coordinators. A bottom-up 
approach to managing volcanic hazards preserves the legislative power of 
Icelandic institutions, whilst also reinforcing their interactions with socio-political 
communities (Bird, 2009; Bird et al., 2011; Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2014b). 
Therefore, the openness of Iceland’s network has strengthened the continuity and 
resilience of collaborative engagements (Scolobig et al., 2015). However, whilst 
this research has identified several links between reduced power disparities and 
improved levels of trust and collaboration, the process of renegotiating power 
cannot be standardised as it is contextually dependant and reliant on the 
evolution and flexibility of Iceland’s hazard network.  
 
5.1.4: The source of power and responsibility: Decision-making and evolution 
This study has found that assignments of power and responsibility are only 
relevant in the short-term and are vulnerable to change. The fieldwork established 
that whilst coordinators are likely to have a greater level of stability than 
supporting actors, their cohesion can be eroded and their positionality within the 
network can become increasingly unclear. For example, the VolcIce exercise may 
appear to exhibit stability, but both the exercise and its participants were 
subjected to regulatory changes during the eight months between the original 
fieldwork and the follow-up research. The positionality and power of 
coordinators were progressively weakened by changes in the personnel taking 
part, as well as by the policymaking of ICAO. Therefore, the research findings 
have viewed Iceland’s network in a state of constant flux, highlighting the need 
for its various stakeholder communities to illustrate adaptability. 
In the context of VolcIce, airlines have gained greater decision-making 
responsibilities over the course of the study (see p.110), and this has impacted on 
the collective power of the actors who participate in the exercise. An interview 
carried out with Isavia referred to how VolcIce has sufficient leverage to reform 
and evolve over time: 
This (VolcIce exercise) is the one that was endorsed September 2010, 
but we will most likely endorse another one this year when we get a 
new plan, the international “rules” that govern these exercises (and 
real events) are for ICAO to decide, so as a result, we are transferring 
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responsibility to the airlines and the exercise needs to be up-to-date 
(Isavia, March 2014). 
The interviewee anticipated change as participants were required to comply with 
policy amendments that were in the process of being authorised by the governing 
body, ICAO. As responsibilities were transferred to airlines, the decision-making 
powers of those involved in the exercise were weakened. For example, key 
personnel were required to make the transition from decision-makers to 
informants:   
We (Isavia) will not be closing airspaces like we do now, we will be 
informing, the SIGMET will be sent and they (the airlines) will make 
decisions (Isavia, March 2014). 
As the VolcIce community evolves, new collaborations can be formed with 
airlines as a result of power being redistributed. The changing composition of the 
exercise reflects the fluidity of Iceland’s networked infrastructure, and illustrates 
the ambiguity of power dynamics.  
However, ICAO should not be viewed as dominating and hierarchical; 
findings indicate that policy amendments are reliant on the trust and support of 
airlines. Nevertheless, this research has found that ICAO has sufficient power to 
evoke change as proposals have been met with widespread compliance. The 
increased power and responsibility of airlines has not affected the entire structure 
of the VolcIce exercise, but has demanded adaptability from the leading actors 
within it. Therefore, institutional power has been decentralised throughout 
Iceland’s network; the acquisition of decision-making power by airlines can be 
compared to the impact social media has had on the power dynamics of 
community-based actors. Both transitions have led to responsibilities becoming 
increasingly fragmented from institutions such as the IMO, the CP and Isavia.  
Archival research of the Bárðarbunga eruption (2014-2015) illustrated 
how connections had formed between the CP and the communities closest to the 
event. For example, social media activity within Iceland was far greater during 
Bárðarbunga than it had been for the eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull and Grímsvötn.  
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Figure 5.3: The CP’s use of Twitter during the Bárðarbunga eruption. Advice was issued 
and hazard information was requested (Source: Department of Civil Protection - Twitter page. 
Date accessed: December 2015). 
Platforms such as Facebook and Twitter had begun to present themselves as 
channels through which to exchange knowledge and circulate hazard information 
throughout the network (see Figure 5.3, p.138). This has enabled institutions such 
as the CP and the IMO to outsource power to multiple stakeholder communities 
and to expand collaborative practices. 
Therefore, the adaptation of aviation policy and the expansion of social 
media have sporadically increased the number of points within Iceland’s network 
at which actors connect and share information. Whilst these transformations 
highlight the flexibility of Iceland’s approach to hazard management, they also 
refer to an increasingly democratic method of decision-making. However, social 
media is still in its infancy, so the long-term impacts on the monitoring of 
volcanic hazards remain largely speculative. Nevertheless, these findings profile 
the need for complex infrastructures to have the capacity to adapt, and social 
media has provided a mechanism that can improve stakeholder communication 
and strengthen levels of trust.  
The social and aviation trajectories of Iceland’s network demonstrate how 
it is not only the leading institutions who are “flicking the switch” (CP, March 
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2014); this has influenced the development of black-boxed knowledge (Latour, 
1999a) as facts are no longer sourced or communicated solely by institutional 
entities. However, the CP and the IMO have both played an active role in 
nurturing the changes that are referred to in this research: 
Being cooperative, and then being trusted, is the backbone of our 
decision making; the persons we have to work with have changed, 
but we have had to be loyal to make sure we are trusted and listened 
to (CP, March 2014). 
The interviewee recognises the importance of loyalty when engaging in a network 
that is continually evolving; the extract is also indicative of the CP’s adaptability, 
culture and attitudes. By analysing the dynamism of Iceland’s approach, this study 
has found that institutional trust remains “critical” (McAllister and Taylor, 2015, 
p.89) to the establishment and renegotiation of power.  
Whilst this thesis explains how power can be ambiguous and difficult to 
define, it plays a key role in analysing and navigating complex networks such as 
Iceland (Oliver-Smith, 1996; Paton, 2006). Through the scope of the research 
question, the fluidity of power dynamics gives credence to Iceland’s holistic 
approach to hazard management. Furthermore, power relations also explain how 
volcanic activity is increasingly “co-managed” (Dorcey and McDaniel’s, 1999, in 
Pearce, 2003, p.212), and why multi-hazard environments require trust and 
collaboration between actors. By analysing power from an interdisciplinary and 
post-structural perspective, this study has assessed “stakeholder influences” 
(Rowley, 1997, p.887) and the mobility of decision-making practices. The 
decentralisation of power has been a recurrent theme and highlights the 
movement of stakeholder communities from either central or peripheral positions 
within the network.  
 
5.2: Valuing technical actors: From innovation to evolution 
Transitions in power have often been underpinned by improvements in 
stakeholder engagement; technical actors have been influential in the expansion 
of communication channels and are integral to the hazard network in Iceland 
(Donovan et al., 2012). Technology exists in the form of devices and software 
packages, and can range from mundane computational artefacts to sophisticated 
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satellites. The innovation of digital and virtual technologies has re-energised both 
trust and collaboration, primarily because they can provide contact areas between 
society and science. Devices and systems increasingly have value, purpose and 
policy relevance within hazard management; this section of the chapter addresses 
the research question by assessing how technical actors are able to bridge multiple 
stakeholder communities. The mobility and positionality of each individual device 
can be viewed as part of a process, extending from their innovation to the point 
at which they either adapt or become disconnected from Iceland’s network.  
 
5.2.1: Reforming space and time: The innovation of the screen-world 
Iceland provides a model environment in which technical devices can optimally 
serve the complex and evolving demands of various stakeholder communities. 
This research has found that technology is increasingly renegotiating the concept 
of time and space within Iceland’s networked infrastructure. For example, social 
media, mobile applications and real-time information are altering the spatial 
geography of volcanic hazard management in Iceland. Furthermore, innovative 
devices have led to the expansion of the screen-world by constructing digital and 
cybernetic spaces of engagement (Turkle, 2011). Collectively, these tools and 
software packages have transformed the process of exchanging knowledge: 
In Cyberspace, we can talk, exchange ideas, and assume personae of 
our own creation, we have the opportunity to build new kinds of 
communities, virtual communities (Turkle, 2011, p.9). 
This study has found that Turkle’s interpretation of the screen-world can be 
applied to Iceland’s network; for example, digital spaces between actors and 
institutions have ensured instantaneous communication and interoperable 
exchanges of hazard information. Therefore, with improvements to stakeholder 
connectivity, technical actors have attempted to eradicate the challenges posed by 
time and space. 
The observation of VolcIce highlighted how the screen-world can be 
used to communicate information artefacts; these include SIGMET notifications 
between the IMO and the London VAAC. In addition, when interviewing 
prominent members of the IMO and the UoI, numerous references were made to 
the value of screen-based devices and software packages: 
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Technology has been very important in increasing communication 
between scientists, it is very helpful, you can sit somewhere as an 
expert in remote sensing, and if you see something, an event, and 
have established a contact, you can use technology to share 
information. Your contact can see what you are seeing regardless of 
where they are located, your expertise is therefore being shared 
through the web or on a screen (IMO, March 2014). 
Here, a scientist from the IMO explains the impact of the screen-world on 
communication between scientific institutions, and highlights how time and space 
can be renegotiated. Therefore, geographical distances have become less 
significant in the context of how volcanic hazards are monitored; this makes it 
easier for collaboration and trust to be established within networked 
infrastructures.  
However, screen-based technologies can inhibit valuable face-to-face 
contact in an environment such as Reykjavík, where the headquarters of scientific 
institutions, monitoring agencies and response organisations are in close 
proximity. Therefore, whilst technology has transformed the spatial and temporal 
dynamics of the network, virtual communication has arguably restricted team 
building and limited stakeholder familiarity. Digital spaces of engagement are 
valuable when communicating hazard information between Iceland and the UK, 
but can be much less beneficial to network cohesion at a domestic level within 
Iceland. Furthermore, there is a need to consider the multiplicity of many devices 
and systems; for example, screen-based platforms such as social media improve 
the frequency of mainstream communication (Yates and Paquette, 2011; Yin et al., 
2012), but their value can be questioned as they rarely serve a specific purpose 
within the network.  
 
5.2.2: Context and standardisation: The use and symbiosis of technical actors 
This research has also found that the innovation of the screen-world has 
promoted standardised methods of communication; these have influenced levels 
of trust as divisions between stakeholder communities have been further 
eradicated. Whilst Iceland is a contextually unique environment (see pp.91-94), 
technologies have the potential to reduce complexity and standardise 
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representations of risk (Fearnley et al., 2012). Felpeto et al. (2007) relate standard 
practices to the autonomy of technological systems:  
The development of automatic systems… lead to the standardization 
of protocols for hazard assessment and risk management, facilitating 
the tasks of scientists and technicians in charge of such responsibility 
and the exchange of information between the different working 
groups (Felpeto et al., 2007, p.115). 
By explaining how standardisation affects knowledge exchange, Felpeto et al. 
(2007) refer to the positive impacts on the management of volcanic hazards. The 
extract also implies that the actions and responsibilities of multiple stakeholder 
communities are intrinsically linked to the mobile attributes of technical devices.  
Standardisation can also be considered during the convoluted process of 
constructing and designing innovative technologies:  
When we begin to consider creating new technologies, we need to be 
aware of the likelihood that we can use them to get information and 
data in a format that is standardised, but also interchangeable 
between organisations (IMO, March 2014). 
The IMO explain how attributes that facilitate standardisation emerge from 
collaborative discussions during the research stage of technical innovation. 
Therefore, the integration of standard practices into Iceland’s network can be 
analysed from a constructivist perspective. For example, if technology is co-
produced by the IMO and their partners, then the value of standardised 
information is also determined by this confluence of knowledge. Both the IMO 
and the CP refer to stakeholder discussions when explaining the value of 
standardisation: 
We have had to set standards for giving it (the hazard information) to 
communities; we have looked at the formats (XML, PDF, etc.) and 
have identified what is most suitable; it was important that we 
addressed these issues, however small, before going into the field 
(CP, March 2014). 
Here, the interviewee illustrates how standard practices appear to be controlled 
by the decision-making of leading institutions. Whilst technology exhibits 
autonomous capabilities, these are ultimately determined during stakeholder 
discussions of how a device or software package is intended to be developed.  
 
   148 
 
5.2.3: Exploring technological innovation: The emergence of the Airborne Volcanic Object 
Imaging Detector 
Many interviewees were eager to discuss the impact technology has on trust and 
collaboration, but tended to refer to the innovation of a system, rather than its 
use in crisis situations. Both Isavia and the Norwegian Institute for Air Research 
(NILU) explained the potential impact of the AVOID equipment (see pp.107-
109) by referring to the collaborative engagements that had underpinned its 
testing. Interviewees outlined how the innovation process led to improved 
collaboration between science and industry; for example, the UK-based budget 
airline ‘EasyJet’ (Learmount, 2013) had played a significant role in trialling the 
equipment in European airspace. This study found that the airline’s contribution 
had been influenced by the economic damage suffered during the eruption of 
Eyjafjallajökull, and the potential acquisition of additional decision-making 
responsibilities (see p.110 and pp.137-138). Therefore, the innovation of AVOID 
has appeared to account for previous volcanic activity in Iceland as well as policy 
relevance; this has strengthened collaboration between the intended end-user and 
the scientists constructing the device. 
However, over the course of the fieldwork, the influence of protocol and 
regulatory measures became apparent. Without returning to ICAO’s governance 
of the aviation industry (see pp.125-126 and p.137), interviews conducted with 
Nicarnica Aviation, the London VAAC and the Civil Aviation Authority (UK), 
explained how technology is implemented based on regulatory frameworks. For 
example, an interviewee from the London VAAC referred to the constraints 
imposed on the implementation of the AVOID equipment: 
It (AVOID) hasn’t been approved yet, it is not approved to be flown 
on a civilian aircraft, so it has got to go through a whole certification 
process and be cleared to fly, and then of course they have got to 
write a plan about how they are going to use it operationally, so there 
is quite a long way to go, to get it into an operational environment 
(London VAAC, October 2014). 
The extract refers to how the technology has been shaped by the need to comply 
with a rigorous regulatory framework; acceptance and legitimacy are more 
significant to innovation than attempts to ensure long-term collaboration 
between stakeholder communities. 
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Therefore, the construction of the AVOID technology has been reflective 
of ICAO’s sphere of influence; as a result, this thesis now examines the critical 
importance of protocol such as Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 
measurements (see pp.109-110):  
Our objective is developing the technology for AVOID, that’s our 
role, that’s Nicarnica Aviation, but we have known that there is a 
need to be developing it in accordance with and through the 
technology readiness levels. To be able to put an instrument on an 
aircraft, it has to meet certain requirements, and in working with 
airbus, this has been really beneficial, you have to have links with the 
aviation industry (Nicarnica Aviation, July 2014). 
The extract provides further evidence of how systems such as AVOID are 
designed according to regulation (TRL’s); for example, the interviewee refers to 
the establishment of a middle-ground between the ambitions and intentions of 
scientists, and the governance of technology in the aviation industry. However, 
Nicarnica Aviation do not view TRL’s as a threat to their operations, but 
interpret them as obstacles to be overcome; this illustrates how deeply embedded 
TRL’s are in the process of technical innovation.  
Furthermore, the interview conducted with Nicarnica Aviation also 
expressed the need for continued collaboration between science and industry. 
The perceived success of how the AVOID equipment was tested stems from 
scientific and industrial actors being involved in the innovation process from the 
outset. For example, EasyJet and Airbus made a significant contribution, with the 
role of the latter “providing the planes, as well as the radar and technology” that 
were used for testing the device (NILU, June 2014). Therefore, the industrial 
involvement allowed the AVOID technology to meet the criteria for TRL’s, 
primarily because testing could take place in an environment where the system 
would be used at first-hand (see Figure 4.6, p.108). A collaborative approach to 
designing and using the technology has, therefore, been evident at each stage of 
its innovation, and was initiated by its creator, Dr. Fred Prata. 
The engagement of airlines and aircraft manufacturers provides evidence 
of AVOID being a product of a “wide-ranging operation” (EasyJet - Corporate 
page: AVOID section, 2016). Exchanges of knowledge and expertise have been 
integral to the construction of the equipment, and illustrate how boundaries 
between stakeholder communities can be transcended. This research has 
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established that these examples of collaboration between science and industry 
appear to be having long-term impacts on levels of trust within Iceland’s hazard 
network. For instance, the Eyjafjallajökull eruption (2010) strained the 
relationship between airlines and monitoring institutions such as the London 
VAAC. Interviews conducted at NILU have since referred to a strengthening of 
these ties, primarily as a result of continued collaboration in the development of 
new technologies. Therefore, the value of the AVOID equipment can be 
enhanced when considering the positive impact its innovation appears to have 
had on the sociality of the network.  
Furthermore, AVOID has been designed for use in the context of 
volcanic activity in Iceland, but both NILU and the London VAAC have 
explained how it could also be adapted for use in other global regions. There are 
a relatively high number of end-users with whom the device can potentially be 
associated, so the impact on levels of trust between stakeholders could be more 
widespread than is reflected in this thesis. Both scientists and the aviation 
industry appear to have recognised the long-term relevance and flexibility of the 
device; these are particularly valuable attributes for technology to possess in 
environments such as Iceland.  In a post-Eyjafjallajökull age, technical actors have 
an aura when they can be tailored to socio-economic responsibilities (Learmount, 
2013); this research studied numerous devices and software packages that have 
impacted on trust and collaboration because of their socio-political relevance.  
As Iceland’s network is complex and evolving, connections between end-
users and innovators are integral to ensuring that devices and systems are 
resilient. For instance, Nicarnica Aviation have created camera systems such as 
“NicAir” (Nicarnica Aviation, July 2014), and have consulted extensively with the 
end-user, namely the IMO: 
The instrument we have, you would take it into the field, and plug it 
in, and then take measurements. IMO wanted something very much 
sort of automated, so when we were designing the device to deliver 
to them, we knew that once it was in the field, it would need to 
operate by itself and connect to their server (Nicarnica Aviation, 
March 2014). 
Here, the interviewee refers to how the IMO has influenced the construction and 
autonomy of the NicAir device. The extract also highlights the existence of a 
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collaborative and trustworthy relationship, between Nicarnica Aviation and the 
IMO, prior to the physical construction of the technology.  
Therefore, NicAir has been shaped and designed in a manner that has 
ensured its compatibility with the culture and actions of its end-user:  
We (Nicarnica) are sort of responsible for the technology, but we 
have been in discussion with the IMO because they are going to be 
the ultimate user of the three instruments we are developing; so we 
have been discussing how they want to use the instruments in a 
slightly different way to how they have been used in the past… we 
have designed this instrument (NicAir) with Iceland in mind, any sort 
of comments or feedback that IMO have are sent back to us 
(Nicarnica Aviation, June 2014). 
By referring to specific discussions and exchanges of knowledge, the interviewee 
provides evidence of Nicarnica Aviation’s constructive know-how connecting 
with the scientific expertise of the IMO. This has allowed the individual attributes 
of NicAir to be nurtured through institutional collaboration and trust. However, 
whilst the extract explains the contextual niche within which the NicAir cameras 
were assembled, the device has since been used in environments other than 
Iceland, notably the Canary Islands and the Kamchatka Peninsula (Mackie et al., 
2016). Nevertheless, the development of both NicAir and AVOID has illustrated 
how technology can impact on trust and collaborative engagements in complex 
hazard networks. As monitoring devices become increasingly mobile and 
autonomous, they have a greater ability to become self-sufficient once deployed 
in fields of research.  
 
 
5.2.4: Valuing information: The Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment 
By interviewing and observing stakeholders at the IMO, the London VAAC and 
Isavia, this research has been able to study the mobility and independence of 
monitoring devices and communication platforms. Software programs are often 
shared between these institutions, with an example being the Numerical 
Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment (NAME). Unlike the AVOID 
equipment, the NAME software had already been deployed within Iceland’s 
network when the fieldwork was conducted, and was used extensively during the 
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VolcIce exercise (Jones et al., 2007). The purpose and functioning of NAME (see 
p.116) has strengthened trust and maintained collaborative links between the 
IMO and the London VAAC. Interviewees from both institutions explained how 
the software had improved their adaptability and resilience in the context of 
VolcIce.  
Software packages such as NAME are integral to this research, primarily 
because they illustrate how technology can ensure that leading institutions have 
the capacity to co-evolve (Rip, 2002). Furthermore, first-hand experience of 
NAME has enabled this study to recognise how technical actors can be purposely 
designed to react to change. Whilst observing the VolcIce exercise (see Appendix 
3.1, p.266), notes recorded in the field diary highlighted the value of the 
connective bridging point that NAME provides between the IMO and the 
London VAAC:  
1) The London VAAC use the NAME modelling software once they 
have received a warning (within the exercise) from the IMO.  
2) Graphs constructed by NAME are shared with the IMO and 
Isavia.  
3) The NAME outputs are used by each of the institutions 
participating in the exercise - to identify the concentration and 
dispersal of volcanic ash (Research field diary, March 2014). 
By constructing graphical outputs, NAME generates information artefacts that 
are dynamic and can be used by multiple stakeholder communities (see Figure 
4.10, p.116). When discussing NAME with the IMO and the London VAAC, it 
became apparent that the form and representation of the outputs were 
considered at length during the software’s innovation; the Volcanic Ash Graphics 
are designed to facilitate efficient communication between end-users.  
Therefore, NAME has impacted on the scope of knowledge exchange 
within Iceland’s network, primarily by translating hazard data into Volcanic Ash 
Graphics (see Figure 5.1 [p.135] and Figure 5.2 [p.136]). This research has 
assessed the software’s contribution to the aviation industry, and has found that 
the mode of representation is navigable by both coordinators and supporting 
actors. The communication of graphics depicting the dispersion of volcanic ash 
has transformed decision-making, both within the VolcIce exercise and during 
ongoing volcanic eruptions. Furthermore, this analysis of the NAME software 
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can reflect key elements of Latour’s approach to ANT (1993; 2005); for example, 
Volcanic Ash Graphics can be viewed as circulatory artefacts that generate and 
reinforce connections within the network. However, NAME is largely used in 
modelled situations and can inadvertently lead to stakeholder communities, such 
as the aviation industry, being over-reliant on the data and graphs it exhibits. In 
addition, NAME is also constrained by the governance of ICAO; for example, an 
assigned colour code is not evident on NAME illustrations, as this would 
contravene ICAO regulations.  
Nevertheless, NAME demonstrates how technical actors are able to self-
sufficiently translate hazard information. By removing the quantitative purity 
from datasets, and converting them into graphics, NAME translates knowledge 
so that it can be exchanged by a wide range of stakeholder communities (Jones et 
al., 2007, p.580). Furthermore, this study has recognised the dependency of the 
VolcIce participants on the NAME software; this has drawn attention to the 
power dynamics between human and technical actors. During a period of 
volcanic activity, when information needs to be distributed to multiple 
communities, NAME restricts human intervention to computational demands 
and demonstrates the autonomy of Iceland’s technical infrastructure. The 
technology is equipped with the in-built capability to act and communicate 
information; this makes differentiating between human and technical 
contributions to hazard management, a challenging task.   
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Figure 5.4: A graph displaying ash dispersal data, produced by the NAME software and 
communicated as part of the VolcIce exercise (Source: Met Office [UK] - London VAAC: 
Volcanic Ash Graphics page. Date accessed: January 2015). 
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Figure 5.5: A further output illustrating volcanic ash, using data that has been converted by 
the NAME software [Nephanalysis] (Source: Met Office [UK] - London VAAC: Volcanic 
Ash Nephanalysis. Date accessed: August 2016). 
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However, whilst this research has been able to establish the power 
dynamics of the NAME software, the extent to which its contributions to hazard 
management are self-sufficient remain questionable. For example, an interview 
conducted with the IMO referred to the actions of forecasters in response to 
receiving NAME outputs:  
We (the IMO) amend ash cloud forecasts when we receive the 
information coming from the ash distribution model (NAME); it is 
the VAAC that share this with us, and we have had to make sure 
that, through the exercise, we have a good relationship with them 
(IMO, March 2014). 
The interviewee views NAME as the distributor and communicator of hazard 
information, but its value and significance would be lessened if channels of 
communication did not already exist between the IMO and the London VAAC. 
NAME provides an efficient means of utilising these channels, but does not 
actively form or widen them. In addition, the role and influence of institutional 
coordinators cannot be discredited as NAME outputs are subject to the IMO’s 
amendments of ash forecasts; therefore, human intervention is required and is 
not replaced entirely by the technology available.   
This study has recognised the need to interpret technical actors from 
holistic perspectives; whilst transforming information is significant, AVOID and 
NAME can only impact on collaboration and trust when their end-users are able 
to engage with the artefacts and outputs they produce. Therefore, analysing the 
encoding and decoding of outputs is integral to appreciating the value, 
positionality and autonomy of technical devices and software’s (Hall, 2001). An 
interview with the IMO highlighted how this has been reflected in the context of 
VolcIce: 
The London VAAC are not likely to be interested in the same data as 
what we are defining, so in interpreting the data we need to consider 
what is relevant and concerns our view? The volcanic ash graph is 
different for each of us, depending on our local view (IMO, March 
2014). 
By referring to the outputs of NAME, the interviewee illustrates how 
interpretations can vary once the graphics are distributed to human actors. The 
outreach of the technology is extensive, and whilst the information is 
transformed by the software in a largely autonomous manner, its impact on 
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various stakeholder communities can be diverse. If Volcanic Ash Graphics are to 
influence trust and decision-making, they ultimately require individual negotiation 
by a plethora of human actors. 
 
5.2.5: Negotiating technical actors: The importance of translation  
Prominent stakeholders from both the IMO and the London VAAC have 
repeatedly referred to the medial process of negotiating technical devices and 
systems. Kirsch (1995) viewed technology as a producer of space, and it is the 
exponential growth of the digital space within Iceland’s networked infrastructure 
that human actors have negotiated. Space is produced by the construction and 
mobilisation of datasets, as well as the multiplicity of cyber-based channels of 
communication. Real-time data, Geographical Information Systems and “Big 
Data” (Boyd and Crawford, 2012; Bowker, 2014) have collectively expanded 
Iceland’s network, developing technological spaces that institutions and 
communities alike have needed to negotiate.  
The negotiation process has been aided by projects such as FutureVolc 
(see pp.103-106 for additional information), a research community that has 
intended to centralise data streams, construct feedback loops and improve 
knowledge exchange. Many approaches to negotiating technology have involved 
the removal of boundaries between quantification and sociology; in a complex 
network such as Iceland, this has led to the expansion of citizen science (Rotman 
et al., 2012) and Volunteered Geographic Information (Zook et al., 2010; Elwood 
et al., 2012; Dransch et al., 2013; Haklay, 2013). Interviews conducted with the CP 
and the UoI have provided examples of how these methods facilitate negotiation 
between social, scientific and technical communities: 
If people can take photographs and electronically send us 
photographs of the areas identified at high risk, then that can help us 
with the mapping of risk, this is something that has come from 
advances in technology (UoI, April 2014). 
The interviewee refers to the use of mobile technology, and explains the 
importance of virtual space when sharing and interpreting hazard information. 
Communities such as Vík are actively engaging with monitoring institutions in 
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Reykjavík on a regular basis, using either smartphone applications or internet 
links: 
We use technology to observe threats, and send any information we 
have to the IMO and to the university in Reykjavík, we do it on the 
computer database, we follow reports and also message through to 
Reykjavík using the internet (Vík-based interviewee, April 2014). 
Here, the extract provides an example of how digital spaces are being negotiated 
and utilised to maintain or improve communication. By conducting interviews in 
Vík, this research has found that trust and resilience have generally been 
enhanced by an advocacy of citizen science. 
Innovative technologies tend to provide the space for stakeholders to 
negotiate, and this has led to a psychological reduction in distance between 
science and society. Therefore, a change in stakeholder perception appears to 
have made it simpler to strengthen trust and collaborative engagements (Pearce, 
2003; Cronin et al., 2004b; Paton, 2008); this was referred to during an interview 
carried out with a researcher from the UoI: 
We have found that technological breakthroughs have helped to 
close gaps between scientists and the general public; the general 
public quite often denies access to validity, if you associate 
communities of end-users to your assessment, and expose them to 
the technology, then they are more likely to accept the conclusion of 
that assessment. Technology brings this possibility of interactions, 
and you increase the likelihood of having the results of a risk 
assessment accepted by all stakeholders (UoI, April 2014). 
The extract directly refers to the link between technology and trust, and explains 
the impact on Icelandic communities and scientific institutions. As technologies 
become increasingly participatory, they have a greater ability to empower human 
actors in the manner expressed by the interviewee. Participatory devices and 
systems can be continually negotiated, and improve hazard knowledge by 
ensuring a close relationship between the technical infrastructure and the 
community affected.  
The process of negotiating technology can prevent hazard information 
from becoming too closely aligned to scientific or social ideals. Instead, it can 
close the knowledge gap by reflecting multiple stakeholder communities, and 
encouraging actors from contrasting backgrounds to work progressively alongside 
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each other. However, an interview conducted with the CP questioned the extent 
to which an effective negotiation process can be attributed to technical actors:  
It has nothing to do with changes in technology, we could have these 
relations with the communities anytime, the technology only allows 
us (CP) to do more things, but if you are not prepared mentally to 
explore new ways then the technology is useless, you need 
perspective (CP, March 2014). 
The extract implies that the Icelandic network strives for maximum trust and 
collaboration, with or without the use of participatory devices and systems. 
Whilst the interviewee accepts that technology may enhance interaction, the 
attitudes and willingness of society are much more significant. The translation of 
hazard knowledge is strengthened by social actors negotiating with technology, 
but is ultimately underpinned by their enthusiasm to access and connect with the 
leading institutions that implement the devices and software packages, namely the 
IMO or the CP.  
Within hazard management, the characteristics and behaviours of human 
actors need to be considered to a greater extent. Innovative technologies are 
valued highly in Iceland’s network as an engaging stakeholder community is 
openly exposed to them. Channels of communication present themselves as 
binding features of the network, but can only be maintained and widened by 
technology if local communities are prepared to utilise them for sharing and 
translating hazard knowledge. For example, during the VolcIce exercise, the 
research established that both trust and collaboration stemmed from the presence 
of a post-structural space that allowed for frequent consultation. Each of the 
participating institutions had coordinators and supporting actors who were 
willing to negotiate with the technology at multiple points in the exercise, both in-
house and during the debrief that followed. Therefore, interactions between 
human and technical actors can explain the mobility of knowledge exchange and 
the flexibility of monitoring exercises. Technology enables hazard knowledge to 
be translated (Akrich et al., 2002), but requires an engaging and interconnected 
stakeholder community. 
 
5.2.6: The reliance of stakeholders on technical actors 
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The VolcIce exercise and the FutureVolc project have both illustrated the 
prominent role now played by technical actors in Iceland’s network. As the 
technical infrastructure has expanded, it has become difficult to decipher 
communication channels that are increasingly mobile and overlapping. This 
research has found that many human actors are reliant on the technology 
available to them; this was reflected in an interview conducted with the CP: 
We rely on technology to solve problems, it is a gut feeling, we rely 
on technology to take care of problems that will arise, whether that 
be to protect us from the sea, or from the volcanoes (CP, March 
2014). 
The interviewee expresses the emotive connections between technology and 
stakeholder communities in Iceland, and illustrates the extent to which human 
actors are reliant on their technical counterparts for protection. Technology can 
enhance the adaptive capacity of Iceland’s network, but over-relying on it 
highlights the potential flaws of a techno-centric approach to volcanic hazard 
management. For example, in the event of a malfunctioning device or software 
program, the resilience of the network can be undermined. The reliance on 
technology was felt most strongly when observing the VolcIce exercise; for 
instance, the recommendations that were documented in the exercise report 
stemmed directly from the performance and mediation of artefacts such as 
NAME. Furthermore, during the exercise, representations of ash dispersal were 
constructed and communicated by both mundane and advanced technologies; 
this demonstrated, in the relatively confined settings of VolcIce, how technical 
actors were able to determine the flow and format of hazard information.  
Technology appears to have become so deeply integrated within Icelandic 
society that it can be challenging to distinguish between the human and technical 
elements of the hazard network. For example, a staff member at the CP explained 
how participatory forms of technology had impacted on the flexibility and 
attitudes of human actors:  
People are extremely computerised in this country (Iceland), young 
and old, and they have smartphone and tablet apps, so in that sense 
they are well equipped, they check forecasts, not only from the 
Icelandic Met Office but also from the Norwegian Met Office, and 
instinctively use the mobile device (CP, March 2014). 
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The interviewee does not explicitly draw on trust and collaboration, but refers to 
the intrinsic relationship between community-based stakeholders and mobile 
devices. This illustrates how technical actors are normalised and viewed as default 
measures for monitoring volcanic hazards in Iceland. The digital agency exhibited 
by many devices and systems appears to have enabled human actors to become 
dependent upon them, particularly during a time of anxiety or crisis. This has 
been reflected in the development of crowdsourcing (Rossi et al., 2015) and 
citizen science; these methods of data collection and knowledge exchange 
provide an insight into how embedded technical actors are in hazard 
management.  
Furthermore, the routine use of Iceland’s technical infrastructure appears 
to have rendered many human actor’s unconscious to their reliance upon it. For 
example, an interview conducted in Vík illustrated how devices and systems have 
become less visible as they assimilate with day-to-day life in the hazardous regions 
of Southern Iceland:  
We don’t really see technology because it is such a part of our lives, it 
is all around us, we often do not notice when we are using it directly, 
whether it be for monitoring the volcano or whatever (Vík, March 
2014). 
Here, the extract reflects the level of compatibility between technical actors and 
Icelandic society; the regular use of technology underpins human interaction and 
influences both trust and collaboration. The research also found that interviewees 
from the IMO and the CP were keen to refer to the contextual relevance of many 
innovative devices, as well as the information artefacts they produce.  
Therefore, the impact of technology on trust and collaboration is 
determined by far more than the innovation of a device or software package. 
When informative outputs are translatable by their intended users, value is 
attached to how the technical infrastructure is integrated with society and relied 
upon by stakeholders. During interviews and observations, the IMO and the CP 
both referred to technology increasing social expectations of what knowledge and 
information should be communicated. This approach to Iceland’s network 
resonates with the views of Donovan et al. (2012): 
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The dependence on technology, coupled with its complexity, has 
produced social gradients of understanding, reliance and knowledge 
acquisition (Donovan et al., 2012, p.680). 
Donovan et al. imply that social attitudes can be reconstructed and redesigned by 
community engagement with technical actors; this constructivist approach to 
explaining a hazard network is contextualised within this PhD research. For 
example, by exploring Iceland’s network, this study has been able to identify how 
stakeholder communities negotiate technology and translate information 
artefacts. The research has analysed multiple communication channels and 
assessed several data translation mechanisms within the network.  
 
5.3: Conclusions 
To conclude, technical actors are essential components of Iceland’s network, and 
their fluid flow of information is integral to understanding knowledge exchange. 
In addition, the study has highlighted how power dynamics are continually 
evolving, with a trend towards power being distributed from leading institutions 
to a plethora of stakeholder communities. The widespread use of participatory 
technologies, and the outreach of projects such as FutureVolc, have collectively 
transformed collaboration and trust. In response to the research question, 
Iceland’s approach to hazard management accepts that both power and 
technology evolve in a manner that tends to widen channels of communication 
and improve the adaptability of the network.  
This research has established that stakeholder connectivity is more 
significant than a balance of power when explaining the dynamism and resilience 
of hazard management. By analysing the VolcIce exercise and models such as 
NAME, this chapter has interpreted Iceland’s network from a range of 
interdisciplinary perspectives. The exchange and translation of knowledge are 
recurring themes, and highlight the relevance of constructivist approaches such as 
co-production and ANT. However, these findings are specific to Iceland and may 
not be a fair reflection of how stakeholders communicate in hazardous regions 
that are less economically developed. Nevertheless, as levels of trust improve and 
collaborative engagements expand, actors and institutions have a greater capacity 
to frequently interact across local, national and international scales. Therefore, the 
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study emphasises the need for a relational approach to managing volcanoes in 
multi-hazard environments such as Iceland. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six: Transcending scale: The emergence of a borderless hazard 
network in Iceland 
 
The evolution of decision-making power and innovative technologies have 
illustrated how the concept of scale can be redefined within Iceland’s hazard 
network. For example, this research has identified a general strengthening of trust 
and collaboration, easing the process through which scale boundaries can be 
transcended. By documenting how amendments have been made to the scale at 
which monitoring and response practices take place, this study has analysed the 
convergence of stakeholder communities and the expansive outreach of leading 
institutions. Therefore, the configuration and composition of Iceland’s network 
can represent a microcosm of a largely borderless social and technical world. This 
chapter will critically assess the features of the network that support this view; 
scale boundaries between Icelandic institutions and communities are contestable, 
and can be explored from a range of interdisciplinary perspectives.  
This chapter approaches scale in a way that can relate to broader 
geographic debates. Geographers have seldom established a collective 
understanding of what constitutes scale, but have referred to the flexibility and 
dynamism of scale boundaries (Marston et al., 2005). By analysing the 
institutionalisation of hazard management, this study resonates with the politics 
of scale (Cidell, 2006) and explains how local, national and international 
stakeholders are interconnected by flows of information. A focus on boundary 
spaces progressively weakens rigid and hierarchical interpretations of scale, and 
counters the view that clearly defined scales of importance can be attributed to 
actors and institutions, particularly in the context of hazard networks.  
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An increasing number of geographers are acknowledging the fluidity and 
mobility of scales and boundaries (Lemke, 2000; Cash et al., 2006; Hein, 2006). 
This trend resonates with Iceland as the transition, interaction and changeability 
of things between local and international scales are documented extensively 
within this thesis. Therefore, geographical engagements that replace scale with a 
flat ontology of “complex, emergent spatial relations” (Marston et al., 2005, p.422) 
can be associated closely with this research. For example, the flat ontology 
argument appreciates relationality and constructivism; flows and channels allow 
scale to progressively fragment through the construction of the social world. This 
narrative relates to the research conducted in Iceland, primarily because it 
replaces scale boundaries and hierarchies with disordered and unstable 
interactions. Furthermore, it can also be reflective of ANT (Moore, 2008) and the 
sociological approaches that underpin this PhD research. For instance, Smith’s 
(2003) explanation of a flat ontology does not differentiate between humans and 
non-humans. 
Wisner and Luce (1993), and Blaikie et al. (2005), have both used the lens 
of social vulnerability to associate scale with volcanic hazards. These works 
referred to there being a choice of contextual scales at which to manage volcanic 
activity, whereas this study analyses the connections that exist between local, 
national and international scales. Furthermore, this thesis analyses how the 
process of transcending scale impacts on the adaptive capacity of Iceland’s 
approach to volcanic hazard management. Scale directly relates to the research 
question as boundary-work can theorise communication practices between the 
human and technical components of Iceland’s network. This research argues that 
an interdisciplinary approach can redefine the relationship between volcanic 
hazards and scale (Renschler, 2005; Biasse et al., 2014); for example, Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) implies that both scale and context are subsumed by 
interconnectivities between individual actors (Latour, 1999b). Meanwhile, co-
production explains how tensions between local and international scales can be 
overcome by generating knowledge and technology. 
When viewing a volcanic hazard in isolation, the volcano represents a 
fixed geophysical construct, conditioned at a local scale through social attitudes 
and attachments. However, unlike many climatic or other seismic hazards, 
volcanoes possess surface permanence within landscapes that are otherwise 
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evolving. In addition, the impacts of volcanic activity are not static and can be 
localised (lava and pyroclastic flows, e.g. Hekla [2000]), nationalised (gas 
pollution, e.g. Bárðarbunga [2014-2015]) or internationally significant (ash fall, 
e.g. Eyjafjallajökull [2010]). Therefore, hazard management practices need to 
adapt to changing demands, and require the flexibility to extend communication 
and decision-making across a range of scales. This chapter will draw on the 
FutureVolc project and the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) 
to analyse how scale is transcended in the context of Icelandic volcanism. The 
second part of the chapter then assesses how the construction and calibration of 
data allows information and knowledge to be communicated across boundary 
spaces. 
 
6.1: Transcending scale: The fragmentation of boundaries 
The stability of scale in Iceland’s hazard network has become increasingly 
speculative; since the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull (2010), a fluid transgression of 
scale has been evident. Boundaries are breached on a regular basis as actors and 
institutions increasingly interact at multiple scales. This section examines how the 
relevance of scale has been transformed and focuses on what actions are taken at 
scale boundaries. In the context of this research, boundaries are interpreted as 
imagined spatialities or dividing lines between actors positioned locally, 
domestically and internationally within Iceland’s network. Boundary spaces are 
integral to understanding the transformation of hazard management as 
communicating across them provides an insight into a network’s flexibility 
(Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2012). As boundaries have been eroded by 
frequent communication and knowledge exchange, they have become 
increasingly difficult to define and identify. Boundary crossing has been explained 
by scholars such as Gieryn (1983), and is used extensively in this chapter to 
examine how network dynamics improve Iceland’s adaptive capacity and 
resilience.  
 
6.1.1: Positioning hazard response and monitoring beyond Iceland: The European Response 
Coordination Centre and the FutureVolc project 
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As channels of communication become more expansive in hazard networks, 
decision-making is increasingly influenced at a European or global scale. This 
research found that the creation of EU-governed institutions, such as the ERCC 
(see pp.110-111), has altered the scale at which monitoring responsibilities and 
responsive actions are determined. The ERCC provides one example of how the 
science and socio-politics of Icelandic volcanoes extend far beyond regional and 
national boundaries:  
A coordination hub facilitating a coherent European response during 
emergencies helping to cut unnecessary and expensive duplication of 
efforts (European Commission - ERCC main page, 2016). 
By encouraging collaboration between the Civil Protection (CP) and their 
European partners, the ERCC typifies how scale can be annexed within Iceland’s 
network. For example, knowledge is co-constructed and exchanged at a 
European level; this improves the resilience and adaptive capacity of the network 
as actors are less reliant on local and domestic interactions.  
The ERCC has improved the co-production and communication of 
hazard knowledge; this demonstrates not only the holism of Iceland’s network, 
but also the value of supranational intervention. For example, an interview 
conducted with the CP touched on the largely positive attitude towards an EU-
level response to Iceland’s volcanic hazards:  
Iceland, it is a country where we have volcanoes that are local 
hazards, but sometimes we need international help, for example, 
health, agriculture issues, technology issues, we understand that and 
react to it (CP, March 2014). 
The interviewee does not refer to the impact on the adaptive capacity of the 
network, but demonstrates how actors are willing to transform the scale of 
hazard response. Both the IMO and the CP have referred to the practical 
grounds on which European intervention is authorised and boundaries are 
transcended (Guston, 2001). For instance, there is a relative scarcity of human 
actors at a local and domestic scale in Iceland; this explains the will for hazards to 
be governed from a supranational level, and gives credence to Wisner and Luce’s 
(1993) contextual affiliation with scale. 
Actors and leading institutions appear to support the spatial expansion of 
Iceland’s hazard network, and refer to the ease with which scale boundaries can 
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be breached and contested. Several interviewees from both the University of 
Iceland (UoI) and the CP explained how the monitoring network can be 
modelled on the concept of a ‘supersite’ laboratory (see pp.103-104). Whilst this 
terminology implies that Iceland can be viewed as an enclosed study area (see 
Figure 6.1, p.162), the scope and design of the FutureVolc project has enabled 
Icelandic actors to integrate with a European research community. An interview 
carried out with the British Geological Survey (BGS) expanded on the structural 
meaning of a supersite: 
The supersite brings together large clusters of people across Europe 
as a template for future project development, determining what the 
future directions should be in European geo-infrastructure and geo-
research (BGS, March 2015). 
The extract refers explicitly to supranational influences; by envisioning the 
supersite as a “template”, context and individuality are removed, and engagement 
and “coordination” are prioritised (Cocco, 2014). In addition, the interviewee 
appears to embrace the European perspective, using it to explain the relevance of 
supersites to the future monitoring of volcanic hazards in Iceland.  
However, a supersite is not only confined to a local, domestic or 
international scale; instead, it utilises boundary-less attributes such as “open data 
policies” (CP, March 2014) to expand and contract scale intermittently. This 
explains how supersites can improve the adaptability and resilience of a complex 
network such as Iceland. As a dynamic and interactive entity, a supersite 
facilitates coordination and uses the European scale of hazard management to 
take a bird’s-eye view of monitoring practices (see Figure 6.1).  
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Figure 6.1: An illustration of the regions covered by Iceland’s Supersite, with the area of 
interest defined by the red polygon. The green rectangles represent the area covered by TerraSAR-
X satellites, used to collect hazard data (Source: FutureVolc Project - Supersites, p.18. Date 
accessed: March 2016).  
On the other hand, interviews conducted with the UoI and the CP stressed the 
uncertainty of supranational approaches to monitoring volcanic hazards. For 
example, this research found that the stability and duration of holistic projects 
such as FutureVolc (see pp.103-106) can be met with scrutiny; a researcher from 
the UoI questioned the longevity of supersites, one of the project’s core concepts.  
Therefore, whilst approaches to hazard management can increasingly be 
positioned beyond Iceland’s borders, their sustainability and continuation is 
questionable. Nevertheless, the supersite concept appears to operationalise 
Iceland’s network (Cocco, 2014; Sigmundsson et al., 2013b), apportioning 
responsibility and decision-making to an international community of actors and 
institutions. This interpretation is reflective of an interconnected “European 
infrastructure” (BGS, July 2014) for hazard management; the continental 
approach was referred to on numerous occasions during interviews and 
observations conducted at the CP. However, collecting and monitoring hazard 
information from a European perspective is not exclusive to Iceland (Rhinard, 
2015). For instance, the database of information constructed by the World 
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Organization of Volcano Observatories (WOVOdat), has also stemmed from a 
collective effort to standardise data so that it can be effectively communicated 
beyond local and domestic boundaries (Widiwijayanti et al., 2015). Both 
FutureVolc and WOVOdat work to transcend and fragment scale, as well as to 
co-produce and co-manage hazard knowledge.  
 
6.1.2: Contesting boundary spaces: The role of information hubs and partnerships  
This research also analysed the contextual and technical forces that have driven 
prominent actors beyond the domestic scale of hazard communication. Fluid 
nodal points, information hubs and institutional partnerships permeate Iceland’s 
network; these have collectively weakened boundaries by transforming knowledge 
exchange. Interviewees in both Iceland and the wider European community 
referred to how boundary spaces have become increasingly challenging to 
maintain, primarily because new alliances have progressively undermined their 
resilience. This research has recognised the positive impacts that many of these 
transformations have had on the network’s adaptability. 
The ERCC and the FutureVolc project have both exploited boundaries 
by facilitating international consultation and assistance. Following interviews with 
stakeholders in Iceland, the UK and Europe, this study has found that Iceland’s 
network does not possess a deterministic or rigid structure, but contains 
boundary spaces that are continually renegotiated by the actions of coordinators 
and leading institutions. From a sociological perspective, the flexibility of 
boundaries enable knowledge to be co-produced, and construct a resilient and 
adaptable approach to hazard management. This interpretation is supported by 
the protocol of the ERCC: 
We can send a request into the hub managed by the ERCC, and the 
hub can send that request to all the member states. The states would 
then respond directly, through an internet database, and an email 
would follow, which everybody would see and recognise that the UK 
has promised to help Iceland with this, for example; this allows us to 
work together to form a response (CP, April 2014). 
Here, the ERCC are viewed as a cross-scale entity that allows responses to be co-
managed, providing a robust exchange of information and assistance. By 
   170 
 
constituting a hub-like repository, the ERCC allows the responsive actions of the 
CP and their European counterparts to coalesce.  
Information sharing and co-management are priorities of the ERCC (CP, 
March 2014), and demonstrate the convergence and connectivity of Iceland’s 
network. By positioning the ERCC within the boundary space between the 
domestic and supranational level of interaction, this research can explain how the 
problems alluded to by Cash et al. are prevented: 
Knowledge is often held, stored, and perceived differently at 
different levels, resulting from differences across levels about what is 
perceived as salient, credible, and legitimate knowledge (Cash et al., 
2006, p.8). 
As the ERCC coordinates responsive actions, knowledge disparities are lessened 
between local and continental actors. During the fieldwork, prominent members 
of the CP were keen to accredit the ERCC with a reduced knowledge gap 
between actors from social and scientific backgrounds. The ERCC converges, but 
does not replace, existing approaches to hazard response; therefore, by analysing 
“boundary organizations” (Cash et al., 2006, p.8), this study has assessed multiple 
responses to volcanic activity can co-exist and be simultaneously commandeered.  
The structure of European-wide institutions can appear authoritarian, but 
interviewees were generally eager to draw on how management practices are 
assimilated between actors at the local and continental scale (Webersik et al., 
2015). Therefore, boundary spaces are flexible and this was also highlighted 
during an interview conducted at the CP:  
If something happened in Iceland, the format and content of our 
request for assistance would be determined in-house by us (CP). It is 
only when the ERCC receive the request, that they can reformat it 
and send it out to everybody in their report of what’s going on, at 
which stage the information compiling the report will have been 
included by us and amended by the ERCC (CP, March 2014). 
Here, the interviewee describes an exchange of information between national and 
international stakeholders, referring directly to the importance of communication 
channels. The “request for assistance” can be interpreted as an intermediary 
artefact that co-evolves as it is communicated from the CP to the ERCC. By 
acting as a “point of contact” (CP, March 2014), the ERCC do not co-produce 
the request as they do not influence its content until they receive it. The CP 
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repeatedly acknowledged the privilege of having a collaborative relationship with 
a European hub, and explained how it is widely perceived to have a positive 
impact on the adaptive capacity and resilience of the network.  
Therefore, boundary spaces are relevant to this research as they theorise 
how the ERCC and FutureVolc facilitate the processes that Cash et al. claimed 
were integral to cross-scale exchanges of knowledge:  
(1) Accountability to both sides of the boundary; (2) the use of 
“boundary objects” such as maps, reports, and forecasts that are co-
produced by actors on different sides of the boundary; (3) 
participation across the boundary; (4) convening; (5) translation; (6) 
coordination and complementary expertise; and (7) mediation (Cash 
et al., 2006, p.8). 
By explaining how Iceland’s network has evolved to accommodate these 
processes, this study can establish how hazard management is co-produced by 
national and international stakeholders. Furthermore, research projects such as 
‘Cosmic’ (Cosmic Project, 2015) and ‘POP-ALERT’ (POP-ALERT Project, 
2015) also illustrate how boundary spaces are continuing to reduce the 
prominence of scale. Both projects were designed in accordance with the 
European Commission’s ‘7th Framework Programme’ for hazard research; as a 
result, they work to continue improving interactions between stakeholder 
communities at multiple scales.  
 
 
6.1.3: Communicating at the boundary: Distributing knowledge and reducing complexity  
With boundary spaces continuing to develop within Iceland’s network, this 
research has been able to explore how channels of communication impact on the 
transcendence of scale (Gieryn, 1983; Seo and Creed, 2002; Hage et al., 2010). As 
scale provides a categorised means of analysing the dynamics of the network, it 
can relate to the research question by explaining the extension and evolution of 
communication practices. By observing the Volcanic ash exercise in Iceland 
(VolcIce), this study found that regular communication contributes to the 
expansion of boundary spaces between institutions based in Iceland and the UK. 
Frequent communication garners familiarity and erodes the boundary between 
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the national scope of the Icelandic Met Office (IMO), and the international 
expanse of the London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC).  
An interview conducted with the IMO implied that the repetitive 
undertaking of VolcIce had weakened boundaries between the participating 
institutions. The exercise was interpreted as a European alliance of actors with 
shared interests:  
We have been doing these exercises (VolcIce) for many years and we 
have encouraged new groups to join us, expanding the exercise and 
working with it in different ways. It is very much a European 
exercise, even though only us three participate directly (the IMO, 
Isavia [Icelandic Aviation Service] and the London VAAC). We need 
to know where everyone else is and what they need to do so that we 
can prepare and react (IMO, March 2014). 
However, attaching scale to VolcIce is contentious as the exercise focusses 
primarily on its participants (the IMO, the London VAAC and Isavia), but can 
also interact with external actors in the aviation industry during volcanic crises. 
Nevertheless, this study observed VolcIce from an Icelandic and UK perspective, 
and found that it illustrated a range of “boundary objects (e.g., concepts, problem 
definitions, models, standards), boundary workers (e.g., scientific advisers, 
experts) and boundary institutions” (Hage et al., 2010, p.257).  
Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET’s), and the Numerical 
Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment (NAME), can both be 
construed as boundary objects that consolidate ties between the IMO and the 
London VAAC. By deconstructing the network and analysing how SIGMET’s 
and NAME communicate location data, this study has been able to identify 
boundary characteristics. From a sociological perspective, SIGMET’s and NAME 
resolve knowledge controversies by enabling volcanic ash to be communicated 
across scale boundaries. Therefore, the role of both objects can resonate with the 
modelling of flood risk in literature that explains co-production (Landström et al., 
2011; Lane et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, this study has demonstrated how the expansion of 
boundary spaces has led to a hierarchical flattening of scale within Iceland’s 
hazard network (Collinge, 2006; Moore, 2008). Participatory technologies and 
international affiliations have encouraged greater cross-scale communication; this 
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appears to have transformed institutional cultures. For example, both the IMO 
and the CP have become internationally focussed following the eruption of 
Eyjafjallajökull (2010), but have also retained the ability to communicate in-house 
or at a local scale in regions such as Þórsmörk. An interviewee from the CP 
referred to the institution’s ability to effectively communicate knowledge and 
information across multiple scales:  
The Civil Protection has grown, we speak with task forces and 
committees from all over Europe, some less formal than others, and 
we use the information and advice we gain from those meetings to 
produce documents or something like that, often as a joint 
publication with them. But we also use the forums that we attend to 
go into affected areas here in Iceland and talk to locals, showing 
them our outputs, and feeding back to them by offering them advice, 
we have all this information now and these opportunities to work 
with other people who we are sometimes not that familiar with, but it 
is better to share your knowledge and learn from others also (CP, 
March 2014). 
This extract demonstrates how Icelandic institutions are perceived to have 
become increasingly reflexive, with communications transcending both local and 
international stakeholder communities. Therefore, by analysing institutions from 
a sociological perspective, the holism and adaptability of Iceland’s network can be 
appreciated.  
The research findings represent a destabilisation of scale; this is relevant 
to the research question as it directly associates communication methods with the 
evolution of actors. However, an interview carried out at the IMO implied that 
boundaries and structure have not become obsolete:  
We communicate new-found knowledge or new-found information 
about the Icelandic volcanoes in a European hub (the ERCC), it’s not 
just OK we are going to tell you once something’s happened, it has 
to be more systematic, who has what information at which time? The 
hub allows us to communicate with others whether they are local or 
from the UK or wherever through modules, predesigned packages 
for help, and that is what’s legal for them to use, we all need to 
understand what information is going to be sent, and who it is going 
to be sent to (IMO, March 2014). 
The interviewee refers to commands and modulated criteria when explaining 
communication between the IMO and European institutions. Iceland’s network 
does not represent a post-structural entity, but transcends scale by 
communicating in a “systematic” way that “packages” hazard information. By 
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referring to legal remits, the interviewee explains how boundaries remain relevant 
as communication is not completely free-flowing.  
Therefore, the study has also found evidence to suggest that cross-scale 
communications are purposely constructed; for example, interviews conducted 
with members of the FutureVolc project have referred to “licenses” and 
“registrations” (CP, March 2014) when explaining communication practices. 
These legislative artefacts represent the structural elements of an otherwise 
malleable boundary between national and international levels of hazard 
management. FutureVolc highlights how boundaries are weakened, but an 
interview conducted at the UoI illustrated how the process of engagement across 
them is pre-determined and controlled by stakeholder discussion: 
Discussions within FutureVolc determine the standard and packaging 
of the data, and its presentation in the databank that each member 
uses; you have to have a uniform goal for the data so everyone knows 
what they are getting (UoI, April 2014). 
Whilst scale boundaries are breached, communication practices are purposely 
constructed by the actors and institutions involved. Similarly, boundary objects 
such as SIGMET’s and NAME are powerful acquisitions of Iceland’s network, 
but their functionality and degradation of boundaries are determined by the 
“Memorandum of Understanding” (IMO, March 2014) that underpins the 
VolcIce exercise.  
Nevertheless, boundary objects have the capacity to impact on scale, and 
many can adapt to policy changes. In the case of the VolcIce exercise, boundary 
objects are crucial to preserving the communication of knowledge and 
information between Iceland and the UK. However, their resilience and ability to 
withstand change are likely to have been influenced by effective stakeholder 
discussions across multiple scales: 
As part of a scientific committee, which includes our colleagues in 
Iceland, we (London VAAC) are supposed to meet two times a year, 
I think, and put forward our views on what we would like to 
improve. So, the agreements we have are evolving, they are different 
between each year and each meeting (London VAAC, October 
2014). 
The interviewee describes the evolution of cross-scale dialogue and discussion, 
and refers to the involvement of the London VAAC in biannual meetings. In 
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addition to VolcIce, entities such as the ERCC and the FutureVolc project are 
also able to construct discussion spaces whilst developing boundary objects. 
Members of FutureVolc have referred to boundary crossing in the 
context of wider publics, often touching on the importance of stakeholder 
connectivity and knowledge management. For instance, an interviewee from the 
IMO explained how all stakeholder groups can transcend scale boundaries, 
regardless of their size or background:  
We (the IMO) build on our role of representing the views of the local 
community, and together with our own view, we take their input and 
work with others in FutureVolc; this is where I would like to return 
to this idea of a network, as it is not just a data collection - 
transformation - distribution process, as there are wider publics that, 
however small, have some say in what happens… it is important that 
we ensure each contribution filters through to the FutureVolc 
community (IMO, April 2014). 
Here, the extract describes how knowledge is co-produced and exchanged; the 
interviewee implies that effective communication channels can filter knowledge 
through the network. This extract reflects aspects of Latour’s approach to ANT 
by focussing on the importance of connectivity, and drawing attention to the 
multiplicity of boundary crossing. Weaker boundaries can improve the resilience 
of Iceland’s network by enhancing its ability to withstand “node failures” 
(Barabási, 2009, p.413). For example, the cross-scale interactions within the 
VolcIce exercise and the FutureVolc project have illustrated how stakeholder 
relationality can be improved by forming a single and customisable source of 
information.  
 
6.1.4: Technical actors and scale: Improving adaptability by deconstructing borders  
Scale boundaries have become increasingly difficult to identify, with technology 
playing a significant role in providing a randomised web of interaction amongst 
stakeholders. By exploring Iceland’s technical infrastructure, this research has 
recognised what Lemke (2000, p.275) termed “semiotic artifacts”. Rawolle (2015) 
explains their role and position in the context of actor-networks, and refers to 
how they facilitate cross-scale interactions:  
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Actor-Network Theory adds the rather crucial observation that 
networks are in general non-local, and that (semiotic) artifacts are 
often the 'boundary objects' that mediate non-local, scale-breaking 
interconnections (Rawolle et al., 2015, p.45). 
Technical actors have been influential in weakening scale boundaries and enabling 
greater “non-local” interactions; this is evident in the use of hazard notification 
systems to channel commands between the CP and the ERCC. During the 
fieldwork, interviewees also referred to social media’s “push notification” feature 
(UoI, April 2014), and “colour-coded alert notification” graphics (IMO, March 
2014); these technological outputs have improved the exchange of hazard 
knowledge by deconstructing geographical, educational and social boundaries. 
Notifications provide an example of how fluid methods of communication are 
continuing to destabilise scale throughout Iceland’s networked infrastructure.  
As Iceland’s approach to managing volcanic hazards has become 
increasingly digitised, the length of communication channels has been 
significantly reduced. New methods of sourcing, representing and sharing hazard 
information have enabled communication practices to circulate the network, 
removing knowledge and data from the confines of the scale at which it is 
constructed (Murdoch, 2005; Bosco, 2014). The supersite concept also provides a 
further illustration of how technical actors can influence perceptions of scale; for 
instance, interviewees referred to “new opportunities for engagement” following 
the initiation of the FutureVolc project (BGS, June 2014). These interpretations 
of the network resonate with Leitner and Miller’s view that “technologies of 
power” are closely related to the “social construction of scale” (Leitner and 
Miller, 2007, p.120).  
Interpreting Iceland’s network from a sociological perspective is relevant 
as it explains how stakeholder communities have adapted in a techno-centric 
manner, primarily to prevent the problems identified by Cash et al. (2003) in their 
analysis of cross-level interaction: 
The production of scientific and technical information that lacks 
salience, credibility, or legitimacy in the eyes of critical players at 
different levels (Cash et al., 2003, in Cash et al., 2006, p.8). 
A circulation of appropriate knowledge and information facilitates a democratic 
approach to mitigating and managing volcanic hazards. This study has found that 
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technical innovation and foresight have ensured the harmonious relationships 
between different actors and institutions are not affected or marginalised by the 
regularity of cross-scale interactions.  
Therefore, technology has transformed the adaptability and holism of 
Iceland’s network, and has enabled an expansive European community to 
become an integral part of monitoring and responding to volcanic activity: 
There’s a collaborative ability to do science, and send and receive 
hazard information across Europe very easily. We have established a 
very good network here, and our ability to do things together, and to 
work as a community, not just with the IMO or the UK, has certainly 
been enabled by technology, and it will be exciting how this 
continues (UoI, March 2014). 
Here, the interviewee directly relates technology to an evolution of scale; by 
removing borders between local, domestic and international stakeholder 
communities, technical actors have enabled the network to become largely scale-
free (Hein et al., 2006; Caldarelli, 2007). Devices, systems and software packages 
have collectively eased the process of transcending multiple scales, explaining 
why local communities in Iceland generally recognise a European contribution to 
the management of volcanic hazards (Puglisi et al., 2014).  
This research has explored the connections between Icelandic society, 
innovative technology and the integration of a European stakeholder community. 
The study has established that proactive social engagements are of considerable 
value to transcending scale (Christiansen et al., 1999; Risse, 2004); this explains 
why many technical devices and software packages have been designed at 
European or global scales, but have successfully conflated with communities in 
Southern Iceland: 
I am sure the ministers here have to say there is a strong domestic 
and international accord when asked about their capabilities to 
monitor and respond to activity. Our approach involves many groups 
of people working together, both in the communities here in Iceland, 
but also with our partners in Europe… it’s very good for the science 
and for us (the IMO) to be able to use and share different types of 
devices that are global. If I just give you an example, the strainmeters 
we are using are the same type of strainmeters that are installed on 
Mt Etna (IMO, March 2014). 
The extract refers to the institutional flexibility of the IMO, and outlines how 
interconnections have been strengthened between the local context and Europe’s 
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monitoring of volcanic hazards. By referring to “different types of devices”, the 
interviewee highlights the multiplicity of technical actors and explains how they 
are able to be deployed in numerous seismic environments. 
Furthermore, interviewees in Höfn and Vík have repeatedly described 
how technical devices, enrolled across Europe, work “in tandem” (Vík resident, 
March 2014) with Icelandic society; this illustrates how boundaries can be 
deconstructed between local and European stakeholders. Both WOVOdat and 
supersites have been designed to use technology that is purposefully equipped to 
transcend scale. When discussing these databases, the CP and the UoI referred to 
how devices and systems can be freely transferred from one hazardous region to 
another. These include social media platforms and objects such as strainmeters; 
both can be deployed globally and have the mobility required to expand or 
contract boundary spaces. Therefore, the adaptability and coherence of Iceland’s 
network can be explained from both social and technical perspectives.  
 
6.2: Managing and calibrating data: The evolution of hazard information 
The previous section of this chapter demonstrated how communication practices, 
technical actors and information hubs have collectively transformed scale. Whilst 
at times theoretical, a general move towards a supranational approach to volcanic 
hazard management has been explained, and the dynamics of boundary spaces 
have been analysed at length. However, each of the projects and technologies that 
encourage cross-scale interactions have transformed the construction and 
communication of data variables. Therefore, managing and handling data are also 
significant when explaining the relevance of scale and boundaries.  
 
6.2.1: Communicating open data: An assessment of the impact on scale  
This study found that the ERCC and the FutureVolc project are designed to 
communicate data openly: 
All of the data gathered in the project (FutureVolc) will be made 
available through an open-access policy (Jordan et al., 2013, p.287). 
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FutureVolc uses openness and transparency to empower actors and mobilise 
data; this strengthens communication nodes in networks such as Iceland. The 
project is predicated on improving the size and scope of data repositories, 
enabling them to become infinitely larger as a greater number of stakeholders can 
add and consume information: 
If 20 countries need access to the data, people (actors) that are in 
these 20 countries all have access to the databank; they can get all the 
data they require and develop their opinion of what is going on (UoI, 
March 2014). 
By referring to the vast and expansive databanks that FutureVolc provides, the 
interviewee illustrates how abstract scale has become. In addition, the extract also 
questions the relevance of context, primarily because the databank allows 
information and knowledge to be interpreted openly by stakeholders across 
Europe. 
Archival research and penetrative interviewing has led to this study 
establishing that openness and transparency are the driving forces behind 
improving the adaptability of Iceland’s approach to hazard management. Scale 
becomes less distinct as open data policies have the capacity to deconstruct local, 
national and international boundaries. Whilst open data is not inscribed into 
legislation, it has become an integral aspect of the Civil Service ethos. For 
example, Icelandic communities expect to have open access to transparent data, 
so this method of communication is assisted by the actions and intentions of the 
CP and their partners. In contrast, interviews conducted with institutions based in 
the UK illustrate a greater level of resistance towards openly communicating 
hazard information. This is particularly true for stakeholders affiliated with the 
aviation industry, where legal remits can limit the distribution and transparency of 
data.  
The value of open data in Iceland is increased as hazard information is 
likely to be deciphered and understood correctly by stakeholders from socio-
political backgrounds. For example, interviews conducted with farmers and 
community leaders explained how the public tend to be attuned to a diverse 
variety of data types. Furthermore, the FutureVolc project intended to use and 
combine a myriad of data formats to facilitate and encourage consultation. This 
point was relayed during an interview carried out at the UoI: 
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FutureVolc is a big project that seems to have created this database 
with historical data and raw data and all types of real time data from 
the volcanoes (UoI, March 2014). 
Combining datasets has been integral to the success of the project, and further 
demonstrates a lack of commitment to scale. From a sociological perspective, an 
amalgamation of data resonates with co-production as it contributes to the 
prevention of knowledge controversies (Whatmore, 2009; Lane et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, the database constructed by the FutureVolc community can 
arguably represent a digital nodal point within Iceland’s network (Sigmundsson et 
al., 2013b; Dumont et al., 2014). For example, the combination of data allows 
connective pathways to overlap as actors from contrasting backgrounds seek to 
produce or access the vast quantity of information. This interpretation of data 
handling conceptualises how clarity and knowledge can be navigated through 
networks that are complex and evolving. 
 
6.2.2: Representing hazard information: Scale and the mapping of risk 
The ability for stakeholders to openly source information has transformed how 
data variables are calibrated (Sangianantoni and Puglisi, 2014) and hazards are 
represented. Technical infrastructures are increasingly leading to a confluence of 
data channels within hazard networks; WOVOdat (Widiwijayanti et al., 2015) and 
Vhub (Palma et al., 2014) aggregate data so that it can transcend spatial and 
demographic scales. An interview conducted with a Vhub user referred to the 
discussions that have influenced how these platforms function: 
We, together, define what it is we want to put into the databank 
(Vhub) - what do people want to have in the databank? How can this 
be represented? Who do we need the data to be interpreted by? (UoI, 
April 2014). 
The extract highlights the active role of various individuals and institutions; the 
design and functioning of Vhub can relate to co-production as it enables multiple 
stakeholders to voice their opinions and impact on the capabilities of the 
platform.  
However, this study also observed scale conflict, primarily in relation to 
how risk is represented at a domestic and international scale. For example, during 
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the debrief that followed the VolcIce exercise, data discrepancies became clear 
and illustrated the scalar divide between the IMO and the London VAAC (see 
Figure 5.2, p.277). The debrief raised the issue of mapping risk and found that the 
internationally recognised Mercator projection was incompatible with Iceland:  
In the polar area we cannot use Mercator, because Mercator - you 
stretch out the pole to be as long as the equator (Isavia, March 2014). 
Therefore, scale is still relevant to Iceland’s approach to hazard management as it 
impacts on how risk is represented. Data can extend beyond scale boundaries and 
be used by the both the IMO and the London VAAC, but representing the data 
can expose divisions that question the relationship between scale dynamics and 
the adaptability of the network. 
Furthermore, the debrief also highlighted divisions between the national 
and international responsibilities of the IMO and the London VAAC respectively. 
For example, discussion was instigated when the IMO raised the issue of the 
London VAAC being unable to measure and represent re-suspended ash from 
Icelandic volcanoes:  
London VAAC don’t measure or communicate re-suspended ash 
concentrations over Iceland very well, in fact we don’t do them at all 
(London VAAC, March 2014). 
The extract refers to scale limitations, and implies that the London VAAC do not 
always have the ability to transcend boundary spaces, despite being tasked with 
monitoring and forecasting volcanic ash at a supranational scale. However, the 
VolcIce debrief provides a cross-scale platform where these constraints can be 
addressed and flaws can be negotiated. This research also established that the 
discussion space within the debrief allows exercise reports to be co-produced by 
the coordinators of the IMO, Isavia and the London VAAC.  
However, interviewees beyond the VolcIce community have also referred 
to the need for scale boundaries when discussing how data is represented: 
If you use a community approach for all European countries then 
sometimes it barely makes sense, but for Iceland, the administrative 
boundaries cover large areas where you have nobody, so how you 
represent data should take into consideration these potential issues 
(UoI, March 2014). 
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Here, a researcher from the UoI refers to the relevance of boundaries when 
representing data in a unique and multi-hazard environment such as Iceland. The 
extract indicates that international or global representations of risk are unreliable 
and lack the ability to relate to the demographics of an affected region. Various 
interviewees from both the IMO and the CP have highlighted how scales of 
representation should be spatially and temporally focussed rather than extended. 
Therefore, the evolving relationship between scale and data is widely 
disputed amongst stakeholder communities in Iceland. Contradictions illustrate 
the need for greater flexibility in how data and risk are conveyed and represented 
to various end-users. For example, an interview conducted with the IMO referred 
to the value of a medial and dynamic approach: 
When you make a map you display information to assert an extent. In 
dynamic representations, you can check and uncheck many layers, so 
you have much more freedom and can aggregate information; but 
you need to decide at which scale you think about the resolution, this 
is something that is often very underestimated, the impact of scale in 
mapping. You need to assume that generally the population pays 
more attention to something at the national level than at a European 
level, but we return to the same question, at which scale do you 
deliver the results? (IMO, March 2014). 
The interviewee explains the need for risk to be mapped in a way that is 
adaptable, but does not dismiss or eradicate the concept of scale. Instead, the 
extract explains how disparities between the local, domestic and international 
scale can be lessened when both data and methods of representation are mobile 
and evolving (Kruke and Morsut, 2015). The adaptive capacity of a complex 
network can be annexed depending on how data is calibrated and representations 
of risk are constructed.  
 
6.2.3: The value of calibrating data: From adaptation to interpretation  
Technical devices and systems can mediate scale boundaries by calibrating data; 
interviews conducted with both the CP and the IMO referred to the need for 
adjustable representations of risk, primarily because hazard information relates to 
actors positioned at multiple scales. Furthermore, the research assessed how the 
network’s adaptation and resilience have been revolutionised by data repositories 
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that are customisable. The UoI and the CP both explained how these repositories 
are constructed by sourcing data from a plethora of stakeholder communities: 
Whenever someone goes out and does a risk analysis, it is likely that 
people will not be wanting just a report, but they will want your 
underlying data, and for you to share it in a repository that is going to 
be accessible to anybody. So, if you want to start mashing up your 
data with somebody else’s data, you can get something out of it, new 
knowledge of the risk that is posed, or the hazard in question (CP, 
March 2014). 
I can go and take data from ten different research studies and I can 
start mashing that together or finding things out, I may find 
something brand new and much more interesting than any one of 
those ten can find by themselves, or anybody could have found by 
just looking at the results. Technology is vital in allowing us to do 
this, and it is most effective when we mash data and then study and 
interpret it as a group (UoI, March 2014). 
Both extracts refer to the “mashing” of data; the use of technology is integral to 
this process as it enables repositories to be accessible and customisable. The 
management of data within hazard networks is increasingly leading to the 
establishment of “mashups” and “dashboards” (Liu and Palen, 2010); these 
innovative mechanisms for handling data have enlarged scale boundaries by 
improving the network’s capacity to tailor information to the end-user. An 
interviewee from the IMO referred to existing mashups such as the “Geospatial 
Disaster Management Mashup Service Study” (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari, 2014), 
and explained how the GeoWeb (Haklay et al., 2008; Roche et al., 2013) has 
provided equal access to information and resources.  
Therefore, mashups can contribute to the co-production of knowledge 
within hazard networks; for example, by seamlessly integrating data and then 
situating it according to the end-user, the repository has a greater ability to 
resolve knowledge controversies (Whatmore, 2009; Lane et al., 2011). The scale of 
data management has become increasingly protracted as local and regional actors 
have the flexibility to access a repository of mashed-up data that has been 
sourced from an international community of stakeholders. Repositories are 
designed in a way that enables datasets to be mobilised across geographic scales 
for both analytical and actionable purposes. Calibration is an essential part of this 
process and was referred to during an interview at the IMO:  
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Are we willing and are we capable of delivering results to the level of 
a village, to the level of a building, or the level of an agglomeration? 
Of course, but sometimes it’s a matter of using data more effectively, 
how far can we go in the analysis? And also the datasets, how can we 
alter, or rather calibrate, the data variables so that they can allow for 
finer analysis at a local, regional or national level? (IMO, April 2014). 
The interviewee directly refers to the impact that calibration has had on scale and 
the adjustability of data. By occupying digital spaces within Iceland’s network, 
repositories allow data to be redefined by numerous actors, gradually eroding its 
purity. This interpretation of data management resonates with constructivism as it 
reflects key aspects of Latour’s approach to ANT. 
Calibration is becoming increasingly relevant to volcanic hazard 
management due to the expansion of Big Data and Volunteered Geographic 
Information (Zook et al., 2010). For example, the process of calibrating data was 
central to the principles and objectives of the FutureVolc project:  
Converge and harmonize observation methods and tools, to promote 
the use of standards and references, inter-calibration and data 
assimilation (FutureVolc Project - Data Policy page, 2015). 
Interviews conducted with FutureVolc members have referred to how calibration 
has influenced the models and datasets that have been constructed by the 
FutureVolc community. As a result, calibration has transformed the 
“interpretative flexibility” (Latour et al., 1992, pp.44-45) of forecasters and 
seismologists at institutions such as the IMO.  
However, when applying calibration to the performance of FutureVolc, 
the role technology and translation play cannot be overlooked: 
In FutureVolc we combine the different techniques, monitoring what 
is in the ground, what goes on inside the ground and what goes on in 
the air, and we rely both on ground based techniques and satellites to 
do this. We are also focussing on how we then use that data 
effectively, how we exploit the databanks to successfully integrate the 
information we have, and how we then present the information to 
non-scientific stakeholders (UoI, April 2014). 
By referring to “techniques and satellites”, the interviewee demonstrates the 
reliance of the FutureVolc community on technical actors. Furthermore, the 
extract also alludes to the process of translating data so that it can be shared 
effectively with non-scientific stakeholder communities. Unlike the scale conflicts 
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that were identified during the debrief of the VolcIce exercise (see p.175), the 
FutureVolc project has illustrated how calibrating data prevents information from 
being confined by time and space. 
By exploring Iceland’s network, this research has established that the 
quantity of data, and number of communication channels, have progressively 
increased because of new technology and projects such as FutureVolc 
(Sigmundsson et al., 2013b). Paradoxically, calibration has led to a decrease in the 
positions from which data is sourced as nodal points have been strengthened by 
cross-scale models and repositories. For example, the calibration of ash dispersal 
data has operationalised NAME within the network (Jones et al., 2007); the set-up 
of the model was explained during an interview carried out at the London VAAC:  
We can combine the data into one model (NAME), and a related goal 
is to disseminate this information effectively to the IMO and others 
in Iceland, to local aviation, international, and elsewhere, and what 
we do is merge information from different techniques in a timely 
manner, coming up with a general model that brings the information 
forward, so this is a very important step (London VAAC, April 
2014). 
Here, the interviewee refers to how the NAME software distributes information 
to actors through a multitude of communication channels. Whilst data variables 
are reduced to a single model, the distribution of hazard knowledge remains 
complex and transcends scale. 
The eruption of Bárðarbunga (2014-2015) also highlighted how 
innovative software packages calibrate hazard data and impact on the scale at 
which information is managed. For example, the gas dispersion model was used 
extensively by the IMO during the eruption (see Figure 6.2, p.180), and calibrated 
data that had been gathered at national and international scales. The model stored 
data in one digital space, but distributed real-time hazard information to 
stakeholders using adjustable graphics. Calibration provided the flexibility 
required for both local and European stakeholders to interact with the model; for 
example, its adaptability meant that scale and representations of risk could 
spatially expand or contract depending on the interests, location and demands of 
the end-user. 
   186 
 
 
Figure 6.2: A real-time graphic generated by the gas dispersion model during the 
Bárðarbunga eruption (2014-2015). Calibrated data is used to visualise the movement of gas 
and to communicate information effectively with the public (Source: Icelandic Met Office - 
Holuhraun [Gas Model page]. Date accessed: March 2015). 
Therefore, in the context of Bárðarbunga, the capability to adjust information is a 
valuable attribute for Iceland’s hazard network to have in times of uncertainty. 
As stakeholders become accustomed to using data that can represent and 
simulate risk in real-time, the scale and adaptive capacity of Iceland’s network 
evolves. This research has demonstrated how scale is widely perceived to have 
become less relevant, and has explained how the mobilisation of data variables 
has led to spatial and temporal boundaries appearing less restrictive. By analysing 
technology such as NAME and the gas dispersion model, this study has explored 
“spaces of negotiation” (Murdoch, 1998, p.364) between human and technical 
actors. These spaces handle and redefine data in a way that widens 
communication channels and improves the “interpretative flexibility” of leading 
institutions (Latour et al., 1992, pp.44-45). 
 
6.3: Concluding remarks  
As a rapidly evolving and complex entity, Iceland’s hazard network appears to 
contradict scale. For instance, the FutureVolc project and the VolcIce exercise 
have both weakened scale by expanding boundary spaces (Gieryn, 1983). 
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Furthermore, when analysing the construction of data repositories and models 
such as NAME, this study has illustrated how Iceland’s approach enables 
knowledge to be co-produced, and transcends scale to resolve controversies 
(Whatmore, 2009; Lane et al., 2011). Therefore, this chapter implies that scale 
boundaries are more erodible in the management of volcanic hazards than has 
been purported by academics such as Blaikie and Wisner.  
The eruption of Eyjafjallajökull (2010) illustrated how the impacts of 
Icelandic volcanoes can naturally transcend geographical boundaries, with 
potential disruption to local, national and international stakeholder communities. 
Mitigation requires cross-scale interactions, which in the context of Iceland, have 
been facilitated by open and transparent means of communication. By 
interviewing and observing multiple stakeholder communities, the research has 
studied the connections and processes that have led to the “co-management” 
(Dorcey and McDaniel’s, 1999, in Pearce, 2003, p.212) of volcanic hazards in 
Iceland. Co-management resonates with constructivism, and can be defined by 
the allegiance of many stakeholders to European research projects. 
This chapter addresses the research question as it explains how cross-
scale communication improves the adaptability and resilience of Iceland’s 
network. Despite projects such as FutureVolc being limited in duration, their 
dynamic characteristics appear to have a long-term impact on the interactions of 
stakeholder communities. Data and information are increasingly being 
communicated through a circulatory process that recognises the holism of 
Iceland’s network. Nevertheless, there is a need to further explore group 
dynamics, and assess the extent to which actions are taken or constructed by 
either individual actors or institutional entities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   188 
 
Chapter Seven: Defining actors and stakeholder communities in Iceland’s 
hazard network 
  
The preceding chapters have analysed power relations and scale dynamics, and 
have drawn on the evolution and complexity of Iceland’s approach to volcanic 
hazard management. From the fieldwork conducted in both Iceland and the UK, 
it transpired that the network is composed of a myriad of interacting stakeholder 
communities. This chapter examines the extent to which these communities are 
influenced by the synergy and relationality of institutional entities, or the 
flexibility and evolution of individual actors. Constructivist approaches such as 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and co-production are referred to when analysing 
the positionality of actors within the network. ANT is ideologically inclined to 
explain Iceland’s network from an individualistic perspective, primarily because it 
focuses on connectivity rather than sociality (Latour, 1993; 2005; Callon, 1999). 
In contrast, co-production is more accommodating of collective entities and can 
be used to explain the clustering of actors into institutions. 
This chapter takes a more holistic and distanced view of Iceland’s 
network, primarily to recognise the positionality and dynamics of different 
stakeholder communities. The interdisciplinary narrative identifies and critically 
analyses the overlaps between hazard management and sociology (Glickman and 
Gough, 2013). Firstly, this chapter discusses the extent to which individual actors 
can be grouped and institutionalised according to their scientific or socio-political 
allegiances. Secondly, the chapter questions whether institutional entities can 
collectively shape and cultivate change in how volcanic hazards are approached. 
This study of Iceland’s network has explored how actors are either moulded into, 
or detached from, leading institutions such as the Icelandic Met Office (IMO) 
and the London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC). Analysing the 
positionality and mobility of both individuals and institutions can further explain 
the spread of expertise and the evolution of communication channels within the 
network. 
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7.1: Deconstructing institutional entities: The contentious role of 
individual actors 
Whilst a number of actors in Iceland’s network can be observed through the 
actions of the institution to which they are aligned, others display an ability to act 
heterogeneously as individuals. An actor’s positionality is important in the context 
of this research as it can explain mediation, communication practices and 
institutional flexibility. This section examines how it has become increasingly 
difficult to define an actor’s mobility and independence within a networked 
infrastructure such as Iceland. For example, community leaders and policymakers 
have highlighted how flexibility and interconnections have blurred the division 
between autonomy and dependency. 
 
7.1.1: Institutional flexibility: The impact on the positioning of actors 
When distinguishing between institutions and actors, this research has often 
needed to detach the latter from the former. By exploring Iceland’s approach to 
volcanic hazard management, it has become apparent that monitoring institutions 
can promote or constrain the self-determination of actors. Social constructivists 
are inclined to argue that individual actors can be restricted by the 
institutionalisation of networks such as Iceland: 
For Berger and Luckmann, such control is intrinsic to institutions… 
institutions achieve a reality that ‘confronts the individual as an 
external and coercive fact’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, 76, in Bevir 
and Rhodes, 2015, p.101).  
That they do so, and thereby achieve such an effect, is principally 
through the assignment of roles to actors and the codification (both 
formally and informally) of such roles through the establishment and 
reproduction of a series of rules and associated expectations (Hay, 
2016, p.3). 
Constructivism is certainly no exception in having a deeply socialised 
conception of the actor (Hay, 2016, p.6). 
These quotations imply that institutional frameworks have the capacity to control 
or constrain the heterogeneity of actors, undermining their individuality. 
However, the research findings presented thus far have generally disputed these 
claims, and have demonstrated the evolution, independence and mobility of 
stakeholders in Iceland’s network.  
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This study has found examples of actor’s independently deviating from 
the ideological premise of institutions such as the IMO. For example, the 
University of Iceland (UoI) and the IMO are both orientated towards pre-
emptive research, whilst the Department of Civil Protection (CP) tends to have a 
reactive approach to managing volcanic hazards. Regardless of the different 
attitudes and ideologies, an interview conducted with the CP illustrated how 
actors have the capacity to migrate between these institutions: 
Our role here at the Civil Protection is to get information and apply 
it, we are in the business of taking the new-found scientific 
information from others (the IMO, the UoI, etc.), and then using it 
to work for the public. But in FutureVolc, we are forming a route for 
the information to flow freely. It is by working alongside each other 
that we can have a lexicon of our volcanoes, this has meant we are 
doing work that we are not familiar with (CP, March 2014). 
Here, the interviewee perceives the FutureVolc project to be a vacuum through 
which multiple institutional entities interact; it can be deduced from the extract 
that individual actors have gained a greater ability to work between pre-emption 
and reaction. The increased exposure to the information and working practices of 
the IMO and the UoI implies that individuals from the CP have been mobilised 
to fill knowledge gaps; this contradicts the narrative of Hay (2016). Furthermore, 
by emphasising institutional differences, the interviewee refers to individuals 
moving from binary or default positions.  
By deconstructing Iceland’s network, this PhD research has highlighted 
how projects such as FutureVolc generate informative artefacts that ensure actors 
can transcend institutional entities. This narrative resonates with Latour’s 
approach to ANT (Latour, 1993; 2005), primarily because it associates technical 
artefacts with the agency and connections of individual actors. However, Latour’s 
understanding disputed institutionalisation, and Murdoch highlighted how 
explanations of individual agency can vary: 
The agency of humans and nonhumans can be continually 
transformed one into the other (Murdoch, 1997, p.746). 
Pickering believes intentionality to be a stable and real distinction 
between human and nonhuman entities: although he is keen to stress 
that agency and action are emergent effects, dependent on networks 
of intimate human-nonhuman interactions and relations, he sees 
intentionality as a mobilising force (Murdoch, 1997, p.746). 
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Murdoch (1997) presents two contrasting interpretations of human agency; in the 
first extract, agency is interchangeable between human and non-human actors, in-
line with the narratives of Latour (1993; 2005) and Callon (1999). However, in the 
second extract, Murdoch refers to the human-centred approach of Pickering 
(1993), who recognises the role of intentionality and focuses on the impact of 
artefacts to a lesser extent.  
This research has found that both of Murdoch’s interpretations are 
applicable to Iceland’s network, and can be used to explain the mobilisation and 
evolution of individual actors. For example, an interviewee from the UoI claimed:  
The primary goal of academic institutions like ours (the UoI) is to 
produce interesting research; conventionally, our goal has been to 
work with the data that we collect and to ensure that it complements 
our longer-term ambitions. However, FutureVolc has allowed us to 
extend our research to a wider community, giving us a greater ability 
to independently share our data with the end-users ourselves (UoI, 
March 2014). 
The extract initially draws attention to the institutions ideology, and the 
constraints that are imposed on the freedoms of individual actors. However, the 
interviewee also refers to how the FutureVolc project has provided actors with 
the agency required to remain in the collective set-up of the UoI, whilst also 
having the self-determination to strategically extend the scope of their research. 
By alluding to actors autonomously forming associations with end-users, the 
interviewee presents a post-structural interpretation of Iceland’s scientific and 
academic research community. Furthermore, this narrative demonstrates how the 
intentions of actors can be individually realigned, reflecting the views of Pickering 
(1993).  
By studying the autonomy of stakeholders, this research has recognised 
that the politics of Iceland’s network are continually evolving. However, writing 
in an economic context, Boettke and Coyne (2009) caution against deconstructing 
institutions to the level of individual actors:  
Institutions direct individual behavior for better or worse. We cannot 
fully understand economic outcomes without considering the 
institutional context within which that outcome emerged (Boettke 
and Coyne, 2009, p.150). 
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This extract acknowledges the conditioned environment that institutions create 
and sustain, and implies that actors can be mobilised by institutional flexibility 
rather than individual choices and intentions (Lee and Hassard, 1999; Elder-Vass, 
2008). In the context of Iceland’s approach to hazard management, this study 
found that the Volcanic ash exercise in Iceland (VolcIce) provides evidence of 
how stakeholders can migrate to spaces in-between institutions. By observing the 
exercise at first-hand, this research could grasp an understanding of the positional 
flexibility of VolcIce coordinators.  
Since the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull (2010), prominent members of the 
IMO and the London VAAC have repeatedly demonstrated a greater level of 
institutional flexibility, and have transitioned to connective spaces between 
scientific institutions and the aviation industry (Kruke and Morsut, 2015). This 
narrative is compatible with the views of Gunderson (1999): 
One way in which institutional flexibility appears is when an 
unforeseen policy crisis allows for restructuring of power 
relationships among stakeholders (Gunderson, 1999, p.7). 
Despite Gunderson’s approach being tailored to ecology and resilience, it is 
applicable to the trends identified in Iceland since Eyjafjallajökull, and can be 
used to explain the transformation of the relationship between aviation and 
science. This interpretation can also be applied to the development of the 
FutureVolc project, primarily because membership facilitates the evolution of 
research communities.  
The study has highlighted how VolcIce and FutureVolc have both 
annexed actors from leading institutions. For example, an interviewee from the 
British Geological Survey (BGS) described FutureVolc as the bringing together of 
“large clusters of people” (BGS, October 2014). However, by referring to 
“clusters”, membership is related to institutions and research communities rather 
than individual actors. The representation of institutions within the project 
enables FutureVolc to resonate with co-production rather than ANT, largely 
because individuals are acting in an institutional capacity to resolve knowledge 
gaps, and not in response to their personal choices and connections. 
Nevertheless, whilst this research can explain institutional flexibility through the 
construction and design of projects such as FutureVolc, Iceland’s network is 
complex and evolving, and the heterogeneity of actors cannot be discounted.  
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7.1.2: The persistence of heterogeneity  
This next section focuses on an individual actors’ expertise and authority (Misztal, 
2013); when exploring Iceland’s network, the research identified several 
influential mediators that displayed a level of autonomy, intentionality and 
independence. Elder-Vass (2008) draws upon Latour’s rejection of sociality to 
explain the theoretical differences between mediators and intermediaries:  
Instead of a sociology of the social, Latour proposes a ‘sociology of 
associations’ (Latour 2005: 9)… any collective influence is always 
passed through chains of mediators, who actively shape and translate 
that influence in ways that correspond to their own projects and 
purposes, as oppose to intermediaries, who transmit tokens of authority 
unchanged [Latour 2005: 39] (Elder-Vass, 2008, p.465). 
Mediators have the leverage required to reconstruct and redefine collective 
influences; they are not entirely disconnected from actuarial clusters but are able 
to maintain a degree of individuality and self-determination. In the context of 
Iceland’s network, observations of both the IMO and the CP demonstrated 
how coordinators and project leaders gather information from supporting 
intermediaries. This communication process enables coordinators to redefine 
the network by translating information and redistributing it to multiple 
stakeholder communities.  
Coordinators from the IMO, the London VAAC and Isavia were each 
observed during VolcIce; this study established that their roles within the exercise 
can be assimilated to Elder-Vass’ interpretation of mediators: 
08:30: IMO co-ordinator endorses communication with the London 
VAAC and Isavia after being informed of volcanic activity. 
14.30: Exercise co-ordinators simultaneously chair meeting with 
institutional colleagues, during which information is shared by the co-
ordinator; the exercise is discussed as a team, and the institutions 
collectively devise feedback for the coordinator to discuss in the 
debrief (Research field diary, VolcIce exercise, March 2014). 
The field diary highlights the elevated status and decision-making capabilities of 
each coordinator. However, the extracts also allude to the multitude of 
interconnections a coordinator has with a ‘team’ of supporting actors (Moor, 
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2012); these associations reflect the holism of institutional entities and are integral 
to the success of the exercise. By interpreting the set-up from a sociological 
perspective, this research theorises Iceland’s networked infrastructure and 
identifies the stakeholder interactions that ensure it remains adaptable and 
resilient. Furthermore, if coordinators and project leaders can be viewed as 
mediators, then this study can explain how the network can be further adjusted to 
improve knowledge exchange and the efficiency of communication.  
However, the collective influence of an institution cannot be overlooked 
in Iceland’s network. For example, an interviewee implied that the internal 
structure of the IMO actively promotes the grouping of actors: 
Here at the IMO there are five coordinators for natural hazards, they 
are for the volcanic hazards, the seismic hazards, the hydrological 
hazards, the hydrological/meteorological hazards, and for the 
avalanche hazards, so there are these five main fields. The 
coordinator will influence what we do (IMO, March 2014). 
Here, actors are categorised according to the hazard for which they are 
responsible; this undermines their heterogeneity as positions are determined by 
the approach, vision and ethos of the IMO. Furthermore, this set-up does not 
address the key transverse actions that occur between individual actors in 
different assigned categories. Unlike previous approaches to ANT (Latour, 1993; 
2005; Callon and Law, 1995), this research has not denied the existence of 
institutions, but has studied an actor’s individual capacity to deviate from them. 
By exploring Iceland’s network from a holistic perspective, this study has 
established that institutional frameworks cannot be refuted or deconstructed in 
the way implied by Latour. The autonomy of actors is contentious and 
challenging to assess (Knoblauch, 2013); for instance, coordinators and project 
managers are less constrained by institutional attitudes, but cannot be detached 
from their intrinsic connections with intermediaries. 
 
7.1.3: Institutions and individual actors: The rejection of ideology 
When defining institutions, theorists such as Stalder have drawn on the 
importance of associations, and have interpreted actions as outcomes of 
collective movements. The FutureVolc project and the Emergency Response 
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Coordination Centre (ERCC) provide examples of how collective movements 
merge specialist expertise from a wide range of individuals within Iceland’s 
network. This study has analysed multiple levels of stakeholder interaction, and 
has found that institutions such as the IMO do not ideologically hold together a 
dense network of actors, but instead position actuarial representatives across 
several inter-organisational frameworks. As a result, distinguishing between 
institutional entities and individual actors has become increasingly arduous.  
Interviewees at the IMO often referred to institutional responsibilities, 
and outlined the process through which these are devolved to individual actors 
such as coordinators and forecasters. For example, both the IMO and the 
London VAAC have a legal remit and policy framework; this determines what 
responsibilities are assigned to leading actors. However, this study discovered that 
many actors occupy several roles, enabling them to work both within and 
between institutions: 
Actors may play multiple roles. The roles they elect to play may be in 
tension with or even in contradiction with the expectations or 
demands of other actors or the constraints of institutions. Individual 
human actors are members of organisations, research groups, 
disciplinary communities and policy networks which, as collectives, 
can all have agency and which may play different and contradictory 
roles from those played by the individual human actors who make 
them up. 
Considering actors as playing roles in processes (policy processes, 
innovation processes), rather than seeing them as simply fulfilling a 
specific function in a pseudo-mechanical “system”, acknowledges the 
reality that “actors” are defined by their agency (Flanagan et al., 2011, 
p.706). 
Flanagan et al. reflect on the multiplicity of roles in complex networks, and 
explain the relevance of agency. The extract relates to Iceland’s network as the 
agency attached to transient actors influences their contribution to mitigation 
efforts, decision-making and response mechanisms. By analysing the positional 
flexibility of actors, this study has found that many of their actions are co-
produced by their affiliations with several institutions. These interpretations reject 
the view that actors can be confined by the ideological conventions of 
institutional entities.  
The agency and roles of actors are relevant to the research question as 
they explain the evolution and flexibility of many stakeholder communities. 
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Findings suggest that actions and capabilities are not determined by the 
heterogeneity of an actor, or by the collective influences of the institutions to 
which they are affiliated. For example, interviewees often referred to both their 
institutional allegiances and their individual interactions: 
Every individual within the network has very defined responsibilities, 
so all of us are aware of our line of work, but I would say that we 
now can adapt to policy changes better. We do find that we can 
readily disconnect ourselves from the IMO if we need to; I think this 
is true for those that frequently work in the field or have close links 
with the University (IMO, March 2014). 
Here, a forecaster from the IMO illustrates the varied commitments of an actor 
within Iceland’s network, and highlights the ease with they can adapt to changing 
roles and responsibilities. Furthermore, the interviewee directly refers to 
connectivity, and implies that institutional connections are intermittent and 
circumstantial; this narrative resonates with elements of Latour and Callon’s 
understandings of ANT.  
By interacting with numerous stakeholder communities, this research 
highlighted how actors can occupy a position in-between institutions. In 
environments such as Iceland, where actors often need to respond to multi-
hazard events, this observation explains their capacity to connect with both 
domestic and international communities. Therefore, individual actors can be 
viewed as part of a holistic process, questioning their ability to remain rigidly 
committed to institutional ideologies. However, writing in the context of firms 
and markets, Grossetti refers to the differences between the adaptation of actors, 
and the renegotiation of institutions: 
No matter what the space considered, the mobility of individuals is 
not the same as that of the firms to which they belong. It is necessary 
to take into account at least these two levels of action and to 
understand how they interact (Grossetti, 2004, p.613). 
The extract acknowledges the need to avoid envisaging institutions as “dummy 
entities with no real impact on their members” (Grossetti, 2004, p.613). For 
instance, the IMO and the London VAAC are likely to be much more resistant to 
change than the actors within them (coordinators, forecasters and technicians for 
example), so their transformation in response to projects such as FutureVolc 
should not be presumed.  
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However, during the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull (2010), the aviation 
industry experienced an “institutional crisis” (Jessop, 2001, p.1215) that reformed 
their engagement with entities such as the IMO. This study has found that the 
transformation of the industry, following the event, has required individualists 
and holists to work together. For example, as individual actors have mobilised, 
institutions have become increasingly open and interconnected. The preceding 
chapters have also reflected this sustained movement, and have identified closer 
affiliations between scientific institutions and those prominent in the 
policymaking process (such as the International Civil Aviation Organization 
[ICAO]). 
 
7.2: Institutions, actors and expertise: Cultivating change within 
stakeholder communities  
Over the course of this research, network evolution has been a recurring theme, 
and has influenced discussion related to power, technology, trust and scale. 
However, the various stakeholder communities within Iceland’s network have 
made it almost impossible to establish, without contradiction and ambiguity, how 
expertise has been renegotiated. Stakeholder expertise can be evaluated from 
both technical and collaborative perspectives, and this study has attempted to 
explain how it is shared and translated between actors and institutions.   
 
7.2.1: The relevance of intermediaries in conveying expertise  
The research has focussed on the medial role that actors play between multiple 
institutions, and has found evidence to suggest that many retain a level of 
autonomy despite being a member of entities such as the London VAAC:  
There’s lots of people in universities working on monitoring tools 
and technology, and generating knowledge, but in most cases, it is 
down to us as individuals what we do with our findings and 
developments; of course, we have to act in the interests of the 
VAAC, but we also need to make sure that we maximise the potential 
of what we create, so for instance, I also work closely with the IMO 
(London VAAC, October 2014).  
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Here, the interviewee displays an awareness of their obligation to work towards 
the London VAAC’s collective interests and objectives, but also reflect on the 
degree of independence they have when conducting research and handling 
information. Therefore, the extract indicates that institutions allow expertise to be 
conditioned and shared by individual researchers. ANT and co-production 
interpret expertise differently, but neither explanation has recognised both the 
individuality of actors and the collectivism of institutions. For instance, 
approaches to ANT have generally associated expertise with an actor’s ability to 
translate knowledge and information, usually through a circulation of artefacts 
and technologies (Kaghan and Bowker, 2001). Therefore, the role and collective 
influence of institutional entities are not explained.  
This study of Iceland’s network has assessed the positionality of 
intermediary actors; these include forecasters at the IMO and technicians at the 
London VAAC. The research found that many intermediaries were exposed to 
numerous technologies, and had their specialist expertise shaped by either current 
or previous exchanges of knowledge. Therefore, findings suggest that expertise is 
cultivated over time by the range of institutions to whom an intermediary is 
connected. Whilst actors can collectively represent institutions such as the 
London VAAC or the IMO, they have individually progressed to their current 
position in the network. Interviews were conducted with various “cultural 
intermediaries” (Maguire and Matthews, 2010, p.412), and have provided 
evidence of how expertise can be mobilised between institutions (Van Leeuwen, 
1996; Dwiartama and Rosin, 2014): 
We actually are working with a guy from the Finnish Meteorological 
Institute (FMI), who helps us with the LIDAR (Light Detection and 
Ranging) data issue, he assists us in the LIDAR measurement, and 
this is really good because we allow his expertise to come into the 
IMO. Otherwise, it is sometimes difficult here when you don’t have 
people in-house (IMO, March 2014). 
The extract refers to the openness of Iceland’s approach to hazard management, 
and provides an example of how it enables expertise to flow freely and be 
transferred between geographical regions. Furthermore, the interviewee seldom 
refers to the institute that the technician represents (the FMI), focussing instead 
on their individual engagement with the IMO. A holistic view of Iceland’s 
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network needs to be taken so that the impact of such transitions and mobilities in 
expertise can be analysed.  
However, this narrative of intermediaries and expertise does not resonate 
with Latour’s approach to ANT. For example, Latour claims that it is not 
possible “to follow how an element goes from being individual - a - to collective - 
b - and back” (Latour, 1996b, p.371). As the connections of each individual actor 
contribute to the establishment of black-boxed knowledge (Latour, 1993; 2005), 
their engagement and expertise is circulatory and cannot be transferred in 
multiple directions between two institutional entities. On the other hand, 
approaches to co-production can account for the mobilisation and transfer of 
expertise in Iceland’s network; co-production enables the networked 
infrastructure to be explained from a holistic perspective. An analysis of expertise 
is of value to this research as it underpins how Iceland’s approach to volcanic 
hazards has been transformed, particularly since the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull. 
This is true for the changing dynamics of the aviation industry, and the 
interactions between scientific institutions and communities such as Vík.  
Co-production explains that whilst expertise stems from the connections 
and experiences of individual actors, it gradually becomes institutionalised by 
various collective influences: 
One emerging science policy frame, called co-production, questions 
institutionalized notions of expertise from the outset and hard 
demarcations between nature and society (Jasanoff, 2004). The frame 
of co-production aims to open-up how authoritative technical 
knowledge is produced in society and gets stabilized and 
institutionalized over time, so that it becomes a ‘given’ or ‘taken for 
granted truth (Corburn, 2007, p.152). 
Corburn does not dismiss the evolution of expertise, but takes an opposing view 
to Latour; this interpretation can explain how expert knowledge is produced and 
shared in Iceland’s network in a way that is compatible with the unique challenges 
and characteristics of a multi-hazard environment. By observing institutions such 
as the IMO and the CP, this study has established that both intermediary actors 
and technologies play a vital role in how expertise can be institutionalised.  
 
7.2.2: Sharing, transferring and coalescing expertise: The role of institutions  
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As Iceland’s network continues to evolve, this study has established that actors 
are generally becoming less grounded and increasingly mobile. Stone (2002) used 
the dynamics of expertise to explain how institutions remain relevant: 
As global and regional networks proliferate, one important aspect of 
their operations has been the exchange of knowledge, information 
and expertise (Stone, 2002, p.1). 
The network may become institutionalized with the creation of 
formal arrangements such as advisory committees, consultation 
procedures and recognition by state and multilateral agencies in the 
implementation of policies (Stone, 2002, p.4). 
The extracts recognise the interchangeability of expertise, and refer to how the 
infrastructure of networks such as Iceland can be transformed. For example, the 
creation and development of interdisciplinary advisories, committees and research 
programmes have become integral to Iceland’s approach to managing volcanic 
hazards, but have also reworked how expertise and information are exchanged 
(Sigmundsson et al., 2013a; Kruke and Morsut, 2015).  
During an interview conducted with a researcher at the BGS, a discussion 
of expertise led to questions being asked in relation to the EU’s ‘Exchange of 
Experts in Civil Protection Programme’ (European Commission - Exchange of 
Experts page, 2016):  
We recently took part in the ‘EU Exchange of Experts Programme’, 
which involved us flying to Iceland to meet others involved in 
emergency management, including some who we had not really had 
that much contact with previously. We established our links and now 
we keep in contact with them, for ongoing risks, but also for the 
wider monitoring of potential hazards, so yes there is now a good 
degree of crossover, everyone is uncultured, they can be considered 
transferable experts (BGS, June 2014). 
Here, the interviewee demonstrates how EU initiatives have extended the 
influence and engagement of the BGS. The extract uses a collective tone 
throughout, with language such as “our” and “we”; this illustrates how actors 
participate in the programme in an institutional capacity. Furthermore, by 
referring to the generation of institutional “crossover”, the researcher indicates 
how expertise can coalesce and hazard knowledge can be co-produced. 
Therefore, it is unclear whether actuarial engagements with 
interdisciplinary research platforms are led by the objectives of institutions, or the 
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intentionality of individuals. This study has found that even when a specific actor 
engages with a diverse community, they do not become completely detached 
from their homogenous institution. For example, the IMO and the London 
VAAC are established entities, and if an actor within them integrates with 
FutureVolc or the ‘Strengthening Resilience in Volcanic Areas’ project 
(STREVA), then the detachment is only temporary. The finite durations of both 
FutureVolc and STREVA do not allow actors to become wholly independent 
(Guffanti and Tupper, 2014).  
On the other hand, interviews conducted with members of the ‘Volcanic 
Ash Observations Review Group’ (VAORG), and the UK-based ‘Scientific 
Advisory Group for Emergencies’ (SAGE), have suggested that individual actors 
can be mobilised from a wide range of institutions: 
If there is a crisis which involves a scientific element, the government 
say ‘go to some nominated experts in this field, pull them together 
and they can be our advisors in this crisis’, so VAORG is a group of 
academics from various research institutes, and they advise the 
COBR (Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms) on volcanic ash observation 
work, it gives us here at the Met Office a bit more of a spread in 
expertise (London VAAC, October 2014). 
The extract indicates that actors are integrated into VAORG based on their 
specific research background and perceived expertise. Furthermore, the 
interviewee implies that consultation extends to the individual and not to the 
collective influences of their institution. However, human actors cannot be 
viewed as free-flowing variables, primarily because their membership of 
institutions is likely to have orchestrated their research agenda and contribution 
to VAORG.  
Nevertheless, when conducting interviews with individual members of the 
STREVA project (Strengthening Resilience in Volcanic Areas - main page, 2016), 
it became apparent that many contributions were interpreted in a largely 
heterogenous manner: 
Some of us within STREVA have operations with individuals from 
the United States Geological Survey (USGS), for example, and we 
had a small volcano workshop that rated the volcano seismology last 
year. I don’t have any kind of formal links to the USGS, but it is up 
to us to maintain good working relationships with the individuals in 
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STREVA, both whilst the programme is ongoing and after it has 
concluded (STREVA, January 2015). 
Here, the STREVA member implies that individuals choose the connections they 
establish within the project. The extract also indicates that actors have the 
capacity to circumvent the institutional entity to which they originally belonged, 
and to make independent decisions regarding their relationship with other 
stakeholder communities. Therefore, the expertise exchanged within STREVA 
appears to result from self-determination and intentionality; from a sociological 
perspective, this narrative can reflect Pickering’s (1997) interpretation of actor-
networks (see pp.184-185).  
 
7.3: Concluding comments 
To conclude, this chapter has analysed the mobility of individual actors and the 
flexibility of institutional entities. Iceland’s complex and evolving network 
illustrates how actors are neither controlled by institutions, or detached from their 
collective influences. Stone (2002) draws on advocacy to explain the impact 
networked infrastructures have on the holism and fluidity of actuarial relations: 
A network amplifies and disseminates ideas, research and 
information to an extent that could not be achieved by individuals or 
institutions alone. Moreover, a network mutually confers legitimacy 
and pools authority and respectability in a positive-sum manner. In 
other words, a network can often be greater than its constituent parts 
(Stone, 2002, p.3). 
This study has demonstrated how Stone’s narrative is compatible with Iceland’s 
approach to volcanic hazard management. By deconstructing institutions, this 
research has explored the mechanisms that allow the IMO, the London VAAC, 
the CP and various other entities to be adaptable and resilient.  
Iceland represents a networked infrastructure rather than a system, 
primarily because knowledge exchange is facilitated by interconnections between 
actors, flexible entities and technological objects. The research has established 
that many human and non-human actors can be positioned ‘in-between’ 
institutions; these transitions stem from robust stakeholder connections and the 
mobilisation of expertise. However, whilst actors can function as hybrids in both 
institutional and network environments, links to ANT remain tenuous as the 
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research findings are less representative of Latour (1993; 2005) and Callon’s 
(1999) ideological approaches. This chapter is relevant to the research question 
because the points raised can improve understandings of how communication 
channels can be mediated and utilised in Iceland’s network. Actors and 
institutions have a dynamic relationship, which the interdisciplinary scope of this 
research explores to illustrate both heterogeneity and institutional flexibility.  
 
Chapter Eight: Research conclusions and recommendations 
 
The first part of this concluding chapter responds to the main and subsidiary 
research questions, before the outcomes of the research are explained at length. 
These can be tailored to various disciplines, research communities, monitoring 
institutions and the aviation industry. The second part then focuses on the 
shortcomings of the study, before a series of recommendations are outlined; 
these relate to future trends in academic research, as well as to policy frameworks. 
This study attempts to explain stakeholder connections and knowledge exchange 
using an interdisciplinary narrative. The research draws on aspects of social 
constructivism to analyse how the dynamics of Iceland’s hazard network have 
impacted on the adaptation and resilience of stakeholder communities. Focussing 
on collaborative engagements, scales of interaction and the evolution of 
institutional entities, the research findings reflect the complexity of Iceland’s 
approach to volcanic hazard management. Post-Eyjafjallajökull, this research has 
increased relevance as it explains how communication breakdowns can be 
prevented, and close contact can be progressively maintained between scientists, 
the aviation industry, and communities in Southern Iceland. 
 
8.1: Responding to the subsidiary research questions 
By using a mixed methods approach, this study has been able to access a wide 
range of stakeholder communities, both in Iceland and the UK. For instance, the 
semi-structured interview format could be adapted to the aviation industry, civil 
protection services or communities such as Vík. On the other hand, participant 
observations enabled scientists to be studied in laboratory or institutional 
   204 
 
environments. Therefore, the subsidiary questions can be addressed from a 
holistic perspective.  
 
 
1) How have negotiations of power dynamics and technical actors 
impacted upon trust, collaborative practices, and flows of information 
in Iceland’s volcanic hazard network? 
Technology has revolutionised Iceland’s management of volcanic hazards, and 
Chapter Five refers to the impact on consultation between scientific and non-
scientific communities. Firstly, the research observed a general strengthening of 
trust as technology has tended to spread decision-making powers to multiple 
stakeholder communities within the network. For instance, technical innovation 
and policy reform have contributed to the increased involvement of airlines, and 
their improved interactions with scientists. Secondly, by analysing the impact of 
smartphone applications and social media, this research has referred to the 
expansion of information flows between the Department of Civil Protection 
(CP), the Icelandic Met Office (IMO) and vulnerable communities across 
Southern Iceland. These findings suggest that collaborative engagements have 
stemmed from the increased transparency of communication between scientists, 
policymakers and the public. By addressing this subsidiary question, the research 
has been able to effectively illustrate how Icelandic volcanoes are becoming 
increasingly co-managed (Armitage et al., 2009).  
 
2) What impact has stakeholders becoming sensitised to technology had 
upon the scale at which volcanic hazard networks have the capacity to 
adapt? 
The development of Iceland’s network has generally encouraged interaction 
between local, national and international stakeholders. Chapter Six explains how 
research partnerships have provided technologies that allow Icelandic institutions 
to form and maintain connections with their European counterparts. Therefore, 
in addressing the question, technology has impacted on the network’s 
responsiveness to change, primarily by allowing both local and international 
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stakeholders to influence policymaking. For example, the construction and use of 
real-time communication platforms has enabled stakeholders to interact across 
multiple scales; this was illustrated during the eruption of Bárðarbunga (2014-
2015), when local communities were frequently using social media to 
communicate with monitoring institutions in both Iceland and the UK. As 
stakeholders become intrinsically connected to technical devices and systems, 
their ability to communicate beyond Iceland has been significantly improved; this 
appears to have had a largely beneficial impact on the adaptability and resilience 
of the network.  
 
3) To what extent can Actor-Network Theory and co-production be used 
to interpret interactions between individual stakeholders and 
institutional entities?  
By analysing Iceland’s approach to hazard management from a sociological 
perspective, this study has found that elements of both Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) and co-production can be used to explain the set-up. Iceland’s network is 
dynamic and institutionally dense, and Chapter Seven critically assesses the 
relationship between individual stakeholders and institutional entities. The 
development of task forces such as the Scientific Advisory Group for 
Emergencies, and the Natural Hazards Partnership, illustrate how stakeholders 
act as neither individuals or as members of a single institution. Instead, their 
ability to acquire, translate and communicate knowledge is determined by their 
interactions within the network. This interpretation resonates with both ANT and 
co-production, highlighting the need for a holistic approach to hazard networks. 
For instance, in the context of Iceland, prominent individuals within the aviation 
industry have demonstrated the flexibility to connect with stakeholders beyond 
the institution to which they are affiliated. 
 
8.2: Responding to the research question and outcomes 
This next section begins by addressing the research question and drawing on the 
empirical findings: 
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How may developing communications between human and 
non-human ‘actors’ be explored to theorise and manage a 
volcanic hazard network in Iceland? 
Each of the empirical chapters highlight how hazard communication is 
continually evolving within Iceland’s network. Therefore, communication 
practices can be explored by recognising the techniques that enable the network 
to be adaptable and resilient. Firstly, since the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull (2010), 
communication methods have been defined by agreements between scientific 
institutions and the aviation industry. Compromises have led to frequent 
interactions, improved levels of trust and the development of a proactive 
approach to sharing hazard information. Therefore, effective exchanges of 
knowledge have been constructed between scientists and prominent members of 
the aviation community; this has been reflected in volcanic ash exercises. 
Communication practices can also be explored by focussing on the 
development and impact of technology. For example, during the eruption of 
Bárðarbunga (2014-2015), the use of social media demonstrated how stakeholder 
interaction had been transformed. Technology has allowed communication to 
become increasingly diverse, and has facilitated closer engagements between 
scientists and local communities. In the context of Iceland, the public has 
generally been empowered by methods of crowdsourcing and citizen science; this 
has enabled communities to actively participate in hazard management, and to 
maintain contact with both scientists and the civil protection services. Therefore, 
interactions between human and technical actors have increased in both 
frequency and value, with many instigating policy reform.  
Finally, social constructivism can be used to theorise the existence and 
dynamics of communication channels within Iceland’s network. The innovation 
and use of technical devices has been required to facilitate stakeholder 
interactions that have the capacity to fill any continuing knowledge gaps. 
Therefore, methods of communication are constructed by multiple communities, 
and are dependent on connectivity between human and non-human actors. A 
holistic approach to Iceland’s management of volcanoes can acknowledge both 
the scientific and socio-political factors that underpin how hazard information is 
shared. This research has found that stakeholder agreements, technical innovation 
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and social constructivism each have value when interpreting the complex and 
continual development of communication. 
 
8.2.1: Establishing the research outcomes 
The scope of this research means that the following outcomes can be influential 
to scientific institutions in Iceland and the UK, the aviation industry, and local 
communities across Southern Iceland. Furthermore, this study is likely to be of 
relevance to academics from numerous disciplines, and potentially significant to 
stakeholders involved in the management of volcanic hazards in other global 
regions.  
 
1) Iceland’s adaptability and resilience 
This research provides an example of how hazard management can be studied 
from a range of interdisciplinary perspectives, many of which remain unexplored. 
By focussing on the adaptability and resilience of Iceland’s approach to volcanic 
activity, the findings documented in this thesis have the capacity to impact on a 
wide range of academic disciplines. The research has analysed numerous 
stakeholder communities from both scientific and non-scientific backgrounds; 
this has led to several collaborative engagements being outlined between multiple 
actors and institutional entities. Therefore, the study is well positioned to analyse 
the expansion of a field of research that has traditionally been dominated by the 
physical sciences. Volcanic hazards can increasingly be co-managed by both 
scientific and socio-political communities, and this highlights the significant role 
that social scientists can now play in the design and influence of complex hazard 
networks that have the capacity to evolve. 
The eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull (2010), Grímsvötn (2011) and 
Bárðarbunga (2014-2015) have each elicited a need to recognise the value of co-
management in networks such as Iceland (Armitage et al., 2009). This study has 
illustrated how the adaptability and resilience of multiple stakeholder 
communities are integral to this process. Therefore, the research conducted in 
Iceland can potentially influence future approaches to Disaster Risk Reduction. 
For example, the study has explained the relevance of stakeholder co-ordination, 
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knowledge exchange and institutional partnerships. As a result, the findings can 
be valuable to policymakers and strategists, as well as a host of academic research 
communities. In addition, the study has also highlighted the relevance and merits 
of a mixed methods approach to hazard research; this has enabled the adaptation 
of the network to be acknowledged and critically explored. Therefore, the success 
of this study can potentially impact on the methods that are used to study the 
future evolution and development of volcanic hazard management, with less of a 
focus on quantitative measures such as probabilistic modelling, and a greater 
emphasis on social media analysis. 
 
2) The role of virtual and participatory technologies 
A further outcome of this research has been the increased focus on the role that 
technology plays in the management of volcanic hazards in Iceland. The findings 
explain the use of participatory technologies such as social media and 
Geographical Information Systems (Renschler, 2005; Scaini et al., 2014). These 
devices and software packages are creating the digital and virtual space required 
for stakeholders to interact and share hazard information in real-time. This 
analysis of Iceland’s network can potentially be valuable to the aviation 
community and the institutions that were directly involved in responding to the 
Eyjafjallajökull eruption. For example, this study has assessed how real-time 
communication could have significantly reduced the impacts on aviation in 
Europe, whilst also ensuring a robust relationship between the industry and 
scientific institutions such as the IMO.  
In addition, the findings are also relevant to the innovators who are 
responsible for the research and development of technology in hazard networks. 
The study has the potential to influence and encourage future collaborative 
engagements between scientists and technicians, primarily because it directly 
relates to the design and construction of specific devices and software programs. 
Furthermore, the focus on platforms such as Facebook and Twitter enables this 
research to be valuable to the media, both within Iceland and internationally. 
Despite the rather critical assessment of some media outlets in response to 
Eyjafjallajökull, the study explains the need for hazard information to be 
translated by various end-users. Social media analysis has illustrated how 
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participatory technologies can facilitate stakeholder interaction during an ongoing 
volcanic crisis. These findings and research methods can potentially be valuable 
to the future management of volcanic hazards in less economically developed 
regions, where the use of social media platforms and other participatory devices 
are likely to expand. 
 
 
3) The transformation of the scientific community  
By analysing Iceland’s network from a sociological perspective, this research has 
provided new means of understanding scientific communities. For instance, many 
of the findings are defined by the interactions that exist between scientists and 
policymakers. In the context of Iceland, scientists now appear to be 
interconnected with the aviation industry, a progressive movement that has been 
ongoing since the eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull (2010) and Grímsvötn (2011). 
Explaining the development of this collaborative relationship illustrates the policy 
relevance of the study, primarily to the aviation community in Europe. For 
example, it highlights the importance of continued interaction with scientists, and 
the need to maintain valuable connections between institutions in Iceland and the 
UK.  
Furthermore, scientific institutions have frequent and robust links to 
Icelandic communities such as Vík; these appear to have stemmed from collective 
efforts to promote citizen science, and illustrate the value of the research to 
community leaders, farmers and the public in Iceland. The interdisciplinary 
analysis presented in this thesis can potentially be significant to future trends and 
attitudes in regions where scientists are less accessible or trusted by local 
communities; examples include Soufriere Hills in Montserrat (Haynes et al., 2008), 
and Mt Merapi in Indonesia (Mei et al., 2013). Therefore, the study has focussed 
on how the dynamic between science, society and technology continues to 
evolve, and has evaluated their co-existence within Iceland’s approach to volcanic 
hazard management. Communication and knowledge exchange have both played 
a significant role in constructing a diverse network that is sustainable, adaptable 
and resilient.  
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8.3: Research limitations 
This PhD research has largely been successful, but there are limitations regarding 
its contextual focus on Iceland, and the speculative nature of the evidence 
presented in this thesis. Firstly, whilst foreseen as a potential problem before the 
research was conducted (see pp.20-21), the findings only represent Iceland’s 
approach to managing volcanic activity. Chapter Four refers to several unique 
characteristics of Iceland’s environment and society (see pp.91-94); these include 
its high density of volcanic systems, and the small but interconnected population. 
Collectively, these factors explain why Iceland provides an atypical example of 
volcanic hazard management. Furthermore, the lack of demographic or socio-
political challenges means that Iceland contrasts with hazard networks in less 
economically developed regions. Despite the findings having the potential to 
influence Disaster Risk Reduction in future, this criticism could have been 
negated if the research was conducted in multiple hazardous environments. 
However, temporal and financial constraints meant the study could not be 
extended, and Iceland provided a suitable location. Nevertheless, if the research 
were to be repeated, it could be expanded to numerous volcanic regions, both 
within and beyond Europe; this would improve the representation of the 
findings. 
Secondly, this thesis has analysed a considerable number of informed 
arguments from various stakeholder communities; however, much of the 
discussion has lacked conviction. The research has identified adaptations and 
trends within Iceland’s management of volcanic hazards, but if it were to be 
repeated, then it could be less holistic and focussed instead on a clearly defined 
section of the network. For example, by restricting the scope of the research to 
the connective links between the aviation industry and scientific institutions, a 
small number of stakeholders could be studied in greater depth; this may provide 
more definitive conclusions. Furthermore, Iceland’s network is complex and 
continually evolving; therefore, it cannot be explored in one study.  
Thirdly, the longevity of the findings can be questioned as many features 
of Iceland’s approach to hazard management are short-term measures; these 
include the design and duration of the FutureVolc project. However, this is a 
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criticism that could be offset by conducting follow-up or comparative research, 
either at a later date or once the network has experienced a large-scale volcanic 
event such as Eyjafjallajökull (2010). Finally, sections of this thesis have focussed 
on the theoretical aspects of an interdisciplinary approach to Iceland’s volcanic 
hazard network; as a result, the practicality of managing volcanic activity has been 
overlooked. Despite Chapter Four referring to the geology and tectonics of 
Icelandic volcanism (see pp.91-93), these were rarely probed during the fieldwork 
and do not feature in the empirics.   
 
8.4: Recommendations  
Based on the research conducted, the following recommendations can be made 
for how volcanic hazard networks should be designed and developed, both 
within and beyond Iceland:  
1) Facilitate knowledge exchange at an inter-organisational level, 
encouraging co-production and the resolution of knowledge 
controversies between stakeholder communities.  
2) Maximise the use of social media and crowdsourcing, and provide 
transparent methods of communication. Where possible, allow 
participatory technologies to provide frequent two-way 
communication between end-users and leading institutions.  
3) Establish, at the earliest opportunity, a robust collaborative 
relationship between science and industry (aviation) when innovating, 
planning, constructing or trialling new technology.  
4) Continue to devolve decision-making responsibilities, from leading 
institutions to community-based stakeholders; this can maintain or 
improve trust by empowering individual actors. 
5) Encourage collaborative working groups, effective partnerships 
and task forces, ensuring they are designed to mediate or translate 
scientific, social or industrial expertise.  
These recommendations can influence or elicit action from many contrasting 
stakeholder communities, both scientific and socio-political. The complexity of 
Iceland’s networked infrastructure is defined by its institutional density, 
knowledge exchange and incorporation of participatory technologies. As volcanic 
hazard networks continue to develop post-Eyjafjallajökull, there is a need to 
maximise their adaptive capacity and resilience; technical actor’s and stakeholder 
connectivity are integral to this process.  
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Appendices 
Appendix One: Research materials for methodology 
 
1.1: Interview transcript examples 
Key 
Technology 
Power 
Trust 
Communication 
 
I(number) - interviewee number, as noted on either the Dictaphone or in the 
field diary 
R: Researcher 
 
Icelandic Met Office  
I6: Technology has enormously impacted on our knowledge about how the 
different types of processes, improving the system. Technology has been very 
important in general and our understanding, to …. it has been influential in 
increasing communication between scientists, it is very helpful, you can sit 
somewhere as an expert in remote sensing using a satellite and if you see 
something, an event, and have established a contact, of course you have to have 
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that, you can then give information to your colleagues for them to see. The 
expertise then comes into the institute?  
R: And do you feel that is an opinion reflective of the wider institute? 
I6: Yes certainly, technology has helped us a lot in dealing with natural hazards, at 
least in this system, when we started this risk assessment of volcanoes in Iceland, 
one thing we can say in our arguments when we took them to the ministry was to 
say that in modern society we are also vulnerable. 
R: If we have the technology available, then why do you feel we remain 
vulnerable? 
I6: Exactly, we have improved knowledge and know-how and it has made all 
communication between different institutes really much better but we are 
vulnerable if something happens because we rely on the technology. 
R: Have your communication practices changed in response to technology? 
I6: Yes, I would say so. We could say that now, for instance, we use the web a lot 
to put out information, we send out these three hourly volcanic ash reports 
during an event, we have this colour code on the web to not only transfer 
information but also enhance our dissemination methods to show where we are, 
we disseminate it to stakeholders, so, so, it has absolutely, for example, in 2010 
eruption, I had a call from CAA in England and they wanted the chemical 
composition of the ash, I could then give them the website vedur.is where we had 
put out the information, because they are dealing with those things and they were 
very grateful for the information because they could reuse it to put out 
information, both national and international people can get information because 
it is useful for their operation work. 
 
University of Iceland (Institute of Earth Sciences) 
R: Have there been any significant changes in the way that volcanic hazards, or 
natural hazards, are managed in Iceland since 2010/2011? 
I4: Definitely, a big increase in, in investment and monitoring equipment that is 
being used now throughout the volcanic zone but primarily Katla volcano and 
northwest of Vatnajökull, to take a few examples, seismic stations and broadband 
seismic stations that are collecting data continuously and transmitting data in real-
time back to IMO in Reykjavík, we have invested in all sorts of ash detection 
hardware, and you have probably heard about this already, including ground 
based LIDAR for measuring particle composition and ash density LIDARs and 
that of course reflects foreign investment, there’s the global stream network, 
that’s been expanded and processors have been installed to borehole strainmeters 
near Katla, and that’s again with mostly UK and US financial support, so overall 
there has been a big increase in the amount of data, to the extent that it is 
becoming quite a challenge to process it all and use it effectively in day to day 
monitoring and that’s maybe the, the sort of a side of the story that you will 
become overwhelmed with the different types of monitoring data, and it is as 
much a task to install the equipment and maintain it as it is to process it, to the 
process the data and the make that data into useable results 
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R: What level of control or influence do you feel academic research have on the 
technology that you use?  
I4: More, yes, obviously there are some, most of the networks are fully 
incorporated, those networks where there are four or five stations processing data 
are telemetered in real-time and warnings can be given out here based on set 
thresholds, and we play a very important role in that 
R: You mentioned increases in investment, following the eruption in 2010, do 
you think that investment was solely an outcome of the international disruption 
to communication, trade, transport? 
I4: Well we know, from my experience, with the networks we are responsible for, 
there are state level support from different countries, and government funding 
that’s coming from the BGS, we, we have a contact at the BGS, and the mandate 
for that came from the Cabinet Office, apparently there was a meeting during, 
well a series of meetings during and after the 2010 eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull 
and the decision was made that, well the UK should be seen to be making a, a 
move in assisting Iceland, in real-time volcanological measurements, you see 
more pure research interest from scientific groups in UK, US and European 
universities, particularly wanting to follow the aftermath of the eruption, looking 
at the recovery, the landscape for instance or wanting to install other monitoring 
equipment in collaboration with us at the IMO, it’s  about giving warnings and 
taking steps to clear airspace which initially has to be done and then from a 
research aspect we have teams coming here interested in collecting scientific data 
which has a monitoring purpose as well, potentially the people who are installing 
the equipment for research purposes don’t make any attempt to relay the data in 
real-time or to make use of it operationally as we would 
 
Department of Civil Protection  
I20: the International Civil Aviation Organisation, ICAO, they have been 
working with the IMO and their response to all kinds of equipment, for example, 
mobile radars which Sigrun probably told you about, so they would be able to 
respond to that radar, hang it from the back of a truck and drive to the mountain 
which is erupting and they could place it under there and the radar could measure 
with much more precision, much more precisely the quantity of the ash going 
into the air, so using technology in that sense and perhaps creating and providing 
a solution 
R: Do you feel FutureVolc, as a project, is helping the system to become more 
efficient, more transparent, and more open to the public? 
I20: I can definitely see a trend, for example, in Iceland we see money coming in 
for the study of volcanoes, and it’s for a reason, because before the Icelandic 
volcanoes were not on the registers of the European nations but now they are 
and that’s for a reason, because they saw the aviation industry, they bore the cost 
of having a bad system, or not, having precise measurements, or not precise 
enough, so if you want to increase the uptake for the airlines, so you see a 
tremendous amount of money is in place there 
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R: You mentioned earlier about the hub in Europe extending outside, are there 
any conflicts in the advice given in Europe compared to outside of Europe? 
I20: Well, this ECHO organisation, the European Commission Humanitarian 
Organisation, they organise humanitarian aid given by the European Union and 
for that they monitor people outside of Europe, in those location, helping and 
distributing food and aid and whatever and I know the modules we have designed 
in the system we can use them inside of Europe and we can apply them outside 
of Europe, for example, in the typhoon in the Philippines, there were people 
giving aid exactly through these same channels so we were asked by the system to 
assist, if you could send technical assistance down there, and that would be 
registered like the European assistance,  
R: Do you expect to be participating in further similar projects or initiatives? 
I20: it’s not a European platform, it was no platform, it was a scientific platform, 
so it was just the scientists were speaking to each other and they were coming 
from different parts of the world and from different institutions, some of them 
were working for the government or local communities or the universities, my 
next step in my role in FutureVolc is to get some of that information and apply it, 
we are in the business of taking the scientific information and new-found 
information and connecting the Civil Protection and the public because it is 
public money of course for the sake of the public, so we are taking the 
information coming from making a route for the information to flow freely and 
to have like a lexicon of our volcanoes 
 
Isavia 
I24: Here are explanations of every step, the start of the eruption, the first 
SIGMET which was sent out 120 nautical miles from the area, the radius, the 
second action is when you get the interim SIGMET, the cover of the ash, the 
third action is when we get the first information from the VAAC 
R: What is the significance of the information in the notifications? 
I24: We are using the VAAC data at different times, 3:00, 6:00, 12:00, 18:00, 0:00, 
we take new observations and make new forecasts, if we get data at 6:00, then we 
get an observation at 6:00, we take these two and merge it into one and that is 
how we control the air traffic within our area, then the people in the air traffic 
control centre, those people who were working there, were preparing the first 
signal to send out to aircraft, depending on the polygons in the areas, it is only a 
snapshot after twelve hours, we send it out four times a day with three intervals, 
zero to six, six to twelve, twelve to eighteen hours 
R: And is that the same policy across Europe 
I24: It should be according to the contingency but I won’t say so, I think it’s 
different to how the states do it but we stick to the plan because it’s equal, here is 
an explanation of what’s happening in the first action, in the ICAO contingency 
plan they have a preactive phase, proactive phase and a reactive phase in the 
present one but they have changed the name and in the future they will be pre-
eruption phase, eruption phase and ongoing eruption phase, here is the first 
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warning SIGMET, the first SIGMET that is supposed to go out from the Met 
Office, I say to the air traffic controllers look for the wind, then you know where 
it is going, then we come to the second, then we get the interim SIGMET,  we 
went through all these steps, the whole thing, it took a lot of time to think 
through, we only have them in two categories because as you know we have to 
lose control of closing airspace later this year so we are going to look at this again 
in May and again in September and probably in December if there is not change 
but if there is change we don’t have to do it 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2: Interview questions (preliminary guide) 
 
Interview schedule 
Ask interviewee if now is a suitable time to conduct the interview, or would it be 
better for me to I return at a later date? (If the interview cannot take place at the time, 
then arrange a more suitable time later during the fieldwork). 
 
Section A - Introduction 
 Thank interviewee for agreeing to meet and for their contribution to the 
research.  
 Give interviewee an estimated length for the interview (1 hour). 
 Ask for the interviewee’s permission - use of a voice recorder 
 Introduce interviewee to “information for participants” sheet and advise 
future reference to it. 
 
Section B 
1) What is your specialist area/s of expertise? 
 -  What is your role within the Met Office (or organisation/academic institute)? 
 
2) To what extent has the Met Office influenced existing approaches to 
hazard management in Iceland?  
- In your opinion, what is the role of the Met Office in the hazard management 
process? 
 
3) How do you, as an individual interpret what is meant by a “hazard 
management network”?  
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- How does this interpretation of “hazard management” differ from what you 
understand by the term “mitigation”? 
 
4) Are you familiar with the VOLCICE and VOLCEX exercises carried out 
jointly by the Met Office, ISAVIA and the Imo? 
- Would you agree that communication between those directly involved is 
improved significantly as a result of the exercises? 
- What is your role within the exercise? 
 
5) What technological tools or other approaches do you use, directly and 
indirectly, on a regular basis? 
- Do you think monitoring technology has shaped, or reshaped, interaction 
between the Met Office and the Icelandic organisations? If so, how has this 
happened? 
 
6) In the context of hazard management, how do you define and 
understand technology, whether material or virtual? 
- Has your use of technology, however limited or intrinsic, altered your approach 
or interpretation altered what is meant by a hazard or risk?  
 
7) To what extent do you think the Met Office utilises social media 
opportunities to enhance communication with stakeholders in times of 
volcanic activity? 
- How do you envisage social media further altering the means by which hazards 
are monitored and managed? 
 
Section C 
1) Academic and policy documents have indicated that links and 
partnerships between Icelandic and UK-based organisations are extensive 
and have rapidly expanded. Could you clarify in greater depth, what these 
links are?  
- What is you, or your organisation’s role in maintaining these links or 
partnerships? 
- Did the aviation crises in 2010 and 2011 alter the formation of partnerships and 
their operations? 
- What impact has this had upon policymaking? 
- Are your links to Iceland mirrored by your links to other countries, particularly 
within Europe? 
- To what extent do you think communication between Icelandic and UK 
organisation’s has been facilitated by, or accelerated by, the use of technology?  
- How do you think communication shall further develop? 
 
2) To what extent can the use of technology within hazard management 
now play a particular role in terms of sourcing, using and distributing 
data?  
- What specific technological devices, instruments or representations are of 
particular relevance to this process? How are these used or known by your 
organisation? 
- As you are users or end-users of monitoring technology, do you have any 
influence on how the technology that you use is constructed and operated? 
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- Does the use of technology enhance the flexibility of your organisation in 
responding to hazardous activity? 
- Do you think technology has altered power dynamics, not just within hazard 
management organisations such as your own, but also between them? 
 
3) Do you define the relationship between the UK and Iceland as a 
mitigation partnership? 
- To what extent are you aware of the FutureVolc project? 
- What impact do you think projects such as FutureVolc have on technology and 
partnerships going forward? 
 
4) From previous reading, I have noted how projects such as FutureVolc 
have enhanced the relationship between the Icelandic Met Office, ISAVIA 
and the Met Office in the UK 
- To what extent do you think a similar interactive partnership has been, or can 
be generated between the Met Office in the UK and the CAA, as it has between 
the IMO and ISAVIA?  
- Do you share communications with any other aviation authorities to the same 
extent? 
- To what extent did the high profile volcanic eruptions in 2010 and 2011 alter or 
advance collaboration between the UK and Iceland? 
- What relationship do you think the Met Office has with ICAO? How will the 
current set-up be renegotiated by the upcoming alterations that shall see the 
airlines gain the power to determine whether or not to fly in times of volcanic 
activity? How could this alter the power, influence and responsibility of the Met 
Office?  
 
5) To what extent do you share knowledge and resources with academic 
institutes, both within the UK and in Iceland? Where do you source the 
equipment from to monitor volcanic activity?  
- To what extent do you think that technology can now be viewed as an essential 
component of a hazard management system?  
- Do you think technology has simplified the management of volcanic hazards, or 
has it increased its complexity? If yes, in what way? 
- To what extent is crowdsourcing and citizen science now an essential aspect of 
hazard management in Iceland? How has the use of technology complemented or 
progressed these emerging forms of hazard communication? 
 
Section D 
1) Following the high-profile aviation crises of 2010 and 2011, do you think 
Iceland’s links with Europe and North America are essential in the 
adequate management of volcanic hazards?  
- To what extent has this been propagated by the media coverage of past crises? 
- How do you envisage Iceland-UK affiliations developing with further 
investment, use and recognition of technology? 
- Do you think the system could be improved in any way? 
 
2) Are you aware of any individuals or organisations, within either Iceland 
or the UK, who may be interested in my research or who I could contact 
and arrange an interview with? 
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- If a further interview needs to be arranged then would you be willing to meet 
me again? 
 
 Thank you for your time today, your input to my research is of value and I 
appreciate being given the opportunity to interview you. 
 Are there any questions that you would like to ask me, either about my research 
or about the issues we have discussed today? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Two: Fieldwork supplements 
 
2.1: Informed consent form (used for Iceland and UK-based fieldwork) 
-    
Informed Consent Agreement 
Before the interview/observation can begin, please read and consider the 
following information and then sign to give your consent to being 
interviewed/observed as part of the research project: 
 I fully understand and accept the request to participate in the research project 
conducted by Daniel Beech from Aberystwyth University. I understand that the 
project is designed to highlight and analyse the role that technology plays in 
communicating and disseminating knowledge of volcanic hazards. 
 My institution has given Daniel permission to carry out his research with us and 
any questions I have asked have been answered to a satisfactory standard. 
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 I understand that my participation within the project is completely voluntary. If I 
commit to being interviewed then I am free to leave or terminate the interview at 
any time I wish. 
 I understand the potential topics that may arise within the interview/observation 
and I do not object to being asked about them.  
 I am aware that notes may be taken during the interview/observation and that 
any tape recordings shall be kept private at all times and my name will not be 
shared with any external parties or in any reports or publications. The original 
tape and feedback forms will be destroyed within twelve months and stored 
securely. I understand that any recordings are only be used for transcription by 
the interviewer/observer. My confidentiality and rights to anonymity within the 
research will be exercised at all times. 
 I give Daniel my permission to use the name of my institution in his thesis and 
research outputs. I can withdraw this permission at any time I wish. 
 I understand that the research has been approved by the Daniel’s institution and 
that if any problems do arise then the institution (Aberystwyth University) can be 
contacted. 
 
I retain a copy of this consent form and contact Daniel (dib8@aber.ac.uk) if I 
have any further questions. 
 
Name:      
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Signature: 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Date:       
_______________________________________________________________ 
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2.2: Information document (used for Iceland and UK-based fieldwork) 
 
Thank you for your willingness to participate in this research, I am a PhD 
candidate within the Department of Geography and Earth Sciences at 
Aberystwyth University in the UK. My PhD is titled “Managing Volcanic 
Hazards: An Actor-Network of Technology and Communication”, and my 
academic supervisors are Professor Michael Woods and Dr Carina Fearnley 
of Aberystwyth University. Your contribution to this research would be of great 
interest and would enable me to further explore how volcanic hazards in Iceland 
are managed. I have a geographical background and a keen interest in volcanic 
landscapes and hazards. A CV can be viewed on request. This research has been 
awarded the ‘Geographical Club Award’ from the Royal Geography Society, 
enabling it to be conducted with the use of the grant provided.  
 
About the Research 
The aim of this research is to explore how hazard management networks, 
particularly those overseeing volcanic activity within Iceland, are furthered in 
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their capability to mitigate risk by information technology (Geographical 
Information Systems, sensory networks, digitised channels of communication, 
participatory technologies, etc.). The research focuses on the interrelationships 
that exist between scientific, sociological and technological communities, 
exploring how the mitigation and preparedness of volcanic hazards can be 
incorporated into collective, hybrid networks.  
 
My subsidiary research questions are outlined to provide further information 
about what my research is seeking to explore: 
1) How have negotiations of power dynamics and technical 
actors impacted upon trust, collaborative practices, and flows of 
information in Iceland’s volcanic hazard network? 
2) What impact has stakeholders becoming sensitised to 
technology had upon the scale at which volcanic hazard 
networks have the capacity to adapt?  
3) To what extent can Actor-Network Theory and co-
production be used to interpret interactions between individual 
stakeholders and institutional entities?  
 
Methodology 
This research intends to highlight how technology and communications are a part 
of monitoring and policymaking practices, and how the collection, 
communication and dissemination of knowledge relating to volcanic hazards is 
being enhanced. My intention to interview/observe you is subject to your 
consent and your name and details will remain anonymous. I would like to use a 
Dictaphone to record conversations but this is subject to your informed consent 
and acceptance of confidentiality assurances; the use of a Dictaphone is not 
essential to this research.  
 
Potential impact 
By conducting this research, I hope to further geographical knowledge relating to 
the structure, coherence and organisation of hazard management networks. This 
will hopefully contribute to the expansion and broadening of the field of 
volcanology, further enhancing its interdisciplinary and sociological credentials. 
The links between Iceland and the UK, particularly following the aviation crises 
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in 2010, are of great interest to me and I hope my research can draw attention to 
the communication channels between contrasting stakeholder communities. 
Through my research, I intend to further mobilise hazard management, allowing 
it to be viewed to a greater extent, as a participatory and democratic process that 
transcends science, technology and society.  
Thank you 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Three: Participant observation and archival research examples 
 
3.1: Participant observation: Field diary example 
Volcanic ash observation (VolcIce): 11/03/2014 - the IMO, ISAVIA and the 
London VAAC  
8AM: IMO send notice to London VAAC. Activity imminent on Reykjanes 
Peninsula.  
8.30AM: IMO send confirmed activity notice to London VAAC and ISAVIA.  
SIGMET’s issued to the London VAAC from the IMO. Irregularities are present, 
so a correction message is sent to explain the error.  
8.45AM: Radar scanning begins, monitoring of activity is expanded by the IMO.  
9.05AM: Volcanic ash chart sent from the London VAAC to the IMO, ash cloud 
projections are developed by the IMO in due course.  
SIGMET 5 issued: IMO amend ash cloud forecast and receive updates from the 
London VAAC, the ash distribution model is shared.  
Daniel Beech, PhD Candidate 
Department of Geography and Earth Science, 
Llandinam Building, Aberystwyth University, 
Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, UK, SY23 3DB, 
Tel: +441970 622610 / +447853291187 
Skype: daniel_beech 
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10.15: IMO warn the London VAAC and ISAVIA of misrepresentation in 
polygons on information reports. The London VAAC and ISAVIA amend 
reports individually.  
The London VAAC reruns the exercise whilst the IMO awaits communication. 
The Volcanic Ash report is compiled by the IMO and sent to the London VAAC. 
London VAAC compile the data and report back to both ISAVIA and the IMO, 
necessary actions are then taken.  
14.00: Institutional debriefs: Debriefs are held within the IMO, ISAVIA and 
London VAAC. The institute’s contribution to the report, is discussed, and 
feedback is shared.  
15.00: Exercise debrief: A debrief takes place between representatives of IMO, 
ISAVIA and London VAAC, to discuss the success or failure of the exercise. 
 
3.2: Archival research: Internet-based resources 
 
The risk posed to Reykjavík (Source: Icelandic Met Office - Holuhraun [Bárðarbunga 
Article]. Date accessed: August 2016). 
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Images of the 2014-2015 volcanic eruption at Bárðarbunga, an example of the materials that 
were distributed on the social media platforms of the IMO, the UoI, and the CP (Source: 
Icelandic Met Office - Holuhraun [Bárðarbunga Article]. Date accessed: August 2016). 
 
 
The movement of lava on 7th September 2014 (Source: Icelandic Met Office - Holuhraun 
[Bárðarbunga Article]. Date accessed: August 2016). 
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An online video of the AVOID technology test flight; the video is available to view (Source: 
EasyJet - Corporate page: AVOID section. Date accessed: August 2016). 
Appendix Four: Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies - Minutes 
 
4.1: 5th May 2010: Examples of selected discussion extracts and actions  
AGENDA ITEM 1: WELCOME AND REVIEW OF MINUTES 
Professor Beddington welcomed the group and thanked them for attending at 
short notice. Miles Elsden (GO-Science) reviewed the actions. 
 
Action 1 - Confidentiality Agreement and Terms of Reference - This was 
complete. The secretariat will send copies of the confidentiality agreement back 
to SAGE members. 
 
ACTION 2: BRITISH GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, with the SAGE 
SECRETARIAT to finalise letter to Icelandic Authorities requesting certain 
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information. This had been completed, a letter has been sent, and a copy has also 
been sent to SAGE members. 
 
ACTION 3: DR MATT WATSON to talk to contacts at the Science and 
Technology Facilities Council about modelling the agglomeration of volcanic ash 
particles, and to communicate results to SAGE. Dr Watson told the group that 
work was progressing well in this area, and that colleagues from Oxford 
University were making measurements on the amount of Black Carbon in the 
plume. He said that he was looking at a range of funding sources. 
 
ACTION 4: MET OFFICE to form a sub-group to investigate better definitions 
of particle size distribution and mass at source, and over UK. This had been 
completed and progress was discussed as part of agenda item 2. 
 
ACTION 5: BRITISH GEOLOGICAL SURVEY and MET OFFICE to work 
with CIVIL CONTINGENCIES SECRETATIAT and the GOVERNMENT 
OFFICE FOR SCIENCE to investigate lower probability, higher impact 
Icelandic volcano risks, as part of the National Risk Assessment process. This has 
been completed, and progress was discussed as part of agenda item 2. 
 
Action 6: DR WILLY ASPINALL to form a sub-group to investigate the 
likelihood of a Katla eruption as a result of the current volcanic activity, and likely 
magnitude of this. A paper would be presented at the next meeting of SAGE. 
This had been completed and was discussed as part of agenda item 3. 
 
ACTION 7: MET OFFICE, CIVIL CONTINGENCIES SECRETARIAT, 
GOVERNMENT OFFICE FOR SCIENCE AND THE BRITISH 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, on behalf of SAGE, to develop a range of indicative 
scenarios considering plausible short- and longer-term impacts. This had been 
completed and was discussed as part of agenda item 4. 
 
ACTION 8: NATURAL ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH COUNCIL (NERC) 
and DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT to discuss the timing of the scheduled 
refurbishment of the NERC research aircraft, and the associated implications on 
surveillance. This was completed in the discussion during agenda item 5. 
 
ACTION 9: MET OFFICE and the NERC to explore options for developing 
the UK’s monitoring capability for volcanic ash and other airborne particulates, 
and also ways of widening coverage beyond UK borders. This was completed 
during the discussions during agenda item 6. 
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ACTION 10: NATURAL ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH COUNCIL to liaise 
with Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, through the MINISTRY OF 
DEFENCE Chief Scientific Adviser’s office, to organise the chemical analysis of 
NERC’s airborne particulate samples. This had been completed. This work was 
being coordinated by the Natural History Museum and Professor Mobbs gave an 
update as part of agenda item 3. 
 
(Source: The National Archives - SAGE Volcanic Ash Minutes PDF [5th May 2010]. 
Date accessed: August 2016).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2: 19th May 2010: Examples of selected discussion extracts and actions  
Item 1 - Welcome and Review of actions 
Professor John Beddington welcomed Dr Thor Thordarson, Dr Kristin Vogfjord 
(Icelandic Meterological Office) and Dr Gudrun Larsen (Institute of Earth 
Sciences) to the group. 
 
Review of Actions 
Actions 1 and 2 were complete. Actions 3 and 4 were discussed as part of 
agenda item 4 and were complete. Actions 5 and 6 were discussed as part of 
agenda item 2 and were complete. Action 7 was discussed as part of agenda 
item 7 and was complete. Action 8 (the aviation sub-group) had been superseded 
by other actions (see agenda item 5). Action 9 was on-going and was discussed 
as part of agenda item 6. Action 11 was on-going. 
 
Item 2 - situation report 
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British Geological Survey (BGS) 
BGS reported that the plume had reduced in height since the weekend (5000m 
compared to 6000 to 7000m). This along with the decrease in the number of 
earthquakes indicated a decline in activity. However, the depth of the earthquakes 
(most originated at 16-18km below the surface) was likely to indicate a continued 
magma supply. The Institute of Earth Sciences in Iceland continued to collect 
samples which would allow better definition of the source parameters. 
The key points raised in the discussion were: 
 The composition and particle size distribution of the ejected material 
varied daily and there had been significant pulses of sulphur dioxide; 
 The particles collected 30km from the source on the 16/17 May were 
very fine (80% of them were under 90μm) indicating that there could 
be some interaction between magma and water, and 
 There were many other volcanoes in Iceland which presented a risk to 
the UK. 
BGS said that they had procured 6 seismometers from a UK manufacturer. These 
seismometers would be similar to the backbone formed by the IMO network and 
would provide real-time information. There were also a number of non-real time 
measurements undertaken by university groups from around the world. The 
group agreed that a wider agreement was needed to allow this information to be 
shared. 
 
ACTION 3.1: BRITISH GEOLOGICAL SURVEY to work with DR 
GUDRUN LARSEN to produce a short paper which listed which volcanoes in 
Iceland were a current cause for concern, to clarify the reasons for this and to 
quantify the risk as far as was currently possible. 
 
Met Office 
The Met Office reported that there was currently a southerly (favourable) airflow 
over the UK. Conditions were expected to change at the weekend with northerly 
and easterly winds predicted early in the following week. The risk that this would 
pose to UK airspace was dependent on the size of the plume at that time (SAGE 
[Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies] (10) (05) (16). 
Professor Adrian Simmons introduced a paper (SAGE (10) (05) (11) which 
analysed six-hourly data on airflow between Iceland and the UK and the 
likelihood of shifting weather regimes. He advised against over-interpretation of 
this analysis but reported that it indicated that climatologically there was a 28% 
chance of north-westerly (unfavourable) airflows over the UK at any one time. 
There was estimated to be only a chance of under 2% of being in unfavourable 
conditions that would last a further 5 days or more. In contrast, there was 
estimated to be about a 30% chance of being in favourable conditions that would 
remain so for 5 or more days. 
Volcanic Hazards Sub-group update 
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Dr Willy Aspinall reported that initial analysis showed a weak positive correlation 
between the preceding gap and the Volcanic Explosively Index (VEI) of 
eruptions at Katla. Collegues at the Institute of Earth Sciences reported they had 
noted a similar correlation between the VEI and the length of time following 
eruptions at Katla. Work was now needed to determine whether failed eruptions 
should be included in this analysis. 
 
ACTION 3.2: VOLCANIC HAZARDS ASSESSMENT SUB-GROUP to 
look at data from Iceland to assess correlation between magnitude of eruption 
and the following repose time. 
ACTION 3.3: VOLCANIC HAZARDS ASSESSMENT SUB-GROUP to 
consider building “failed eruptions” that didn’t reach the surface into model 
looking at possibility of Katla erupting. 
 
CAA 
The CAA noted that they had held an industry briefing day on the 13th May and 
that this had been supported with presentations from SAGE members. 
 
(Source: The National Archives - SAGE Volcanic Ash Minutes PDF [19th May 2010]. 
Date accessed: August 2016).  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Five: VolcIce exercise materials 
 
5.1: VolcIce report for the observed exercise (March 2014) 
EXERCISE VOLCICE 2014/02 CAT-II. 
EXERCISE DIRECTIVE. 
  
DATE & DISTAFF 
Exercise date: 11 March 2014. 
Exercise leader: Egill Thordarson 
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DISTAFF members:  
Anton Muscat, VAAC London. 
Sara Barsotty, IMO. 
Arni Gudbrandsson, Isavia. 
  
PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS 
IMO,                                                                                                                                       
Isavia,                                                                                                                                     
VAAC London. 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Exercise the conduct of NAT Doc 006, Part II. December 2010. 
EXERCISE DURATION 
 08:00 to approx. 13:00utc. 
EXERCISE VOLCANO 
Reykjanes, 1701-02,  63 52.3N 022 30.0W, Iceland SW. 
 
SCENARIO OF VOLCANIC ACTIVITY 
08:00 Eruption imminent or already in progress. Estimated plume height 1-5 
km. 
08:30 Volcano continues to erupt, seismic tremor increasing, plume height 
observed 5 km. 
 
 
EXERCISE SCENARIO MESSAGES 
To be promulgated by Isavia Monday 10 March 2014. 
(Axxxx/13 NOTAMN 
Q) BIRD/QWWXX/IV/NBO/W/000/999/6425N01719W 
A) BIRD 
B) 1403110800 C) 1403111300   
D) 
E) EXERCISE VOLCICE CAT-II 
VOLCANIC ASH DISPERSION EXERCISE TAKES PLACE  
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11 MARCH FROM 08:00 TO APPROX. 13:00UTC. 
PROJECT NAME: EXERCISE VOLCICE 
EXERCISE VOLCANO: REYKJANES, 1701-02,  63 52.3N 022 30.0W, ICELAND SW   
FREE TEXT OF PROMULGATED EXERCISE MESSAGES STARTS WITH:     
EXERCISE VOLCICE. 
AND ENDS WITH: 
EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE 
F) SFC   G) UNL 
 
08:00 Telcon message from IMO 
EXERCISE VOLCICE. 
INCREASING SEISMIC ACTIVITY IN REYKJANES PENINSULA HAS BEEN 
RECORDED THE LAST WEEK. CHANGES IN GEOTHERMAL ACTIVITY ALSO 
REPORTED. ERUPTION IN REYKJANES IS IMMINENT OR ALREADY IN 
PROGRESS. ASH PLUME COULD REACH 1-5 KM. 
 
08:30 Telcon message from IMO. 
ASH PLUME UP TO 5 KM OBSERVED OVER SUTHERN COAST OF REYKJANES 
FROM GROUND BASED RADAR IN KEFLAVIK. SEISMIC TREMOR CONTINUES TO 
INCREASE AND REYKJANES VOLCANO CONTINUES TO ERUPT. 
 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Exercise telcons to start with EXERCISE VOLCICE. 
Exercise messages to start with EXERCISE VOLCICE and  
End with EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE.  
 
DIRECTING STAFF 
Ex. Leader: 
Egill Thordarson, 
Tel.: +354 4244294 
Mobile: +354 8951233 
E-mail: egill.thordarson@isavia.is 
 
   282 
 
BIRD OACC: 
Arni Gudbrandsson 
Tel.: +3544343 
Mobile +354 891 6464 
E-mail: arni.gudbrandsson@isavia.is 
 
IMO: 
Sara Barsotti  
Tel: +354 5226162 
Mobile: +354 8952517 
E-mail: sara@vedur.is 
 
VAAC London: 
Anton Muscat 
Tel +44 1392 886033   
anton.muscat@metoffice.gov.uk. 
 
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. 
-- END – 
 
 
 
5.2: VolcIce exercise debrief transcript example (field diary) 
London VAAC: I think that was the thinking behind the USGS’ because they 
sent the email out in September and I think they kind of assumed it would be 
implemented by the end of the year but some of the some VAACS, mostly Tokyo 
pushed back and said they wouldn’t be able to do it until after the Tokyo meeting 
Isavia: Yes because Tokyo are … they have their internal relationship with their 
volcanoes and they want this to be compatible 
London VAAC: Yes 
Isavia: And, and there careful, personally I am concerned because they don’t want 
to issue to their customers, the end users, a numbering system that has not been 
issued by ICAO, not formally released, and I have been pushing on ICAO Paris 
and on ICAO Montréal 
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London VAAC: Yes 
Isavia: There is another issue that was discussed, that the VAAC London, that 
you were suggesting that, you used Mercator projection for data, this causes a lot 
of ambiguity in the high latitudes 
London VAAC: So this is the Mercator projection on the LAT/longs 
Isavia: Yes, the LAT/longs yes 
London VAAC: But I think that’s the ICAO recommendation that we use 
Mercator projections 
Isavia: I will have to write you something on this because in the polar area we 
cannot use Mercator, because Mercator you stretch out the pole to be as long as 
the equator 
IMO: Yes 
London VAAC: Yes I know, we see this on our intervention tool, but anything 
that goes over the poles creates a load of noise and a load of spikes, because it 
goes over the same point multiple times 
Isavia: Yes, indeed, yes 
London VAAC: We have transferred this into a, a lambert projection because the 
aviation world, the airlines and air traffic controls which help to deal with large 
areas, they are always using, the, lambert in high latitudes, and polar projection in 
polar latitudes 
Isavia: Yes 
IMO: What are they using in Anchorage for example? 
Isavia: I don’t know what they are using, but I have of course, I have been using a 
Mercator because we are processing at low speed and in relatively small areas 
each time so it is no problem, but with a large area, the high latitudes, we need to 
have the lambert projection 
IMO: Maybe this problem in Iceland has not been apparent to the VAACS 
because there is no civil contingency or, and there not covered 
Appendix Six: Bárðarbunga 
 
6.1: Update report log example - 29th August 2014 
Bárðarbunga update 29082014 
2014-08-29 16:20 UTC 
Bárðarbunga update 
 
Compiled by 
Icelandic Met Office and University of Iceland Þórður Arason (Ed.) 
 
Based on 
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Seismic, GPS, Hydrology, Radar, Webcam, PIREP, visual observations 
 
Eruption plume 
 
Height (a.s.l.) 
No plume was detected by radar (detection limit above 1 km) and 
webcam indicated low level gases and steam from lava fountains 
during the night. 
 
Heading 
No plume now, but winds were about 10 m/s from SE during the night. 
 
Colour 
No plume now. 
 
Tephra fallout 
No tephra fall now. 
 
Lightning 
No lightning during eruption according to ATDnet of the UK Met Office 
and WWLLN-system. 
 
Noise 
None. 
 
Meltwater 
 
The eruption was 5 km N of the glacier, therefore without a jökulhlaup. 
No indication of changes in water flow in rivers. The conductivity still 
remains at the same high level as in the previous days. The size of the 
cauldrons recently observed on the glacier has been estimated to be 
30-40 million m3, but not clear where the meltwater has gone. 
 
Conditions at eruption site 
 
At 00:02 UTC signs of a lava eruption were detected on web camera 
images from Mila. The web-camera is located at Vaðalda, north-east of 
the eruption site. Around midnight, weak signs of increased tremor 
were apparent on IMO’s seismic stations near to the eruption site. At 
00:20 UTC scientists in the field from the Icelandic Met Office, Institute 
of Earth Sciences and Cambridge University confirmed the location of 
the eruption. The eruption occurred on an old volcanic fissure on the 
Holuhraun lava field, about 5 km north of the Dyngjujökull ice margin. 
The active fissure was about 600 m in length. A small amount of lava 
drained from the fissure and by around 04:00 UTC, lava flow is thought 
to have stopped. According to seismic data and web-camera imagery, 
the eruption peaked between 00:40 and 01:00 UTC. Aerial 
observations by the Icelandic Coastguard show that only steam is rising 
from the site of the lava eruption. Location of eruption site is at 64°52'N, 
16°50'W. 
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Seismic tremor 
Weak eruption tremor seen after midnight that diminished with the 
eruption. No signs of tremor now. 
 
Earthquakes 
At the beginning of the eruption, seismic activity decreased, although 
seismicity has since returned to levels observed in recent days. An 
earthquake (4.8) occurred at 11:15 and another (5.2) at 
12:21, both on the N-rim of the Bárðarbunga caldera. 
 
GPS deformation 
The most recent GPS measurements from stations at Dyngjuháls and 
Kverkfjöll indicate continuation of magma flowing into the dike. A new 
GPS station has been set up north of Vonarskarð. In the following days, 
three new stations will be installed: one at Urðarháls and two south of 
Askja, on either side of the dike. 
 
Overall assessment 
At this moment it is unclear how the situation will develop. However, 
three scenarios are considered most likely: * The migration of magma 
could stop, resulting in a gradual reduction in seismic activity and no 
further eruptions. * The dike could reach the Earth’s surface north of 
Dyngjujökull causing another eruption, possibly on a new fissure. Such 
an eruption could include lava flow and (or) explosive activity. * The 
intrusion reaches the surface and an eruption occurs again where 
either the fissure is partly or entirely beneath Dyngjujökull. This would 
most likely produce a flood in Jökulsá á Fjöllum and perhaps explosive, 
ash-producing activity. At 10:00 UTC, IMO changed the Aviation Colour 
Code for Bárðarbunga to ‘orange’, signifying that significant emission of 
ash into the atmosphere is unlikely. The aviation colour-code for the 
Askja volcano remains at ‘yellow’. Other scenarios cannot be excluded. 
For example, an eruption inside the Bárdarbunga caldera. 
 
 
6.2: Daily factsheet - 26th September 2014 
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